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SUPREME STALEMATES: CHALICES, JACK-O’-LANTERNS,
AND OTHER STATE HIGH COURT TIEBREAKERS

DON R. WILLETT†
High courts + high stakes = high drama. But not always. As the Supreme Court’s
2015 Term showed, some bombshell cases fizzle rather than dazzle. During the
fourteen months it took for Justice Antonin Scalia’s successor to arrive at One First
Street, some of the Term’s most controversial—and consequential—cases divided 4–
4. And when the highest court in the land deadlocks, it issues a dry, nine-word order:
“The judgment is aﬃrmed by an equally divided Court.” Supreme stalemate.
That anticlimactic result isn’t inevitable. Indeed, thirty-three states reject
SCOTUS’s “ties happen” approach, using various substitute-justice mechanisms to
avert or break legal logjams when their high court is shorthanded. The anti-stalemate
states diﬀer in four important ways: (1) when fill-in appointments are made; (2) who
can be appointed; (3) who does the appointing; and (4) how much discretion the
appointer has. In Louisiana, for example, the court clerk randomly plucks a
potentially tiebreaking justice’s name, pre-deadlock, from a plastic Halloween Jacko’-Lantern. In Texas, the Governor handpicks the temporary justice, post-deadlock,
knowing exactly which case has stymied the high court. Imagine the President of the
United States deciding Bush v. Gore by deciding who will decide it!
This Article, based on original survey research, canvasses impasse resolution in
all fifty states’ high courts and evaluates the good, bad, and in-between of the sundry
approaches. How do unsatisfying SCOTUS stalemates compare with what happens
in state courts of last resort? High-court snarl-ups are a vexing issue, and the stateby-state details vary widely—and wildly. But this much is clear: Some state
mechanisms to avoid stalemate are plainly more juris-imprudent than others.
† Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. For their careful readings and
helpful revisions, I thank Mitu Gulati, Evan Young, Ben Aguiñaga, Matt Fisher, Ari Herbert,
Brittany Bull, Nicholaus Mills, Alexa Gervasi, Michael Cotton, Cristina Squiers, Hope Garber,
Colleen O’Leary, and Abigail Frisch.
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INTRODUCTION
I was in Atlanta for a symposium on Supreme Court transparency when
the shocking news arrived in a terse Twitter direct message: “Scalia dead.”
For a generation of legal conservatives, the February 2016 death of Justice
Antonin Scalia was a devastating philosophical loss. A towering intellectual
ﬁgure, Justice Scalia was the undisputed godfather of the Court’s conservative
invigoration. His passing portended a seismic, once-in-a-generation altering
of the High Court’s ideological balance.
The impact was not just philosophical, but practical. Justice Scalia’s seat
remained empty for 422 days, the longest-ever opening on the nine-member
Court. The Nation’s capital was consumed with fractious DEFCON-1 rancor,
ampliﬁed by the impending presidential election, and Justice Scalia’s
successor had to await President Obama’s successor.1
1 Soon after Justice Scalia’s passing, two constitutional scholars examined the Court’s various
eight-justice rosters since World War II and concluded that the Court, while “in a tough spot,” had
weathered such vacancies before and “managed its docket without a hitch.” Josh Blackman & Ilya
Shapiro, Only Eight Justices? So What, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 24, 2016, 7:01 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/only-eight-justices-so-what-1456272088 [https://perma.cc/9LT3-CKR7]
(noting also that only twenty-five of fifty-four reargued cases ended up 5–4). The Court, they said,
would not “grind to a halt” but “can easily handle the current vacancy, however long it lasts.” Id. The
most likely result, they predicted: delayed rulings in a handful of cases. Id. Supreme Court justices
from both the left and right appeared to agree. Two uniquely qualified authorities, Justices Breyer
and Alito, similarly remarked that the Court would not be unduly hamstrung in its work. “We’ll miss
him, but we’ll do our work,” said Justice Breyer. Jon Schuppe, Supreme Court’s Breyer Says Scalia’s Death
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Political stalemate in turn yielded judicial stalemate. Because SCOTUS has
no tiebreaking mechanism, divisive cases either lock up 4–4 (thus affirming the
lower court), linger until a new justice arrives, or resolve in ways that duck the
more nettlesome issues. Here, a single indefinite vacancy left the Court evenly
divided in several cases, producing 4–4 nondecisions that resolved nothing.2
Fast forward to 2020, when the passing of another legal giant, Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, sparked an even fiercer confirmation fracas. For the second
presidential election in a row, the Court instantly became a major campaign
issue. This time, the stakes were even higher (the prospect of a 6–3 conservative
supermajority), and the election even nearer (just forty-six days away). Leading
Democrats openly spoke of “packing” the Supreme Court (expanding its size
for the first time since 1869) if they captured the White House and Senate.3
But put aside Court packing—adding seats in hopes of inﬂuencing the
Court’s decisions. What about Court hacking? Not addition but inﬁltration.
What if a politician could singlehandedly engineer the outcome of a case?
Speciﬁcally, what if the President could name a ﬁll-in justice to cast a
tiebreaking vote in a single case? Imagine if President Obama (while the
“Scalia seat” sat unﬁlled) or President Trump (had the “Ginsburg seat”
remained unﬁlled) had possessed the extraordinary power to appoint a

Won’t Impact Most Votes, NBC (Feb. 25, 2016, 4:13 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/supreme-court-s-breyer-says-scalia-s-death-won-t-n525856 [https://perma.cc/HUA2-ZHQ5].
“We will deal with it,” replied Justice Alito when asked about Senate Republicans’ determination not
to advance any nominee during the 2016 election year. Alito: Supreme Court Will Find a Way to Do Its
Work with 8 Justices, CBS (Feb. 26, 2016, 4:26 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/alito-supremecourt-will-find-a-way-to-do-its-work-with-8-justices [https://perma.cc/55LX-AWLV]; but see Katie
Reilly, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Suggests Senate Should Confirm Merrick Garland in Lame-Duck Session, TIME
(Oct. 12, 2016, 4:22 PM), https://time.com/4527889/ruth-bader-ginsburg-merrick-garlandconfirmation [https://perma.cc/U8AM-BV8M] (“Eight is not a good number for a collegial body that
sometimes disagrees.”).
2 Even before Justice Scalia’s passing, the Court was at risk of deadlock over a recurring
controversy: the constitutionality of racial preferences in college admissions. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex.
at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (considering an eight-year-old case making its second trip to the High
Court). Justice Kagan recused herself, likely given her work on the case while serving as Solicitor
General. Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students (Sponsored by Bloomberg Law): Justice Kagan’s
Recusals, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 9, 2012, 9:50 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2012/10/scotus-for-lawstudents-sponsored-by-bloomberg-law-justice-kagans-recusals
[https://perma.cc/PS6W-H7AZ]
(suggesting reasons for Justice Kagan’s recusal). A Kagan-less Court might have split 4–4 over racebased admissions, but after Justice Scalia died, the Court proceeded with seven justices and divided 4–
3 in favor of racial preferences. Fisher, 136 S. Ct. 2198.
3 See Emily Jacobs, Top Democrats threaten to pack Supreme Court if Trump Fills RBG Seat, NY
POST (Sept. 21, 2020, 8:13 AM), https://nypost.com/2020/09/21/top-democrats-threaten-to-packsupreme-court-if-trump-ﬁlls-seat [https://perma.cc/CH7G-BZX5] (reporting on Democratic
support for court packing) (quoting, among others, Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, House
Judiciary Chairman Jerrold Nadler, and former U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder).
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substitute justice to break 4–4 deadlocks.4 How would that strike our ﬁnicky
Framers, who preferred to divide power rather than concentrate it? Such
singular clout seems unthinkable. One might hope, however naively, that a
President would nobly refuse to game the system by naming a “sure thing”
temporary justice. But could any ﬂesh-and-blood politician, if given such an
extraordinary prerogative, withstand the lure of putting a ﬁnger (or an anvil)
on the scale, deciding the case by deciding who will decide the case?
Consider this Mother of All Hypotheticals: Bush v. Gore, with President
Clinton (a Democrat) selecting a tiebreaking justice to decide whether
George W. Bush (the Republican candidate) or Al Gore (his own vice
president) will succeed him. Or recall Spring 2012 when the Court was ﬁrst
weighing the constitutional fate of President Obama’s signature domestic
achievement, the Aﬀordable Care Act.5 Assume that Justice Elena Kagan,
who was Solicitor General when the ACA was debated and passed and whose
oﬃce was involved in litigation strategy, had recused herself.6 Presumably,
the High Court would’ve deadlocked 4–4. Under a President-picks tiebreaker
system, President Obama would’ve had the astonishing power to choose who
decided whether the cornerstone of his presidential legacy lived or died.
These hypotheticals may seem outlandish or otherworldly. But that’s
precisely the system used in my home state of Texas. What sounds hysterical
for SCOTUS is historical for SCOTX. When the Supreme Court of Texas
locks up 4–4, the Governor alone chooses a temporary, one-case-only
tiebreaking justice.7 More remarkable, the Governor knows not just that a case
is tied, but which case is tied. As a constitutional matter, the Governorship of
Texas is relatively weak.8 But this perk is unparalleled. No other Governor in
America boasts such unilateral power—carte blanche license to, essentially,
decide an identifiable supreme court case by handpicking the tiebreaking vote.9
4 Justice Ginsburg’s successor, Justice Barrett, was swiftly confirmed. But the temporarily
shorthanded Court did split 4–4 in an important election case, thus affirming a ruling from the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court that had extended the deadline for counting some mailed ballots.
See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Tie Gives Pennsylvania More Time to Tally Some Votes (Nov. 4,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/19/us/supreme-court-pennsylvania-voting.html
[https://perma.cc/XVC4-4UNS].
5 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
6 See Wermiel, supra note 2.
7 See infra Subsection II.B.2.b.
8 See,
e.g., Paul Burka, The Terminator, TEXAS MONTHLY (Dec. 2009),
https://www.texasmonthly.com/politics/the-terminator [https://perma.cc/29V6-AUFG] (“[T]he state
constitution of 1876 . . . established the governorship as a weak office with few powers . . . .”); accord Harold
H. Bruff, Separation of Powers Under the Texas Constitution, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1337, 1339 (1990) (recounting that
the constitutional convention “fragmented the executive branch by providing for a weak governor”).
9 See infra Section II.B; Appendix A. Texas boasts innumerable sources of Lone Star pride:

Intrepidity at the Alamo; entering the United States as the Republic of Texas; ﬁftyeight Texas-born recipients of the Medal of Honor; Bob Wills and George Strait;
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In Washington, D.C., things operate diﬀerently. The United States
Supreme Court is famously tiebreaker-free. As the Court put it a century and
a half ago: “No aﬃrmative action can be had in a cause where the judges are
equally divided in opinion as to the judgment to be rendered or order to be
made.”10 While federal district and circuit courts freely enlist ﬁll-in judges as
needed, no analog exists for ﬁlling a temporary SCOTUS vacancy. In fact,
federal law ﬂatly forbids it.11 When the High Court deadlocks 4–4 (or 3–3, as
happened in 1792, when the Court ﬁrst split down the middle),12 the lowercourt judgment is automatically, procedurally, perfunctorily aﬃrmed. With
nine bland words, the case is nulled, exactly as if the Court had never granted
certiorari in the ﬁrst place: “The judgment is aﬃrmed by an equally divided
Court.”13 In other words, “a tie goes to the Respondent.”14
A 4–4 nondecision, though hailed by the party that won below, carries the
aura of failure. Failure to decide. Failure to guide. Failure to “get the conﬂict
resolved,” as Justice John Paul Stevens put it.15 When certiorari is granted at
SCOTUS, it means the issue was deemed signiﬁcant by at least four justices
who wanted to settle it. Briefs were submitted. Oral argument was held.
Another cert petition that might have been granted was denied to make room
for this one. True, the issue may recur, and the Court may not be shorthanded
when it does. But for the foreseeable future, a 4–4 draw maroons the
undecided issue on an island of legal confusion, where it lingers, unsettled,
squandering untold public and private resources, lost in “the repeating loop
of intercircuit conﬂicts.”16

Nolan Ryan and Babe Didrikson Zaharias; ﬁve Super Bowl titles (sadly, none this
millennium); Dr Pepper and the “little creamery” in Brenham; deep-fried anything at
the State Fair; a spirit of daring and rugged independence . . . .
In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 378 (Tex. 2011) (Willett, J., dissenting). But the Lone Star State’s
anomalous approach to breaking high court ties does not make the list.
10 Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107, 110 (1868).
11 28 U.S.C. § 294(d) (authorizing retired federal judges to assist in various federal courts but
stating “[n]o such designation or assignment shall be made to the Supreme Court”). Subsection (d)
does not explicitly bar retired SCOTUS Justices from sitting by designation on their former Court,
but the implied prohibition is widely accepted.
12 Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792); see also Thomas E. Baker, Why We Call the
Supreme Court “Supreme”—A Case Study on the Importance of Settling the National Law, 4 GREEN BAG
2D 129, 130 (2001) (citing Hayburn’s Case as the ﬁrst equally divided Court).
13 See, e.g., Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, 562 U.S. 40, 41 (2010) (per curiam) (“Justice
Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.”), aﬀ ’g by an equally divided court 541
F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008).
14 Baker, supra note 12, at 130.
15 Lisa T. McElroy & Michael C. Dorf, Coming Off the Bench: Legal and Policy Implications of
Proposals to Allow Retired Justices to Sit by Designation on the Supreme Court, 61 DUKE L.J. 81, 91 n.39 (2011).
16 Baker, supra note 12, at 131.
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Sure, if shorthandedness results not from a recusal but from a vacancy, the
Court can simply order reargument once it regains full strength.17 Reargument
is common. But if deadlock stems from a recusal, the lower-court decision
persists, yielding finality (of a sort) to the parties but not to the People, for
whom legal clarity must await another day, and possibly quite a far-off day.
The rule of aﬃrmance by an equally divided Court is entirely judge-made.
Nothing in positive law—constitutional, statutory, or otherwise—requires it,
although Congress has tacitly accepted it.18 Unlike the cert-granting Rule of
Four, which “has become interwoven in the warp and woof of the
jurisdictional statutes,”19 the rule of implicit aﬃrmance is an internal
housekeeping tradition. But it is a longstanding one, ﬁrst appearing in 1792,
when the Court divided 3–3 on a motion,20 and formally adopted in 1825.21
By contrast, state high courts are less hidebound, and, frankly, more
consequential. SCOTUS may be the highest court in the land (at least on
federal-law matters).22 “For most Americans,” however, “Lady Justice lives in
the halls of state courts.”23 “Day by day, American justice is dispensed—
overwhelmingly—in state, not federal, judiciaries.”24 As Justice Scalia once
observed, state law (and thus state courts) matter far more to citizens’
everyday lives: “If you ask which court is of the greatest importance to an
American citizen, it is not my court.”25 And when it comes to avoiding high
court stalemate, most states reject SCOTUS’s “nonprecedent” precedent.
This Article examines an ignored area of judicial administration: impasseavoidance mechanisms in state courts of last resort. Using original survey data
covering every state in the nation, plus interviews with key judicial and
17 This is what happened, for example, following Justice Robert Jackson’s sudden death in 1954
and Justice Lewis Powell’s retirement in 1987. See Blackman & Shapiro, supra note 1 (noting also
that only twenty-ﬁve of ﬁfty-four reargued cases ended up 5–4).
18 See Edward A. Hartnett, Ties in the Supreme Court of the United States, 44 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 643, 646, 651-52 (2002) (analyzing 28 U.S.C. § 2109, which suggests Congress “presupposed
the existence of the rule of aﬃrmance by an equally divided Court”).
19 Baker, supra note 12, at 130.
20 Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792); see also Baker, supra note 12, at 130.
21 The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 67 (1825) (“Where the Court is equally divided, the
decree of the Court below is of course aﬃrmed, so far as the point of division goes.”). As Chief
Justice Marshall explained the following Term in Etting v. Bank of the United States, “the principles
of law which have been argued cannot be settled; but the judgment is aﬃrmed, the Court being
divided in opinion upon it.” 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 59, 78 (1826).
22 See generally JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING
OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2018).
23 John Schwartz, Critics Say Budget Cuts for Courts Risk Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/27/us/budget-cuts-for-state-courts-risk-rights-critics-say.html
[https://perma.cc/7F3G-4KW6] (quoting former Colorado Supreme Court Justice Rebecca Love Kourlis).
24 Thompson v. Dall. City Att’y’s Oﬀ., 913 F.3d 464, 471 (5th Cir. 2019).
25 See Justice Scalia Honors U.S. Constitution, GW TODAY (Sept. 18, 2013),
https://gwtoday.gwu.edu/justice-scalia-honors-us-constitution [https://perma.cc/RXU4-77T2].
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gubernatorial oﬃcials, the Article takes an approach generally more
descriptive than normative.
In short, states respond to tie-vote situations in eclectic ways.26 Seventeen
states emulate SCOTUS. If the high court splits evenly, the lower-court
judgment stands.27 But thirty-ﬁve courts reject SCOTUS’s “ties happen”
approach. These anti-stalemate states all use a temporary ﬁll-in justice,
though the state-by-state details vary in four fundamental ways:
1. When a temporary justice is appointed, pre- or post-deadlock: Twenty-four
states name a substitute justice as soon as the court dips below full strength,
while eleven courts wait until a tie emerges before naming someone.
2. Who is eligible for appointment: In thirty-two state high courts, the
replacement justice must be a jurist; in three courts, others are also eligible.
3. Who does the appointing: In twenty-three courts, the Chief Justice
names the substitute justice; in seven, the court does so; and in four, the
Governor steps in.
4. How much discretion the appointer has: Some methods are rote and
mechanical. For example, in fun-loving Louisiana, the clerk draws a name
from a plastic Halloween Jack-o’-Lantern.28 In more urbane Washington
State, they use an elegant chalice.29 In other states, the appointer has
unfettered discretion, sometimes provoking cries of abuse.
This Article proceeds in four parts:
• Part I discusses the myriad costs inﬂicted by unbroken ties in courts
of last resort (and at least some costs of breaking ties).
• Part II comprehensively examines how America’s various high
courts—not just SCOTUS—resolve, or refuse to resolve, evenly divided
votes. In particular, it examines why SCOTUS has never had any tiebreaking
mechanisms, and then looks in some detail at how diﬀerent states tackle
supreme court deadlock.
• Part III evaluates the vices of divergent tiebreaking systems used in
state courts of last resort.
• Part IV, drawing on these broad experiences, proposes a more
sensible approach for breaking high-court impasse, focusing on my home
state of Texas, which has perhaps the most disquieting method of all.
Through this comprehensive analysis, I hope to spark fruitful
reconsideration—perhaps even recalibration—in state capitals across America.

See infra subsection II.A.2; Appendix A.
Some of these states actually have a substitute-justice mechanism but never invoke it to
break ties, e.g., New Jersey. See infra notes 414-423 and accompanying text.
28 See infra Section II.B.
29 See id.
26
27
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I. THE TROUBLE WITH DEADLOCK
In law as in life, ties can be deeply unsatisfying. Rabid football fans would
self-immolate outside National Football League headquarters on Park
Avenue if the Super Bowl ended in a soulless tie. Indeed, the icon after whom
the Lombardi Trophy is named reportedly said, “Winning isn’t everything;
it’s the only thing.”30 Participation trophies are ubiquitous in youth sports,
but grown-up championships distinguish victor and victim. Game seven of
the World Series would never end in a dismal 4–4 tie.31 But America’s other
national pastime—suing people—can end that way. It’s the legal equivalent
of the infamous cut-to-black ending of The Sopranos, when irate HBO
subscribers thought their cable had been whacked; no bang or whimper,
just . . . nothingness.
What is the raison d’être for courts? Krispy Kreme exists to make
decadent, melt-in-your-mouth donuts. Lamborghini exists to make
audacious, 0-to-60-in-under-3-seconds supercars. But what about the
inscrutable judiciary, steeped in pomp and majesty with velvet curtains, black
robes, mysterious Latin phrases? What’s its bottom-line business, speciﬁcally
courts of last resort? There’s no consensus answer:
“To decide cases.”

—Justice Byron White, U.S. Supreme Court32

“Courts exist to do justice, to guarantee liberty, to enhance social order, to resolve
disputes, to maintain rule of law, to provide for equal protection, and to ensure
due process of law. They exist so the equality of individuals and the government
is reality rather than empty rhetoric.”
—National Association for Court Management33
I side with no-nonsense Justice White. Courts, including high courts, are
in the case-deciding business. They render decisions. And decisions rendered
30

Beau Dure, Winning Isn’t Everything; It’s the Only Thing. Right?, GUARDIAN (Sept. 24, 2015,
5:00
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2015/sep/24/winning-everything-sports
[https://perma.cc/AWD7-R7Y7].
31 At least not since 1885, when the second baseball world championship ended in a 3-3-1 tie,
forcing St. Louis and Chicago to split the $1000 prize. Victor Mather, Not Again: Chicago and St.
Louis
Met
in
1885
and
1886
Playoﬀ,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
9,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/10/sports/baseball/not-again-chicago-and-st-louis-met-in-1885and-1886-playoﬀ.html [https://perma.cc/5D6V-X3LL].
32 Charles Lane and Bart Barnes, Longtime Justice Byron White Dies, THE WASHINGTON POST
(Apr. 16, 2002), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/04/16/longtime-justicebyron-white-dies/a5c2335a-81d8-4eb4-8696-1cc061a8b9f0 [https://perma.cc/8HUV-SU23].
33 Purposes and Responsibilities of Courts: Why Courts Exist, Nat’l Ass’n for Ct. Mgmt.,
https://nacmcore.org/competency/purposes-and-responsibilities [https://perma.cc/8XTX-43J7].
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by courts of last resort have precedential eﬀect across their entire jurisdiction,
which (one hopes) advances the noble virtues and institutional goals that
NACM identiﬁes above.
The decisions themselves do the bread-and-butter work of providing
guidance, resolving uncertainties, and clarifying what the law prescribes and
proscribes. On the federal level, the Framers of Article III commendably
aimed for uniformity when they created “one supreme Court.”34 Courts of
last resort, both state and federal, have an irreplaceable function: to settle the
law.35 But no court can do that except by issuing decisions that declare both
result and rationale.36
Stalemate, while infrequent,37 subverts the fundamental—and
institutional—purpose of a supreme court: to be supreme and to speak
supremely. Just as tech lovers once camped outside the Apple store because
they craved the newest iGadget, law lovers frantically click “refresh” on
SCOTUSblog because they too want a product: the latest U.S. Supreme
Court declaration of what the law is. The decision is the prize because it
provides what matters—who won, who lost, and why. The ruling rules.
A 4–4 tie produces a winner but no precedent; it resolves the case but not the
issue. All that time, money, and energy—by the litigants and by the Court itself—
with nothing to show for it. Such wheel spinning impairs the Court’s indispensable
role in resolving lower-court conflicts and ensuring national uniformity.

34 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton) (“To
produce uniformity in [judicial] determinations; they ought to be submitted in the last resort to one
supreme tribunal.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (examining the judiciary in the
proposed constitution).
35 Baker, supra note 12, at 129 (describing Justice Brandeis’s appreciation of the Supreme
Court’s unique responsibility to settle law). As Justice Brandeis famously put it, “It is usually more
important that a rule of law be settled, than that it be settled right.” Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273
U.S. 34, 42 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). He once told Justice Frankfurter, “In ordinary
cases . . . you want certainty and deﬁniteness and it doesn’t matter terribly how you decide so long
as it is settled.” PHILIPPA STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS—JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 366 (1984).
36 Some states have slightly modiﬁed this doctrine by authorizing—under carefully controlled
circumstances—what is anathema (indeed, an epithet) to all federal and most state courts: advisory
opinions. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID
L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 58
(7th ed. 2015) (describing how some state courts may render advisory opinions when, for example,
formally requested by the state legislature). But such a situation only highlights my larger point—a
tie in an advisory opinion is especially worthless, akin to a doctor telling you that you are at death’s
door or perfectly healthy, without deciding between those options.
37 See Ryan Black & Lee Epstein, Recusals and the “Problem” of an Equally Divided Supreme Court,
7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 75, 92 (2005) (ﬁnding an average of approximately 0.65 4–4 splits per
Term from 1986 to 2003); see also McElroy & Dorf, supra note 15, at 94 (2011) (“In recent years, the
Court has, on average, decided fewer than one case per term by a 4–4 vote as a result of a recusal.”).
Indeed, the Court is not often seriously shorthanded. Between 1946 and 2003, “at least eight Justices
participated in almost 97 percent of the Court’s cases.” Id. at 98 n.72.
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Indeed, the mere prospect of deadlock—or more accurately, the absence
of a needed ﬁfth vote—alters litigant behavior. As the head of a D.C.-based
association of corporate lawyers put it, “to assess risk, the business
community likes to expect stability.”38 In the wake of Justice Scalia’s sudden
death, some fretted openly about a divided, Scalia-less Court. For example,
Dow Chemical swiftly reassessed its risk in a then-pending class-action case
and opted to cut its losses, settling the case because it was unsettled about the
Court. Said the corporate spokeswoman: “With this changing landscape, the
unknowns, we just decided to put this behind us.”39 Courts exist to provide
certainty, and the specter of stalemate haunts those craving predictability.
Call it adjudication recalibration. Risk-averse businesses doubtless believed a
Scalia-less Court was less likely to restrict class-action suits.40 And since a
Supreme Court loss ripples from sea to shining sea, they thought it better to
stand down than risk defeat.
High-court impasse lands with a soul-crushing thud. The Kentucky
Supreme Court put it plainly: “This Court’s responsibility is to decide all
cases presented to it in an orderly and just fashion; a case aﬃrmed by an
equally divided court without opinion is not a quality decision by any stretch
of the imagination and would limit this Court’s responsibility.”41 This policy
has since been rescinded, however.42 It is no surprise that tie votes produce
“some unhappy parties,” as the clerk of the Iowa Supreme Court
understatedly put it.43 The North Carolina Supreme Court clerk agrees:
“Parties and litigants are not happy”44—or, at least, the parties who sought
the court’s now-denied review are not happy. One New Jersey group

38 Joshua Jamerson & Brent Kendall, Scalia’s Vacancy Could Leave Companies at a Loss, WALL
ST. J. (Feb. 26, 2016, 8:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/dow-chemical-settles-lawsuit-citingsupreme-court-position-after-scalias-death-1456491317 [https://perma.cc/M56G-6TCR].
39 Id.
40 Cf. Jonathan H. Adler, What Happened When Merrick Garland Wrote for Himself, WASH.
POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (March 21, 2016, 11:07 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/03/21/what-happened-when-merrick-garland-wrote-for-himself
[https://perma.cc/D2KP-HKET] (describing some diﬀerences between the late Justice Scalia and
President Obama’s nominee to replace him); see also, e.g., Aaron L. Nielson, D.C. Circuit Review—
Reviewed: Brooding Spirits, C.J. Garland Edition, YALE J. REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (March 16,
2016),
https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/d-c-circuit-review-reviewed-brooding-spirits-c-j-garlandedition-by-aaron-nielson [https://perma.cc/XCS4-LK7Q] (collecting opinions in which Chief Judge
Garland wrote separately).
41 Ky. Utils. Co. v. S.E. Coal Co., 836 S.W.2d 407, 410 app. (Ky. 1992).
42 See infra note 154
43 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Donna Humpal, Clerk, Iowa Sup. Ct. (Oct.
2015-Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle with author).
44 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Christie Roeder, Clerk, N.C. Sup. Ct. (Oct.
2015-Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle with author).
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editorialized that tie votes “are not good for either litigants or the Court as
an institution.”45
Even so, it bears noting that some are untroubled by deadlock—or, at the
very least, less troubled by deadlock than by the mechanisms for resolving
deadlock. For example, some may fret that breaking a high-court tie using a
non-high-court judge heightens the risk of error and of destabilizing precedent.
Although averting impasse yields instant resolution, that benefit may pale in
comparison to the potential costs of an erroneous resolution of the case or an
erosion of stare decisis. On top of that, is it really that distressing for litigants
to remain stuck with the able, reasoned judgment of the lower court?
As a former state supreme court justice, I dislike judicial deadlock. Many
contemporary legal scholars focus on optimal court structure, assessing how
divergent design characteristics further a court’s goals: impartiality,
independence, efficiency, clarity, accuracy, and consistency.46 But whether these
lofty goals are underscored, or undermined, turns entirely on a court’s ability
to fulfill its fundamental role: to decide cases. For example, some scholars favor
enlarging the U.S. Supreme Court and letting it sit in panels.47 Why? So the
Court can decide more cases, which in turn will further normative goals like
clarity and consistency48 or reduce the power of a “swing” justice and perceived
politicization.49 Scholars may dispute which goals courts should advance, but it
is indisputable that courts can only do so through their decisions. And because
deadlocks dam decisions, it is no wonder that a supermajority of states have
adopted a hodgepodge of procedures to stave off stalemate.
Editorial, Three’s Not a Charm, 201 N.J.L.J. 394 (Aug. 2, 2010).
See, e.g., Nick Robinson, Structure Matters: The Impact of Court Structure on the Indian and U.S.
Supreme Courts, 43 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 173, 175 n.7, 193-95 (2013) (analyzing the impact of court
structure on access, cohesiveness of doctrine, inter-judge relations, and outside perception of the
court); Benjamin R.D. Alarie, Andrew J. Green & Edward M. Iacobucci, Is Bigger Always Better? On
Optimal Panel Size, with Evidence from the Supreme Court of Canada (Univ. Toronto Legal Stud. Rsch.
Paper No. 08-15, 2011) (examining the structure of a variety of international high courts and
proposing a model for determining optimal court panel size); F. Andrew Hessick & Samuel P.
Jordan, Setting the Size of the Supreme Court, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 645 (2009) (discussing the interaction
between size and performance of the Supreme Court, and suggesting reconsideration of the Court’s
size to better achieve institutional goals); Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Remaking the United
States Supreme Court in the Courts’ of Appeals Image, 58 DUKE L.J. 1439 (2009) (proposing several
changes to the Supreme Court, including an increase in the size of the Court’s membership).
47 See George & Guthrie, supra note 46, at 1457 (suggesting that Congress should authorize
ﬁfteen Supreme Court Justices to allow for panels of three); see also Jonathan Turley, Unpacking the
Court: The Case for Expansion of the United States Supreme Court in the Twenty-First Century, 33(3)
PERSP. ON POL. SCI. 155, 155 (2004) (arguing for an expansion of the Supreme Court to nineteen
justices but not the use of panels).
48 George & Guthrie, supra note 46, at 1442 (arguing that panel hearings would allow the
Supreme Court to hear more cases without compromising outcomes).
49 Turley, supra note 47, at 157 (arguing that the prevalence of 5–4 Supreme Court decisions
suggests that more power is concentrated in one or two “swing justices”).
45
46
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Every state high court is odd. That is, while state courts of last resort have
different numbers of justices—five (18), seven (28), nine (6)50—all 50 states have
an odd number of justices, with one self-evident upside: avoiding deadlock.51

Powered by Bing
© GeoNames, Microsoft, TomTom

Figure 1: Number of Justices on State High Courts
Black: 9 justices, 6 states; Dark gray: 7 justices, 28 states; Light gray: 5 justices, 18 states
(Oklahoma’s civil high court has nine justices and the criminal high court has ﬁve)

Judicial vacancies do not slam shut the courthouse doors; the work of the
court continues. But in discrete cases, vacancies can hobble a court. As a
justice of the ﬁve-member Indiana Supreme Court aptly noted in response
to a recusal motion, “the moving parties can do the appellate math and know
that in the event of my recusal, they would only have to convince two judges
to prevail, leaving the Court split and winning the tie.”52
50 See infra Appendix A. The total is 52 because, in Texas’s and Oklahoma’s dual systems, each
state has two high courts. Id. In these two states with bifurcated high courts, the only court that
doesn’t have nine justices is Oklahoma’s ﬁve-member Court of Criminal Appeals. Id.
51 The U.S. Supreme Court began as a six-member Court and endured several changes to its
size until ﬁnally settling at nine in 1869. See Robinson, supra note 46 (discussing the early years of
the Supreme Court and the ﬂuctuating number of justices). While an odd-numbered body seems
obviously preferable, many common law courts—the King’s Bench, the Court of Common Pleas,
and the Court of the Exchequer—operated for centuries with four judges each. See John V. Orth,
How Many Judges Does It Take to Make a Supreme Court?, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 681, 686 (2002).
52 Ind. Gas Co. v. Ind. Fin. Auth., 992 N.E.2d 678, 682 (Ind. 2013) (Massa, J., denying motion
for disqualiﬁcation). The peril is most acute, however, not when a court faces equal division resulting
from a single vacancy, but incapacitation resulting from multiple vacancies. For example, New York’s
highest court began its 2015 session only seventy-two percent full. The seven-member court had two
vacancies, “a deﬁcit that could potentially aﬀect dozens of cases on the court’s docket.” Colby
Hamilton, Court of Appeals Begins 2015 Two Judges Down, POLITICO (Dec. 30, 2014, 5:55 AM);
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II. STAVING OFF STALEMATE: IMPASSE RESOLUTION IN COURTS OF
LAST RESORT
The nation’s highest court has no mechanism to break 4–4 ties. This “ties
happen” approach isn’t intrinsic to courts of last resort. SCOTUS’s approach
is largely the product of history.53 And in our compand republic, states aren’t
bound to follow SCOTUS’s lead when it comes to deadlock. Indeed, most do
not. Unsurprisingly, in our laboratories of democracy, entrepreneurial states
have adopted innovations galore—ranging from mimicking SCOTUS (and
doing nothing)54 all the way to ceding nearly absolute control to the
Governor, as in Texas.55
A. Ties That Bind: SCOTUS and Seventeen Like-Minded States
1. SCOTUS is Statutorily and Structurally Tied to Ties
The U.S. Supreme Court is a by-the-book, rule-laden institution. For
example, it takes four votes to grant a case56 and ordinarily five to decide a
case—but it takes a quorum of six justices to hear a case.57 Congress set the
six-justice quorum under its broad constitutional authority to enact “all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” the judicial
power.58 A majority of whatever number of justices sits is all that is required
for a decision. So, a 4–2 decision is the tightest majority vote possible because

https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/city-hall/story/2014/12/court-of-appeals-begins-2015two-judges-down-000000 [https://perma.cc/3Z68-RSZU] (describing the process and challenges of
ﬁlling the vacant seats on the New York Court of Appeals). The court needs all ﬁve judges to have
a quorum. Id. Upshot: Any court decision would require four of the ﬁve to agree. Id. If they split 3–
2, the court would have to reargue and re-conference the case after new judges come aboard. Id.
53 See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
54 Id.
55 See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
56 See Joan Maisel Leiman, The Rule of Four, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 975, 981-82 (1957) (quoting
Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary: Hearings Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 75th Cong. 490 (1937)
(statement of Sen. Burton K. Wheeler, reading letter from Chief Just. Hughes)) (outlining the Supreme
Court’s rule that, as Chief Justice Hughes put it, “the petition is always granted if four so vote”).
57 28 U.S.C. § 1 (“The Supreme Court of the United States shall consist of a Chief Justice of
the United States and eight associate justices, any six of whom shall constitute a quorum.”).
58 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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it is a bare majority of a bare quorum.59 The High Court can decide a case 9–
0 or 5–4 or 5–1 or 4–2.60 But not 5–0 or 3–2 or 4–1.
The quorum statute and other rules dictate how cases are decided, but
another rule dictates how cases are not decided. Throughout its history, the
Court never purported to have the authority to allow former justices to sit as
substitutes in order to break a tie, and a New Deal-era statute (a vestige of
President Franklin Roosevelt’s court-packing plan) appears to codify that
practice.61 If the Court deadlocks, so be it. Retired Supreme Court justices
can sit on lower federal courts, but not on their former High Court.62 Justice
Potter Stewart once remarked that it was “no fun to play in the minors after
a career in the major leagues.”63 All the same, Justices Tom Clark, David
Souter, and Sandra Day O’Connor used their comparatively early retirements
to sit often with courts of appeals across the Nation.64
a. Recusal Rules Make SCOTUS Uniquely Vulnerable to Ties
Unlike the Judiciary (or Congress), clear rules govern absence, recusal, or
incapacity in the Executive. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment, ratiﬁed

59 More precisely, the Supreme Court “decides” a case by a majority of those sitting, but by
statute six justices must hear a case for there to be a quorum. Thus, it takes ﬁve to decide a case
when there are eight or nine justices sitting. But if only six or seven justices sit, then any four can
decide it. For example, in the important securities-fraud class-action case Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224 (1988), Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy were recused. The Court
nonetheless decided the case by a 4–2 vote, with Justice Blackmun writing for himself and Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. Justices White and O’Connor dissented. When reconsidering that
precedent a quarter-century later, the majority and an opinion concurring in the judgment fought
over whether Basic was entitled to stare decisis, but neither side even mentioned Basic’s bare quorum
or its four-justice majority, much less suggested that those features made it any less authoritative.
See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 274-77 (2014) (explaining why Basic
was entitled to stare decisis); id. at 297-300 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (disputing the
applicability of stare decisis without questioning the validity of a four-justice decision).
60 See, e.g., Basic, 485 U.S. 224.
61 28 U.S.C. § 294(d) (describing the procedure for designating and assigning retired judges
and justices to sit in lower federal courts but stating that no designations or assignments of lowercourt judges “shall be made to the Supreme Court”); see also McElroy & Dorf, supra note 15, at 83.
62 § 294(d); see also Jess Bravin, Welcome Back, Souter (and O’Connor and Stevens), WALL ST. J.
L. BLOG (Sept. 29, 2010, 2:02 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/09/29/welcome-back-souter-andoconnor-and-stevens [https://perma.cc/NAK7-Q5RX] (“[R]etired justices Sandra Day O[’]Connor
and David Souter help decide mundane disputes before federal circuit courts, but are disqualiﬁed
from the job they know best.”).
63 Jess Bravin, Change of Venue: In Retirement, Justice O’Connor Still Rules, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 11, 2009,
12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124994271588320565 [https://perma.cc/97FU-LL3T].
64 See id. (“As a substitute judge, Justice O’Connor has heard nearly 80 cases and written more
than a dozen opinions.”); Bravin, supra note 62; Tom C. Clark, Former Justice, Dies; On the Supreme
Court for 18 Years, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 1977), https://www.nytimes.com/1977/06/14/archives/tom-cclark-former-justice-dies-on-the-supreme-court-for-18-years.html [https://perma.cc/PYU3-UNP6]
(“He was believed to be the only retired Justice in history to sit on all 11 circuits.”).
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following President Kennedy’s assassination, makes the Vice President the
Acting President when the President is “unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his oﬃce.”65 But the Constitution says nothing about a Supreme
Court justice’s inability to discharge powers and duties, either for a short time
(as with a temporary physical issue) or indeﬁnitely (as with a permanent
mental issue). The only vehicle for forced removal is impeachment.66 And the
lone relevant statutory authority seems to foreclose the temporary
replacement of an absent or recused justice.67
Because these structural conditions make tie votes statistically inevitable,
the Court has had to determine the legal eﬀect of a tie. The rule of aﬃrmance
by an equally divided Court derives from a Latin maxim: semper praesumitur
pro negante—that is, the presumption is always in favor of the one who
denies.68 As Justice Field put it in 1868, “It has long been the doctrine in this
country and in England, where courts consist of several members, that no
aﬃrmative action can be had in a cause where the judges are equally divided
in opinion as to the judgment to be rendered or order to be made.”69 This
ancient principle applies in legislative bodies too.70
The rule of aﬃrmance by an equally divided Court has been criticized by
Professor Thomas Baker as “an internal procedural ﬁnesse . . . not required
by the Constitution or by any statute.”71 He would prefer that “[s]omeone on
the Court [be] willing to compromise and change his or her vote to settle an
important issue and to move the policy question back to Congress.”72
The Court must apply this rule most often when a justice recuses,
typically for one of three reasons: (1) a personal or familial interest in the case
(stock ownership or a close family member who works for a party or law ﬁrm
involved in the case); (2) prior involvement in the case (as a lawyer or lowercourt judge); or (3) a non-case-related need to recuse because of the particular

U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, §§ 3, 4.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall
hold their Oﬃces during good Behaviour . . . .”).
67 28 U.S.C. § 294(d) (providing for the substitution of retired judges to the courts of appeals and
district courts but stating that “[n]o such designation or assignment shall be made to the Supreme Court”).
68 AMERICAN LEGAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://lawi.us/semper-praesumitur-pro-negante
[https://perma.cc/NSF7-R8UX] (last visited Dec. 2, 2020).
69 Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107, 110 (1868).
70 See Saul Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority Decisionmaking, and the Voting Paradox, 75 VA.
L. REV. 971, 974 (1989) (tracing the principle back to Aeschylus’ Eumenides, where Athena’s vote to
acquit might have created a tie vote, a scene “plainly meant to signal the beginning of both
democracy and the reign of law”); id. at 1010 (explaining that legislation cannot pass under a tie vote
“because of the ancient rule that a motion needs a majority to pass”).
71 Baker, supra note 12, at 130.
72 Id. (arguing that the justices “failed” their “institutional responsibility to administer the
national law” by dividing equally in Free v. Abbott Lab’ys, Inc., 592 U.S. 333 (2000)).
65
66
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issue the case raises.73 Recusal for illness or other reasons is also possible, but
as described below, 4–4 ties are rare in those circumstances.
The ﬁrst category (personal or familial interest) is the clearest and subject
to the most objective rules. Its application is harsh—owning a single share of
a stock will trigger recusal.74 But it often is also remediable. Federal judges
who initially recuse from a case sometimes return to the bench, for example,
if they sell the stock that necessitated the recusal.75
The second category (prior involvement in the case) typically affects justices
only early in their tenures.76 For example, justices promoted to the Supreme
Court from circuit courts typically recuse themselves from cases (including at
the certiorari stage) that had been pending before their previous courts, while
they were judges there. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor,
Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett were promoted to the Supreme Court from
federal circuit courts. Once they became justices, they followed this practice of
recusal.77 With each passing Term, the need for such recusals diminished.
Justices coming from the Executive Branch face even greater recusal
obligations. For example, Justice Thurgood Marshall, former Second Circuit
Judge and U.S. Solicitor General, recused himself in ﬁfty-seven percent of
cases decided in his ﬁrst Term on the Court.78 More recently, Justice Kagan,
73 See generally 28 U.S.C. § 455; Louis J. Virelli III, Congress, the Constitution, and Supreme Court
Recusal, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1535, 1547 (2012) (describing recusal in practice as being within
the judge’s discretion).
74 § 455(d)(4) (“‘[F]inancial interest’ means ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however
small . . . .” (emphasis added)); An Open Discussion with Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1033,
1038 (2004) [hereinafter Open Discussion] (recalling a case on which she recused until selling her
share in a company).
75 See Open Discussion, supra note 74, at 1038.
76 § 455(b)(2), (3).
77 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (Chief Justice Roberts did not participate
because he was on the panel at the D.C. Circuit in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005));
Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006) (Justice Alito did not participate because he was on the panel
at the Third Circuit in Banks v. Beard, 399 F.3d 134 (3d Cir. 2005)); Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v.
Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011) (Justice Sotomayor did not participate because she was originally
on the panel at the Second Circuit in Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309, 313 n.*
(2d Cir. 2009), though she was elevated to the Supreme Court before a decision was reached there);
Sharp v. Murphy, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) (per curiam) (Justice Gorsuch did not participate in Sharp
because he was on the Tenth Circuit for Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir. 2017); the Court
initially deadlocked, but later resolved the case by relying on McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452
(2020), a case that presented the same issue without the recusal conﬂict); Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 139
S. Ct. 759, 203 L. Ed. 2d 53 (2019) (Justice Kavanaugh recused because he was on the D.C. Circuit
at the time of the challenged decision, Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 860 F.3d 703 (D.C. Cir. 2017)); Walton
v. First Merch.’s Bank, No. 20-311, 2020 WL 7132748 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2020) (Justice Barrett recused
from the denial of rehearing following denial of certiorari, having been on the panel that issued the
challenged Seventh Circuit decision, 820 F. App’x 450 (7th Cir. 2020)).
78 Noah M. Schubert, Replacement Justice on the United States Supreme Court: The Use of
Temporary Justices to Resolve the Recusal Conundrum, 46 UNIV. S.F. L. REV. 215, 218 (2011) (citing Tom
Goldstein, An Update on Recusal, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 3, 2010)). Justice Marshall recused himself
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who also served as Solicitor General, recused herself from roughly one-third
of the Court’s merits cases during her ﬁrst Term.79 In fact, the specter of
frequent recusal was one of the arguments lodged against her conﬁrmation—
that the Court would be short-staﬀed for several high-stakes cases.80 Two 4–
4 splits resulted that Term: (1) a highly anticipated copyright infringement
case involving gray-market goods;81 and (2) the constitutionality of a
citizenship-transmission statute that favored the citizenship claims of
nonmarital children born abroad to U.S.-citizen mothers over U.S.-citizen
fathers.82 Court watchers were disappointed. As to the copyright nondecision,
“The justices’ 4–4 tie left the question unanswered, to the disappointment of
the many people watching the Court and hoping for a deﬁnitive resolution.”83
As to the citizenship case—when the Court gave dads an unwanted “tie” a
week before Father’s Day—many decried “a waste of judicial resources (it
takes a long time and a lot of work for the Court to decide a case) and a wasted
opportunity to make law on a presumably important issue.”84
The third category, while the rarest, can be the most challenging for the
Court as an institution. A need to recuse because of the presence of a
particular issue is not easily cured by selling stock or taking a case from a
diﬀerent party posing no conﬂict, as with the ﬁrst category, nor does it
naturally dissipate after a few early Terms, as with the second. If a justice
must always recuse when a particular issue is raised, and the remaining
justices are evenly divided, this means that the Court will be unable to resolve
the issue at all until either the recusing justice is replaced or another justice’s
replacement takes the opposite view. Justice Scalia, for example, recused
himself in 2004 in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow,85 a case
involving the constitutionality of the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of
Allegiance, after having publicly stated that he disagreed with the Ninth

in sixty-one cases, ﬁfty-three of which were related to his service as solicitor general. See McElroy
& Dorf, supra note 1537, at 96 n.65.
79 McElroy & Dorf, supra note 15, at 82.
80 See Tom Goldstein, Elena Kagan and Recusal—UPDATED, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 18, 2010, 6:20
PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2010/04/elena-kagan-and-recusal [https://perma.cc/M5WW-C9HR].
81 Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 562 U.S. 40 (2011) (per curiam), aﬀ ’g by an equally
divided court 541 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008).
82 Flores-Villar v. United States, 564 U.S. 210 (2011) (per curiam), aﬀ ’g by an equally divided
court 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008).
83 Lisa M. Tittemore, With Supreme Court Deadlock, Cloud Lingers Over Gray Market Goods,
SUNSTEIN, http://sunsteinlaw.com/publications/with-supreme-court-deadlock-cloud-lingers-overgray-market-goods [https://perma.cc/8ALA-8U58].
84 Lisa McElroy, This Week at the Court: In Plain English, SCOTUS BLOG (June 15, 2011,
2:43 PM) http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/06/this-week-at-the-court-in-plain-english-6
[https://perma.cc/S9DG-JCTL].
85 542 U.S. 1, 3 (2004).
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Circuit’s conclusion on the merits of the challenge.86 The remaining justices
resolved the case without a 4–4 split. But they did so without reaching the
merits—instead relying on the nebulous doctrine of “prudential standing.”87
Ties occur in criminal cases, too, with deadlock in death penalty cases the
starkest example. In 2001, the Supreme Court decided Beazley v. Johnson with
a bare six-justice quorum.88 Beazley involved the death of a federal appellate
judge’s father, and three justices recused themselves given their close
relationship with the victim’s son (who had clerked for one justice and assisted
in the conﬁrmation of two others).89 The Court divided 3–3 on whether to
stay the execution pending certiorari, prompting this criticism: “A tie
shouldn’t go to the executioner.”90
Besides recusals, a 4–4 tie is also possible when there’s a lengthy absence
on the Court. A vacancy on the Court sometimes goes unﬁlled for a long
time. Or a justice might take time away for health reasons or for other duties
of unusual importance. For instance:
• Three chief justices have presided over courts of impeachment.91
The first two chief justices were forced to miss sessions of the Court. In fact,
Chief Justice Chase’s absence during the impeachment trial of President
Andrew Johnson was listed as a basis for reargument of the canonical case
Ex parte McCardle.92
• Justice Robert Jackson’s service as chief prosecutor at the Nuremberg
Trials from 1945 to 1946 meant that he was physically absent during a

86 Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court to Consider Case on ‘Under God’ in Pledge to Flag, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 15, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/15/us/supreme-court-to-consider-caseon-under-god-in-pledge-to-ﬂag.html [https://perma.cc/LAJ4-RGCL].
87 Newdow, 542 U.S. at 17-18.
88 533 U.S. 969 (2001) (noting that Justices Scalia, Souter, and Thomas abstained).
89 Raymond Bonner, Three Abstain as Supreme Court Declines to Halt Texas Execution, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 14, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/14/us/three-abstain-as-supreme-courtdeclines-to-halt-texas-execution.html [https://perma.cc/8DRD-7DQP] (quoting George Kendall of
the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund).
90 Id. To be fair, the more accurate description is that a tie goes to whoever doesn’t need the
Court to do anything. Thus, if a lower court stays an execution, and the Supreme Court ties on
whether to lift it, the stay would remain in place, meaning the execution would not proceed.
91 See Frank Bowman, The Role of the Chief Justice in an Impeachment Trial, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan.
10, 2020, 11:18 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/01/the-role-of-the-chief-justice-in-animpeachment-trial [https://perma.cc/A57C-UTL2] (discussing how Chief Justice Salmon Chase
presided over President Andrew Johnson’s impeachment trial, Chief Justice Rehnquist presided over
President Bill Clinton’s impeachment trial, and Chief Justice Roberts presided over President
Donald Trump’s ﬁrst impeachment trial).
92 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 509 (1868) (reporter’s statement of the case) (noting that “the Chief
Justice being detained from his place here, by his duties in the Court of Impeachment,” lead to
reargument the next Term).
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substantial number of arguments. To break ties, the Court ordered three
rearguments upon his return.93
• When recovering from a serious injury after being thrown from a
horse, Justice William O. Douglas missed arguments from October 1949 until
March 1950.94
• In early 1985, Justice Lewis Powell, who occupied the Court’s
ideological center, missed ﬁfty-six oral arguments while ill.95 Eight cases
deadlocked 4–4, and ﬁve others were reargued.96 (It’s unclear why the Court
exercised discretion to reargue some cases while non-precedentially aﬃrming
others.) One notable example: In December 1987, before Anthony Kennedy
was conﬁrmed as Justice Powell’s successor, the Court deadlocked on the
constitutionality of laws restricting minors’ access to abortions.97
• Chief Justice Rehnquist missed forty-four oral arguments while
receiving treatment for thyroid cancer in 2004 and 2005, declining to
participate except when needed to break a tie.98
• While the “Scalia seat” sat vacant for a record-setting 422 days99—
the better part of two Terms—the Court endured deadlock (and thus, at
minimum, delayed rulings) in multiple divisive cases.100
As was the case following Justice Scalia’s death, a vacancy on the Supreme
Court may go unfilled for a long time, not because of a sitting justice’s health
93 Jeﬀrey D. Hockett, Justice Robert H. Jackson, the Supreme Court, and the Nuremberg Trial, 1990
SUP. CT. REV. 257, 279 (quoting a letter from Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone explaining that the
eight-justice Court had led to a number of 4–4 splits requiring reargument, three of which he was
to announce that day).
94 BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT 360, 367 (1979).
95 Stuart Taylor, Jr., Tie Vote: What Happens, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/
1987/10/05/us/tie-vote-what-happens.html [https://perma.cc/3CA9-9MRV]; see also Powell Has Operation for
Cancer of Prostate, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 1985), https://www.nytimes.com/1985/01/05/us/powell-has-operationfor-cancer-of-prostate.html [https://perma.cc/Z3LR-2DCC].
96 Taylor, supra note 95.
97 Linda Greenhouse, Battle Over; Now, a War, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 1989),
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/07/05/us/battle-over-now-a-war.html [https://perma.cc/S7MU-5X9A].
98 Charles Lane, Rehnquist Won’t Vote in Every Case Heard This Term, WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2004),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/12/14/rehnquist-wont-vote-in-every-caseheard-this-term/b4ff02b1-0fa0-495d-b89a-196166db3c94 [https://perma.cc/GGW2-XQY8]; Mark
Sherman & Jessica Gresko, Chatty Thomas Breaks with Precedent, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 6, 2020),
https://apnews.com/article/24d0b14b7ba98d1976ebff1f7106582f [https://perma.cc/62MP-T3MS].
99 Alana Abramson, Neil Gorsuch Confirmation Sets Record for Longest Vacancy on 9-Member
Supreme Court, TIME (Apr. 7, 2017, 12:20 PM), https://time.com/4731066/neil-gorsuch-conﬁrmationrecord-vacancy [https://perma.cc/XAH6-5CYX].
100 See United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam) (mem.); Friedrichs v. Cal.
Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (per curiam) (mem.); Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank, 136 S. Ct. 1072
(2016); Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Bank of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016); see also Franchise
Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 136 S. Ct. 1277 (2016) (affirming by an equally divided Court on one of two
issues).
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or choices, but because there is no sitting justice. In 1969, after Justice Abe
Fortas resigned from the Court amid controversy, President Nixon struggled
to get a successor confirmed.101 The Fortas seat sat vacant for more than a year
before Justice Harry Blackmun—Nixon’s third choice—took office.102 “During
this period eight cases yielded 4–4 decisions, and 18 cases had to be reargued.”103
b. At Least Partly to Avoid Ties, Supreme Court Recusal is Uniquely Disfavored
Justice Scalia himself emphasized the disturbing threat of seemingly
endless stalemate when he denied the Sierra Club’s recusal motion based on
his 2002 duck hunting trip with Vice President Cheney (coincidentally
enough, less than a week before the argument in Newdow, in which he did
recuse).104 A Court of eight, he explained, often “will find itself unable to
resolve the significant legal issue” presented.105 “Even one unnecessary recusal
impairs the functioning of the Court.”106 For example, if the issue in Newdow
had returned to the Court before Justice Scalia passed away, and if Justice
Scalia still deemed himself disqualified, we likely would still be without an
authoritative answer; the seats of the four justices who left the Court between

101 Blackman & Shapiro, supra note 1; see also Andrew Hamm, Legal History Highlight: The Failed
Election-Year Nomination of Abe Fortas, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 10, 2016, 4:03 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2016/03/legal-history-highlight-the-failed-election-year-nominationof-abe-fortas [https://perma.cc/Y4KD-CU6S].
102 Blackman & Shapiro, supra note 1; Linda Greenhouse, Documents Reveal the Evolution of a
Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/04/us/documents-reveal-theevolution-of-a-justice.html [https://perma.cc/EUX3-LY73] (“Harry Blackmun was President
Nixon’s third choice, ‘Old No. 3,’ as he liked to call himself.”).
103 Blackman & Shapiro, supra note 1. The hand of fate also plays a role. When Justice Stone
fell ill, the Court held over West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish because “an evenly divided Court was
thought an ‘unfortunate outcome.’” Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 HARV.
L. REV. 620, 638 (1994); see also West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding the constitutionality
of state minimum wage legislation). A quarter-century later in NAACP v. Button, Justice Frankfurter
had initially circulated a draft majority upholding the law, but then Justice Whittaker resigned for
health reasons, leaving the Court (apparently) divided 4–4. Reargument was ordered for the next
Term, but by then, Justice Frankfurter had suﬀered a stroke and resigned. With two new members,
the Court voted 6–3 the other way. See, e.g., Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State
Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny, 48 AM. J. OF LEGAL HIST. 355, 373-76 (2006); see also Button, 371 U.S.
415 (1963) (striking down a Virginia barratry law that would have impeded the NAACP’s role in
desegregation cases post-Brown).
104 Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 541 U.S. 913, 914-15 (2004) (memorandum of Scalia, J.)
(describing the motion to recuse); id. at 916 (noting his recusal in Newdow).
105 Id. at 915.
106 Id. at 916 (quoting Rehnquist, Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg,
JJ., Statement of Recusal Policy, Nov. 1, 1993, reprinted in RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL
DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES 1101-03 (2d ed., 2007)).
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2004 and Justice Scalia’s death were all filled by new Justices whose views
would probably not have differed sharply from their predecessors’.107
Chief Justice Roberts made a similar point in his 2011 Year-End Report on
the Federal Judiciary. Lower-court judges can recuse knowing that another
judge (even a retired judge or one from a diﬀerent court) can ﬁll the vacancy,
but “[a Supreme Court] Justice . . . cannot withdraw from a case as a matter
of convenience or simply to avoid controversy. Rather, each Justice has an
obligation to the Court to be sure of the need to recuse before deciding to
withdraw from a case.”108
The High Court does try to avoid 4–4 splits. By the Justices’ own
admissions, practical considerations impact their recusal decisions. The
Court’s 1993 Statement of Recusal Policy, cited by Justice Scalia in his Cheney
memorandum, details recusal principles when a law firm associated with a
Justice’s close relative appears before the Court. It suggests that the lack of
judicial substitution warrants a less-rigid recusal standard for the Court than
for lower-court judges.109 While Justice Stevens said that Justices should recuse
without thought to collateral consequences,110 other Justices have confirmed
that functional factors, like avoiding 4–4 procedural affirmances, are at work.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a memorandum explaining his refusal to disqualify
himself in a case, described a SCOTUS Justice’s duty to sit as “stronger” than
a lower-court judge’s duty, given the statutory prohibition on filling recusalbased vacancies.111 Chief Justice Rehnquist was disapproving of “bending over
backwards . . . to deem oneself unqualified.”112 In fact, as he battled thyroid
cancer, he announced he would only participate in cases when necessary to
prevent a tie vote.113 Justice Ginsburg agreed on the undesirability of tie votes:
“Because there’s no substitute for a Supreme Court Justice, it is important that
we not lightly recuse ourselves.”114 After Justice O’Connor retired in 2006,
three cases that could have ended in stalemate were reargued after Justice
Samuel Alito was confirmed to replace her.115
107 Chief Justice Rehnquist was replaced by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice O’Connor by Justice
Alito, Justice Souter by Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Stevens by Justice Kagan.
108 CHIEF JUSTICE’S YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 9 (2011),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2011year-endreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/43SK-Y67P].
109 Rehnquist et al., supra note 106; see also Debra Lyn Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court,
56 HASTINGS L.J. 657, 681 (2005).
110 See McElroy & Dorf, supra note 15, at 100-01 n. 80 (“Standards of recusal are totally
independent of what would occur after recusal.”).
111 Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837 (1972) (memorandum of Rehnquist, J.).
112 Id. at 838 (quotation marks omitted).
113 Lane, supra note 98.
114 Open Discussion, supra note 74, at 1039.
115 See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); Kansas v.
Marsh, 548 U.S. 163 (2006); see also Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students: Rearguments,
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Unnecessary recusals are, therefore, a last resort and never a first impulse.
Recusals are always undesirable, especially when the Court is weighing a
circuit split. Imagine this hypothetical (set prior to the Court’s decision in
Carpenter v. United States116): The Court grants two petitions on the
constitutionality of the National Security Agency’s bulk, warrantless collection
of Americans’ phone records. One court of appeals has struck down NSA’s
metadata program; the other has upheld it. Justice Kagan recuses herself,
having formulated the government’s legal position while Solicitor General.
The Court deadlocks 4–4 along familiar lines. Constitutional chaos ensues, as
both lower-court judgments are affirmed, meaning the NSA program is
constitutional in some parts of the country but unconstitutional in other
parts—something Chief Justice Rehnquist described as “one rule in Athens,
and another rule in Rome.”117 Indeed, other circuits—Florence and Venice—
may have also chimed in with altogether different interpretations. The
disputed law may be federal, but it is not national.
Or consider how diﬀerently the “Obamacare” drama would have ended
had Justice Kagan recused herself in the original Aﬀordable Care Act case
from 2012.118 Shortly after the decision was issued, it was widely reported that
the Court had originally voted 5–4 to strike down the individual mandate,
but that Chief Justice Roberts later ﬂipped to uphold the mandate under
Congress’ taxing power.119 Yet had Justice Kagan recused herself, the original
vote presumably would have been 5–3 against the mandate. A later vote
switch by the Chief Justice would have meant 4–4 deadlock. It’s diﬃcult to
imagine the Court unable to decide the most high-proﬁle case in recent
memory. Or perhaps the Chief Justice would not have changed his vote,
meaning the Eleventh Circuit’s decision (the case the Court granted) striking

SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 31, 2014, 8:00 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2014/10/scotus-for-law-studentsrearguments [https://perma.cc/W3TU-JC5T] (“A similar practice occurred when Justice Alito replaced
Justice O’Connor in January 2006. Two cases, Hudson v. Michigan and Kansas v. Marsh, were reargued after
Alito arrived and when his vote was required to resolve a four-to-four deadlock.”).
116 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (concluding that obtaining cell-site
location information from a wireless carrier is a Fourth Amendment search for which the
government must generally obtain a warrant supported by probable cause).
117 Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 838 (1972) (memorandum of Rehnquist, J.).
118 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
119 Jan Crawford, Roberts Switched Views to Uphold Health Care Law, CBS NEWS (July 2, 2012,
9:43
PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/roberts-switched-views-to-uphold-health-care-law
[https://perma.cc/2BFA-ZBV6].
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down the ACA would have stood.120 Meanwhile the Sixth Circuit and D.C.
Circuit had issued decisions upholding the individual mandate.121
It’s no wonder that the Supreme Court avoids tie votes if at all possible.
Professors Reynolds and Young tally 123 “equal divisions” between 1925 and
1982—seventy-ﬁve percent resulting from a recusal or temporary absence,
and twenty-ﬁve percent resulting from a Court vacancy.122 And a recent
analysis in the wake of Justice Scalia’s death pointed out that since World War
II, when the High Court has split evenly, “25 times the court aﬃrmed the
lower-court judgment without opinion (or precedential value) and 54 times
the court set the case for reargument.”123
c. Plenty Have Proposed Solutions to SCOTUS Ties
Admittedly, split decisions don’t happen every Term,124 but they happen
often enough to raise concern.125 Each stalemate exacts an enormous price.
120 See Florida ex rel Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1282
(11th Cir. 2011) (“We conclude that the individual mandate exceeds Congress’s commerce power”);
Steven M. Klepper, The Practical Implications of Recusal of Supreme Court Justices, 73 MD. L. REV.
ENDNOTES 13, 15 (2013) (discussing the effect of the possible recusal of Justice Kagan on the fate of
the ACA).
121 See Thomas More L. Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 534 (6th Cir. 2011) (aﬃrming the ACA
as a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power); Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (aﬃrming the constitutionality of the ACA).
122 William L. Reynolds & Gordon G. Young, Equal Divisions in the Supreme Court: History,
Problems, and Proposals, 62 N.C. L. REV. 29, 30, 36 n.34 (1983–84).
123 Blackman & Shapiro, supra note 1 (noting that only twenty-ﬁve of those ﬁfty-four reargued
cases ended up 5–4).
124 Black & Epstein, supra note 37, at 90. The authors suggest that perhaps 4–4 splits are so
few because Justices are more apt to recuse in cases they think will not divide 4–4. Id. at 95. Or
maybe a Justice holds her nose and votes strategically to join a 5–3 decision she doesn’t like because
she fears a future decision “may be even more distant from her policy preferences.” Id. at 96. Or a
Justice may simply change his vote “for institutional reasons,” id., as Justice Frankfurter apparently
did in Inman v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 361 U.S. 138, 141 (1959), lest a case “be cast into the
limbo of unexplained adjudications.” Id. Justices White and Blackmun similarly voted to avoid splits.
See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 429 (1969) (White, J., concurring) (“I join the opinion
of the Court and the judgment of reversal, especially since a vote to aﬃrm would produce an equally
divided Court.”); United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 586 (1971) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (using
the exact same language as Justice White).
125 Tellingly, Justice Scalia has implied that the Court has relatively few recusals because there’s
no replacement mechanism. See generally Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 541 U.S. 913 (2004)
(memorandum of Scalia, J.). He suggests recusals would happen more frequently if there were a
tiebreaking procedure. Id. Justice Breyer told a House committee, “You have a duty to sit because
there is no one to replace me if I take myself out, and that could sometimes change the result.” John
Gibeaut, Sitting This One Out: Health Care Case Again Raises Recusal Controversy, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 1,
2012),
https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/sitting_this_one_out_health_care_case_again_raises_
recusal_controversy [https://perma.cc/3XAB-YLME]. Would former Solicitor General Kagan have
recused herself in the ﬁrst ACA challenge had there been a designation policy in place—for example,
if she knew that retired Justice Stevens might have taken her place? Strategic behavior might color
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Obviously, the Court and the parties have expended tremendous resources to
resolve an issue the Court believes should be resolved—yet there is no
resolution. The nation gets conﬂict rather than consistency. A law’s
constitutionality may remain unsettled indeﬁnitely—as, for instance, if the
pledge’s constitutionality, dodged in Newdow, returned to a divided Court.126
The potential disarray could be stark. Many citizens live in New Jersey but
work in Manhattan, separated only by the Hudson River, yet a law’s
interpretation may mean one thing in Newark (the Third Circuit) and the
polar opposite in New York (the Second Circuit). Worse than thwarting
“equal justice under law,” that circumstance—if extended indeﬁnitely—could
subject the same person to completely diﬀerent applications of supposedly
uniform federal law.
There are proposals galore to help the Court to avoid 4–4 stalemates.
Justice Stevens favored enlisting willing retired SCOTUS Justices—who can
already sit in lower federal courts—an idea he said Chief Justice Rehnquist
also supported.127 In September 2010, barely one month after then-brand-new
Justice Kagan recused herself in roughly one-third of the Court’s docket,
Senator Patrick Leahy introduced a bill to allow a majority of active
SCOTUS Justices to designate a retired justice.128
recusal decisions, at least subconsciously. Imagine a controversial case that a Justice suspects will be
decided 5–4 the way she wishes. But if she recuses and is likely to be replaced by someone she
considers an ideological foe, the other side would claim the ﬁve-justice majority. Two law professors,
recognizing that a justice may resist recusal if it means the designation of an unlike-minded
replacement, have proposed a lottery system. McElroy & Dorf, supra note 15, at 101, 103.
126 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
127 McElroy & Dorf, supra note 15, at 83 n. 7. Sometimes, though, there are no retired justices, as in the
span of years before Justice O’Connor left the bench in 2006: Chief Justice Burger retired on September 26,
1986 and died on June 25, 1995; Justice Powell retired on June 26, 1987 and died on August 25, 1998; Justice
Blackmun retired on August 3, 1994 and died on March 4, 1999. Justices 1789 to Present, SUPREME COURT OF
THE U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx [https://perma.cc/8CKA-6WZE] (last
visited Nov. 20, 2020); Justices, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/justices [https://perma.cc/57AU-7FRL] (last
visited Nov. 20, 2020); Warren E. Burger, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/justices/warren_e_burger
[https://perma.cc/RZF6-CWP6] (last visited Nov 21, 2020); Lewis F. Powell, Jr., OYEZ,
https://www.oyez.org/justices/lewis_f_powell_jr [https://perma.cc/4CZ5-8GBF] (last visited Nov 21, 2020);
Harry A. Blackmun, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/justices/harry_a_blackmun [https://perma.cc/H6D4TXBT] (last visited Nov 21, 2020).
128 S. 3871, 111th Cong. § 1 (2010). Scholars have discussed the Leahy proposal in depth. See
generally McElroy & Dorf, supra note 15 (discussing the proposal’s complications as well as the
beneﬁts of avoiding the unlikely 4–4 tie); Rebekah Saidman-Krauss, Comment, A Second Sitting:
Assessing the Constitutionality and Desirability of Allowing Retired Supreme Court Justices to Fill RecusalBased Vacancies on the Bench, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 253, 267 (2011) (arguing that Senator Leahy’s
proposal is a beneﬁcial innovation and preferable to alternative solutions to recusal-based vacancies).
Senator Leahy’s proposal raises many questions. Can the recused justice help select the retired
justice? See McElroy & Dorf, supra note 15, at 103 n.91 (ﬂagging the bill’s lack of clarity on this
point). If so, is that “essentially voting by proxy”—picking someone most apt to vote the way the
recused justice would have voted? See Saidman-Krauss, supra at 281. If the recused justice cannot
vote on the replacement justice, what happens if the remaining eight justices deadlock? Does nobody
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Professors Reynolds and Young take particular aim at the rule of
aﬃrmance by an equally divided Court. They contend that in the appellate
context, sometimes “[the] policies supporting reversal may outweigh those
supporting aﬃrmance.”129 For example, they argue, when a lower court strikes
down a federal statute as unconstitutional, a 4–4 Supreme Court should
require reversal given the presumption of constitutionality.130 Similarly, a 4–
4 tie in a criminal case would produce a reversal of a conviction.131 Notably,
the professors themselves tie 1–1 when their two proposed rules collide:
“[W]hen the Court divides on the constitutionality of a federal statute
challenged on constitutional grounds by a criminal defendant.”132 How do
they resolve their stalemate? By reverting to a SCOTUS-like rule: “The
authors, being divided evenly here, cannot make a recommendation on this
issue.”133 Professor Baker, in fact, argues that a 4–4 split should be resolved
through some sort of vote switching.134 Indeed, he would prefer that someone
ﬂip his or her vote so that the legal question is decided and the policy question
is returned to Congress.135
Although federal law bars the assignment of temporary SCOTUS
Justices, meaning ties go unbroken, the same is not true in most state supreme
courts. Even so, some state high courts mimic the federal High Court.

get appointed? The Court splits 4–4 most often in ideologically divisive cases. Does that suggest the
four liberal justices would strategically resist enlisting a retired colleague if they suspect she might
vote with the four conservatives, and vice versa? Might they favor stalemate, even one that aﬃrms
a conservative lower-court victory, over a High Court judgment that broadens it nationwide? Might
the four justices who voted to grant certiorari push for a particular retired justice, eﬀectively winning
the case “before it is even argued?” See McElroy & Dorf, supra note 15, at 101 n. 83. Even if the
selection method were random, what if the justice pondering recusal suspects the odds are slim that
a like-minded ally will be chosen? Or what if the chief justice, rather than the Court as a whole, is
empowered to designate someone unilaterally? Does that vest him with lopsided power, essentially
giving him two votes? See Saidman-Krauss, supra at 281-82 (fretting the risk of such disproportionate
inﬂuence); see also infra Section III.B (highlighting the problems that can arise when the chief justice
of a state supreme court picks a temporary justice).
129 Reynolds & Young, supra note 122, at 46.
130 Id. at 50.
131 See id. at 52-53 (arguing that “[o]ur system of criminal justice evidences a great concern that
persons not be convicted of crimes unless clear law as applied to clear fact so warrants”; therefore,
“a conviction should not be sustained unless aﬃrmed by a majority of the highest court to hear the
case”).
132 Id. at 52.
133 Id. at 53 n.105.
134 See Baker, supra note 12, at 136 (describing how justices have historically suppressed their
own preferences to settle a case and arguing that modern justices should be willing to do the same).
Of course, this raises the obvious question of which justice ought to switch votes.
135 Id. at 130.
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2. Survey Says: Seventeen States SCOTUS’s “Ties Happen” Approach
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Figure 2: Ties Happen
17 States Aﬃrm by an Equally Divided Court

Like SCOTUS, seventeen state high courts follow the no-tiebreaker
approach: Alaska,136 Colorado,137 Illinois,138 Indiana,139 Iowa,140 Kansas,141

136 ALASKA R. APP. P. 106(a) (“[A]ny issue or point on appeal on which the justices are equally
divided is aﬃrmed in that appeal . . . .”).
137 COLO. APP. R. 35(b) (“When the supreme court acting en banc is equally divided in an
opinion, the judgment being appealed will stand aﬃrmed.”).
138 See Perlman v. First Nat’l Bank of Chi., 331 N.E.2d 65, 66 (Ill. 1975) (per curiam) (“[I]t is
preferable . . . to follow substantially the procedure that is employed by the Supreme Court of the
United States when the judges of that court are equally divided.”).
139 IND. R. APP. P. 58(c) (“When the Supreme Court is evenly divided . . . the decision of the
Court of Appeals shall be reinstated.”).
140 IOWA CODE § 602.4107 (“When the supreme court is equally divided in opinion, the
judgment of the court below shall stand aﬃrmed, but the decision of the supreme court is of no
further force or authority.”).
141 Unlike in many other states, Kansas law does not aﬃrmatively state the legal eﬀect of a tie
vote. The seven-member Supreme Court of Kansas, however, has adopted an equal-division-equalsaﬃrmance rule, relying on article III, section 2 of the Kansas Constitution, which states that at least
four justices “shall be necessary for a decision.” See Thornton v. Shore, 654 P.2d 475 (Kan. 1982).

The general rule in this jurisdiction, and elsewhere, is that when one of the justices is
disqualiﬁed to participate in a decision of issues raised in an appeal and the remaining
six justices are equally divided in their conclusions the judgment of the trial court
must stand. . . . The judgment of the trial court is therefore aﬃrmed by an equally
divided court.
Id.
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Kentucky,142 Maine,143 Massachusetts,144 Michigan,145 Minnesota,146
Mississippi,147 New Jersey,148 North Carolina,149 Pennsylvania,150 Rhode
Island,151 and Wisconsin.152

See infra note 154.
See Day v. State Tax Assessor, 942 A.2d 685, 686 (Me. 2008) (“Because the Court is evenly
divided, we aﬃrm the judgment.”).
144 See Fresh Pond Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Rent Control Bd. of Cambridge, 446 N.E.2d 1060,
1060 (Mass. 1983) (“The judgment of the Superior Court is aﬃrmed by an equally divided court.”);
Pacella v. Milford Radio Corp., 476 N.E.2d 595, 595 (1985) (same). Massachusetts includes the rule
in its rules of appellate procedure:
142
143

If, following allowance of an application for further appellate review, the justices of
the Supreme Judicial Court are equally divided in opinion, unless a majority of the
participating justices decides otherwise, the court shall issue an order noting such
equal division, the eﬀect of which shall be the same as if the court had denied the
application for further appellate review.
MASS. R. APP. P. 27.1(g).
145 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.230 (“When the justices of the supreme court are equally
divided as to the ultimate decision of any case properly before the court on review, the judgment of
the court below shall be aﬃrmed.”); see also People v. Sullivan, 609 N.W.2d 193 (Mich. 2000) (“[T]he
judgment of the Court of Appeals is aﬃrmed by an equal division of the court.”), aﬀ ’g by equal
division 586 N.W.2d 578 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (“[T]he judgment of the Court of Appeals is aﬃrmed
by an equal division of the court.”).
146 See State v. Retzlaﬀ, 842 N.W.2d 565, 565 (Minn. 2012) (“[U]pon an evenly divided
court . . . the decision of the court of appeals . . . is, aﬃrmed without opinion.”).
147 While the Mississippi Constitution can be read to empower the Governor to appoint a
tiebreaking justice, the Mississippi Supreme Court’s longstanding interpretation has been to seek a
substitute justice only when necessary to reach a quorum:
Today we reiterate the long standing application of Section 165. The appointment of
a special justice to this Court is appropriate where the Court lacks a quorum and where
the parties are unable to agree in the selection of special justices to hear a case.
However, so long as the Court has a quorum to conduct business, such an appointment
is not authorized by our Constitution.
Hewes v. Langston, 853 So. 2d 1237, 1243 (Miss. 2003). The court in Hewes was interpreting the
following section of the Mississippi Constitution: “Whenever any judge of the Supreme . . . for any
reason, be unable or disqualiﬁed to preside . . . the Governor may commission another, or others, of
law knowledge, to preside . . . during such disability or disqualiﬁcation in the place of the judge or
judges so disqualiﬁed.” MISS. CONST. art. 6, § 165.
148 A clerk of the New Jersey Supreme Court confirms that while New Jersey law allows substitute
justices, such appointments are never made to break a tie. Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with
Gail Haney, Deputy Clerk, N.J. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015-Feb. 2016) (on file with author).
149 See Forbes Homes, Inc. v. Trimpi, 326 S.E.2d 30, 30 (N.C. 1985) (“The remaining members
of this Court being equally divided . . . the decision of the Court of Appeals is left undisturbed and
stands without precedential value.”).
150 See Commonwealth v. Koch, 106 A.3d 705, 705 (Pa. 2014) (“[T]he Court being evenly
divided, the Order of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.”); see also PA. SUP. CT. INTERNAL
OPERATING PROCS. § 4(B)(3) (“When the votes [of the participating justices] are equally divided,
any resulting opinions shall be designated as the ‘Opinion in Support of Aﬃrmance’ or ‘Opinion in
Support of Reversal,’ as the case may be.”).
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In some of these states, like Michigan, the “no tiebreaker” approach is
prescribed by law;153 in others, like Kentucky, Minnesota, and Mississippi,
ﬁll-in justices are permitted and used to ensure a quorum or adequate number
of sitting justices, but not in response to a tie.154
In most no-tiebreaker states, if impasse results, the court generally issues
a pro forma order or opinion citing the relevant rule or statute that a tie
151 In Rhode Island, the chief justice may assign retired Supreme Court justices but declines
to do so in cases of an evenly divided court. See, e.g., Meyer v. Meyer, 68 A.3d 571, 587 (R.I. 2013)
(“[T]he Family Court judgment is aﬃrmed by an evenly divided court.”); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 8-3-8(d) (“Any [retired] justice of the supreme court . . . shall at the direction of the chief justice
of the supreme court, subject to the retiree’s physical and mental competence, be assigned to perform
such services as an associate justice of the supreme court as the chief justice of the supreme court
shall prescribe.”); Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Debra Saunders, Clerk, R.I. Sup. Ct.
(Dec. 2015) (on ﬁle with author).
152 See Sohn Mfg. Inc. v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n, 854 N.W.2d 371, 371 (Wis. 2014) (“The
court is evenly divided upon the question of aﬃrmance or reversal. That results in aﬃrmance of the
judgment of the court of appeals . . . .”).
153 See supra note 145.
154 For discussion of Mississippi’s quorum-ensuring appointments, see supra note 147. The
Minnesota Supreme Court calls up lower-court judges to ensure it has a quorum—even using a
fancy random number generator to assign temporary justices—but, says the clerk, “There is no
speciﬁc process for appointing acting justices to avoid or break a tie.” But adopting one isn’t out of
the question, says the clerk, noting, “The court has not had to consider the tiebreak issue in the
context of an original jurisdiction case, in which there is no ‘decision below.’” Telephone and E-mail
Correspondence with Rita DeMeules, Ct. Comm’r, Minn. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015-Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle
with author).
Sometimes state high courts shift gears and blaze a new trail over time. In Kentucky, where a
tie vote means aﬃrmance, the system is “rather convoluted,” says the clerk. Telephone and E-mail
Correspondence with Susan Clary, Clerk, Ky. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015-February 2016) (on ﬁle with
author). The constitution prescribes that the Governor appoints special justices—but only when “as
many as two Justices decline or are unable to sit.” KY. CONST. § 110(3). The clerk says the Governor
is a lawyer and has “remarkable staﬀ,” adding, “they’ll review the pleadings and will put people on
who are skilled in that area.” Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Susan Clary, supra.
Pleadings aren’t available online, though. “They must request copies,” says the clerk, “and the current
governor, unlike previous governors, does,” adding the Governor has always appointed “competent
people, not those with agendas.” Id.
But what if only one justice can’t participate, a more common scenario than multiple recusals?
“[H]ere is where it becomes a bit more tricky,” says the clerk. Id. In 1989, the Court, believing it had
the inherent power to name a single replacement, adopted a policy under which the Chief Justice
would appoint a non-judge lawyer as a special justice. Ky. Utils. Co. v. S.E. Coal Co., 836 S.W.2d
407, 410 app. (Ky. 1992). The court opted for lawyer appointees because of this constitutional
provision: “[The Chief Justice] shall assign temporarily any justice or judge of the Commonwealth,
active or retired, to sit in any court other than the Supreme Court when he deems such assignment
necessary for the prompt disposition of causes.” KY. CONST. § 110(5)(b). The court took this to
mean it could appoint lawyers to the Supreme Court. Under the 1989 policy, each justice (elected in
districts) would, at the beginning of the Court’s term, provide the Chief Justice a list of at least 10
attorneys from his district, and if recusals arose, the Chief Justice would pick someone from that
list. Ky. Utils., 836 S.W.2d at 410 app. Yet the current Court does “not embrace that logic” and chooses
to either “go with six or wait out the vacancy.” Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Susan
Clary, supra; accord Hodge v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 824 (Ky. 1999) (“[T]he policy set forth in
the Appendix to the opinion in Kentucky Utils. Co. v. South East Coal Co., supra, has been rescinded.”).
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aﬃrms the lower-court judgment. In Maine, for example, a 3–3 split results
in this anticlimactic sentence: “Because the Court is evenly divided, we aﬃrm
the judgment.”155 Similarly, the rule in Colorado is that “[w]hen the supreme
court acting en banc is equally divided in an opinion, the judgment being
appealed will stand aﬃrmed.”156 Result: oodles of squandered resources—
both public and private—but no precedent.
Other states have an impasse-avoiding mechanism at their disposal but
elect not to use it—at least not consistently. For example, the Alaska Supreme
Court clerk says that, while “a tie goes to the status quo,” the high court itself
“sometimes appoints a retired justice as a pro tem in select cases—not as a
tiebreaker but on the front end to ensure full strength.”157 So the court uses a
discretionary procedure in “select cases” to avert ties, but not to break them.
The Chief Justice has wide latitude to do it diﬀerently—for example, to assign
someone only after stalemate has arisen. The Alaska Constitution broadly
declares: “The chief justice of the supreme court shall be the administrative
head of all courts” and “may assign judges from one court or division thereof
to another for temporary service.”158 The Chief Justice may assign—it’s
discretionary—but doesn’t have to, and the current chief justice has opted to
appoint only in “select cases,” and only on the front end, not after deadlock
occurs. But just what makes cases “select,” and why are they spared the threat
and costs of deadlock but not “non-select” cases? The clerk conﬁrms the court
uses pro tem justices “in other situations, but I don’t think they’ve ever
appointed someone to break a tie.”159 Why not? “The court doesn’t want
someone who is not a sitting justice to be the deciding vote in setting
precedent,” says the clerk.160 But a pro tem justice appointed pre-deadlock is
just as surely the deciding, precedent-setting vote if the court ultimately splits
3–2, with the pro tem justice in the majority.161
Interestingly, even when state law can be read to authorize a tiebreaker, a
high court may opt for deadlock.162 In Mississippi, the Constitution states
See Hale v. Antoniou, 820 A.2d 586, 586 (Me. 2003).
COLO. APP. R. 35(b).
Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Marilyn May, Clerk of App. Cts., Alaska Sup.
Ct. (Oct. 2015-Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle with author).
158 ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 16.
159 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Marilyn May, supra note 157.
160 Id.
161 Because pro tem assignments are used haphazardly, not consistently, and never to break
ties, I have classiﬁed Alaska as following a SCOTUS-like approach.
162 A generation ago in Illinois, the seven-justice Supreme Court “carefully considered” what to
do when, after two justices recused, the court was unable to muster a constitutional majority of four.
Perlman v. First Nat’l Bank of Chi., 331 N.E.2d 65, 66 (Ill. 1975) (per curiam). This wasn’t a tiebreaker
situation, but it broadly presented a choice between no decision and some decision. The per curiam
court concluded it was “preferable” to follow a SCOTUS-like approach. Id. Notably, the Chief Justice
dissented, stating that although “there is no completely satisfactory means of resolving cases such as
155
156
157
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broadly that when any member of the Supreme Court cannot sit, the Governor
may commission someone.163 But the Chief Justice says his Court’s longtime
view is that “a tie’s a tie,” and “we only go to the Governor if we fail to have a
quorum,” never when the Court is deadlocked.164 This view, the Chief Justice
concedes, “is not without detractors,” both on the Court and off, but it’s been
the consistent practice “as far back as anyone knows or can research.”165
In North Carolina, retired Supreme Court justices may become emergency
justices subject to temporary recall to active service, but only to replace a
justice who is temporarily incapacitated, not for ordinary recusals or other
sporadic vacancies.166 The clerk says they affirm by an equally divided court
about three times a year—“not common but not rare.”167 And the justices “try
their darndest not to, using their general persuasive powers.”168 What do the
petitioning parties think when the Court locks up? “Not happy.”169
The Rhode Island Supreme Court likewise declines to name a ﬁll-in
justice when it divides 2–2. State law authorizes the Chief Justice to
temporarily recall a retired high court justice to assist the Court,170 “but it is
not routinely done in those few instances when they are evenly divided,” says
the clerk.171 In 2009, for example, when the Chief Justice retired, the acting
chief justice issued an order recalling his retired colleague until a replacement

this,” it was “desirable to utilize a uniform means of resolving all cases in which four members of this
court fail to agree.” Id. at 67 (Underwood, C.J., dissenting). The chief justice insisted that ample
authority to overcome deadlock was found in the Illinois Constitution, which reads, “The Supreme
Court may assign a Judge temporarily to any court.” Id. (quoting ILL. CONST. ART. VI, § 16). The
chief justice even fleshed out a specific proposal—assigning appellate judges rotationally from a list
(to avoid the mischief of strategic selection) and only after deadlock had arisen:
On the infrequent occasions when at least four members of this court are unable to
agree, because of the disqualiﬁcation of one or more of us, I would assign to our court
appellate court judges who would sit in place of our disqualiﬁed members and only
for the purposes of deciding the case in which four of our members could not agree.
In order to eliminate any possibility that the result in a given case had been
preordained by the selection of a particular judge, I believe our court should select
now a list of seven appellate court members and list their names alphabetically, or in
the order drawn by chance. Those judges would then be assigned to our court, as the
need arose, in rotation.
Id.
See supra note 147; see also MISS. CONST. art 6, § 165.
Telephone Interview with Bill Waller Jr., Chief Just., Miss. Sup. Ct. (Jan. 14, 2016) (on ﬁle
with author).
165 Id.
166 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-39.3, 7A-39.5 (2019).
167 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Christie Roeder, supra note 44.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 8 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-3-8(d) (2020).
171 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Debra Saunders, supra note 151.
163
164
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chief was named.172 In 2011, after a subsequent vacancy, the court simply
operated with four justices.173 The default is aﬃrmance by an equally divided
Court.174 Notably, though, Rhode Island has a rule of appellate procedure that
arguably substitutes for a formal tiebreaker, allowing a litigant to move for
reargument when the Court is joined by a ﬁfth member.175
Some state judicial oﬃcials say having no tiebreaker heightens judges’
willingness to ﬁnd common ground. The Michigan high-court clerk reports
only one tie in fourteen years, calling it “extremely rare” and saying justices
“work hard to reason with each other to reach compromise.”176 Collegiality
matters enormously, she stresses: “If personal relationships, especially trust
and respect, are cultivated among the justices and their staﬀs, there will be
fewer entrenchments that result in tie votes.”177 The Kentucky clerk voiced
similar sentiments: “People try to woo and try to convince to avoid 3–3.”178
Yet in Rhode Island, the Chief Justice responded that he can’t really say that
lacking a formal tiebreaker nudges the Court toward compromise.179
Another upside, say oﬃcials in some no-tiebreaker states, is that working
“without a net” provides an opportunity for chief-justice leadership. In
Michigan, says the clerk, the Chief Justice wields “ultimate control of the
conferences at which opinions are discussed,” adding, “if [she] thinks an
opinion can be massaged in such a way that it could garner a majority, [she]
will continue to bring it back for conference discussion to try to make that
happen.”180 In years past, he says, Michigan high-court justices “were more
Id.
Id.
See Meyer v. Meyer, 68 A.3d 571, 587 (R.I. 2013) (“The court is evenly divided . . .
Accordingly, the Family Court judgement is aﬃrmed . . . .”).
175 R.I. SUP. CT. R., art. I, r. 25(a) (discussing petitions requesting reargument before the full
court “because the Court has evenly divided in an opinion”).
For example,
172
173
174

On December 18, 2009, this Court, sitting as a bench of four justices, was evenly
divided and thus aﬃrmed the Superior Court’s judgment. Morrow moved pursuant to
Article I, Rule 25(a) of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure to reargue
her appeal once this Court was joined by a ﬁfth member. Her request was granted on
January 15, 2010 and on September 29, 2010, this Court again heard oral argument. As
such, we now decide Morrow’s appeal upon its merits.
Cahill v. Morrow, 11 A.3d 82, 86 (R.I. 2011) (internal citation omitted); see also Ucci v. Mancini, 387
A.2d 1056, 1057 (R.I. 1978) (“When Mancini’s appeal came on to be heard, a four-man court divided
equally and aﬃrmed the trial justice’s judgment. Later, we granted Mancini’s motion to reargue
before a full court.”) (internal citation omitted).
176 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Larry Royster, Clerk, Mich. Sup. Ct. (Oct.
2015-Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle with author).
177 Id.
178 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Susan Clary, supra note 154.
179 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Debra Saunders, supra note 151.
180 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Larry Royster, supra note 176.
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entrenched in partisan positions so that was probably more diﬃcult to do,”
but today, “the justices are more collegial and seem willing to ﬁnd common
ground.”181 Also, while “Court policy usually allows a new justice to sit on the
sidelines for any case in which they did not participate in oral argument,” if
it seems the case will deadlock 3–3, “the new justice is strongly encouraged to
participate in the decision in order to break the tie.”182
Yet the lack of a decision doesn’t always mean the lack of guidance. At
SCOTUS, litigants typically get a terse “The judgment is aﬃrmed by an
equally divided Court”—nothing more, and ordinarily no indication of how
individual justices viewed the case.183 Justices are free to express their views
but rarely do. For example, Justice Douglas ﬁled a dissenting opinion
explaining his merits views in Biggers v. Tennessee, a case where the judgment
below was aﬃrmed by an equally divided Court because newly appointed
Justice Thurgood Marshall was recused.184
Some state high courts follow this approach, with justices ﬁling competing
merits-based opinions in deadlocked cases do. When the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts is evenly split, the justices can still write full opinions
explaining why they would aﬃrm or reverse.185 Pennsylvania also permits
dueling writings: “Opinion in Support of Aﬃrmance” vs. “Opinion in
Support of Reversal.”186 To some extent, this mitigates the lack of guidance
that otherwise ﬂows from the sterile announcement of an evenly divided
court, because if multiple justices join these advisory writings, future litigants
can tailor their arguments, having discovered who leans which way and why.
Many state high courts, while opting against tiebreakers, have no qualms
about always telling the public how each individual judge voted, whether or
not there are reasons. For example, in Iowa, the court issues a short
statement—”The court, being equally divided, declares this case aﬃrmed by
operation of law”—but the very next sentence lists by name the justices who
favored aﬃrmance and reversal.187 Likewise in Kansas: Deadlock aﬃrms the
lower court, but the per curiam opinion lists those who would aﬃrm and
reverse.188 The same is true in Wisconsin.189

Id.
Id.
Supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
390 U.S. 404, 404-09 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Bransford v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 832 N.E. 2d 639, 640 (Mass. 2005) (listing
separate opinions, and the justices who joined them, in a case with an equally divided court).
186 210 PA. CODE § 63.4(B)(3) (2020).
187 See, e.g., Polk Co. Bd. of Review v. Village Green Co-Op, Inc., No. 13-1205, 2014 WL
2619674, at *1 (Iowa June 13, 2014) (per curiam) (citing IOWA CODE § 602.4107 (2013)).
188 See, e.g., Thornton v. Shore, 654 P.2d 475 (1982).
189 See, e.g., Sohn Mfg., Inc. v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n, 854 N.W.2d 371 (Wis. 2014).
181
182
183
184
185
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In sum, seventeen states mirror SCOTUS to some degree, letting the
lower-court judgment stand. That leaves thirty-three states with mechanisms
to either avoid or break deadlock. The following section surveys and evaluates
the various approaches taken in that supermajority of states.
B. Varying Procedures of Varying Prudence: Avoiding and Breaking Legal
Logjams in State High Courts
Thirty-ﬁve courts take a stab at resolving judicial deadlock.190

Figure 3: Not Fit to be Tied
35 Courts Avoid or Break Ties

190

Powered by Bing
© GeoNames, Microsoft, TomTom

See infra Appendix A for summary chart classifying each state’s approach.
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And as described below, the no-tie procedures in these antistalemate
states vary in four fundamental ways:
• When a temporary justice is appointed, either pre- or post-deadlock:
Twenty-four courts aim to avert ties by appointing a substitute justice as soon
as the court ﬁnds itself shorthanded. The others wait until a tie actually occurs
before naming someone.

Powered by Bing
© GeoNames, Microsoft, TomTom

Figure 4: Timing of Appointments
Light gray: Pre-deadlock, 24 courts; Dark gray: Post-deadlock, 11 courts
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• Who can be appointed?: In thirty-two high courts, the ﬁll-in justice
must be a jurist; in three courts, nonjudge lawyers can serve too.191

Powered by Bing
© GeoNames, Microsoft, TomTom

Figure 5: Who Can Be Appointed?
Black: judge, 32 courts; Light gray: other, 3 courts
(Others: In Arkansas, the appointee must be a lawyer. In Tennessee, eligible appointees are
“men . . . of law knowledge.” In Texas, the civil court appointee must be a judge and the criminal
court appointee must be “a person who is learned in the law.”)

191 Classifying Texas and Tennessee is admittedly tricky. In the Lone Star State, ﬁll-in justices
on the civil high court (the Supreme Court of Texas) must be lower-court judges while ﬁll-ins on
the criminal high court (the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals) may be “a person who is learned in
the law.” See infra Appendix A. In the Volunteer State, the governor’s appointee must have “law
knowledge” while chief justice appointees are assumed to be lower-court judges. See id.
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• Who does the appointing?: In twenty-three courts, the Chief Justice
picks the temporary justice; in seven, the Court does so; and in four, the
Governor steps in.192

Powered by Bing
© GeoNames, Microsoft, TomTom

Figure 6: Who Appoints the Tiebreaking Justice?
Black: Governor, 4 courts; Dark gray: Chief Justice, 23 courts; Medium gray: Court, 7 courts;
Light gray: shared between Governor and Chief Justice, 1 court

• How much discretion the appointer has: Some selection methods are
completely randomized, literally the luck of the draw. In Louisiana, the clerk
plucks a name from a large Halloween Jack-o’-Lantern. And in Washington
State, a name is drawn from a fancy chalice. In other states, the appointer

Figure 7: The Washington Chalice

Figure 8: The Louisiana Jack-o’-Lantern

192 See id. Caveat: in some of these states, the chief justice or court delegates the actual
selection to its administrative staﬀ. Also, Tennessee is counted under both “chief justice” and
“governor” since state law divides the assignment power.
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wields unchecked discretion, free to pick any qualiﬁed person, which can spur
cries of cronyism.193
Quite simply, the details vary significantly. Some systems are purely
ministerial and apolitical, drawing a substitute justice’s name at random from
among those who are eligible. Others are highly discretionary, where a Chief
Justice or a Governor appoints someone—not neutrally, but purposefully.194 In
some states, a pro tem justice is named as soon as the court is operating at less
than full strength, sometimes even before a case is granted, meaning the court
is naming someone in order to avert a tie, not to break one.195 In other states,
a tiebreaker is commissioned only after the court is hopelessly deadlocked.196
This section will explore these different methods in greater detail.
This Article categorizes states based on what they actually do, not on what
they’re authorized to do. For example, the Missouri Constitution says the
Supreme Court makes temporary judicial assignments,197 but “the practice is
for the Chief Justice to do it as the court’s agent,” says the clerk.198 Another
example: Massachusetts law allows the Chief Justice to temporarily assign
retired high court justices, including presumably to break a tie, but the
practice is to aﬃrm by an evenly divided court.199 Same in Minnesota, where
the Constitution authorizes temporary assignments, but the Court declines
to do so to avoid deadlock.200 This section focuses on courts’ actual practice,
whether or not that practice accords with the written law.

193 States also vary in terms of whether an appointer must appoint someone or may appoint
someone. In twenty-six states, the law uses mandatory, shall-like language, while in ten states, the
law uses more permissive, may-like language, giving the appointer discretion whether to appoint a
substitute. Some states, like Texas and Tennessee, defy easy classiﬁcation. Texas, like Oklahoma, has
dual high courts, one for civil matters and one for criminal matters. The chief justice of the Texas
Supreme Court has discretion whether to notify the governor, who, once notiﬁed, must name
someone. But the presiding judge of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals “shall” notify the governor
of disqualiﬁcations, and the governor “immediately shall” appoint someone. In Tennessee, where
appointment power is divided between the governor and the chief justice, the former seems to have
a duty to name someone, while the latter seems to have discretion. For full treatment, see infra
Subsection II.B.2.
194 See infra Subsections II.B.2.a-b.
195 See infra Subsection II.B.1.
196 See infra Subsections II.B.2.a-c (e.g., Texas, New York).
197 MO. CONST. art. V, § 6.
198 E-mail Correspondence with Clerk, Mo. Sup. Ct. (Mar. 7, 2016) (on ﬁle with author).
199 See infra Appendix A; see also supra note 144.
200 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Rita DeMeules, supra note 149; MINN.
CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“As provided by law judges of the court of appeals or of the district court may
be assigned temporarily to act as judges of the supreme court upon its request and judges of the
district court may be assigned temporarily . . . to act as judges of the court of appeals.”).
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1. Roughly Three-Fourths of Anti-stalemate Courts Appoint Fill-in Justices
on the Front End, Aiming to Avoid Deadlock in the First Place
Twenty-four states aim to bypass impasse—that is, to avoid ties rather
than break them: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming.201
Here is a sampling of various tie-averting approaches:
Arizona: In Arizona, the Chief Justice routinely appoints a lower-court
jurist (“usually a court of appeals judge,” says the clerk) as soon as the court
is operating at less than full strength.202 And in Alaska, as discussed above,
the Chief Justice will sometimes appoint a retired justice “in select cases”—
not to break a tie “but on the front end to ensure full strength.”203 If no frontend justice is named, and the court later ties, so be it.
Arkansas: In Arkansas, the Governor names a substitute justice “anytime a
justice recuses,” says the clerk, and such appointments happen frequently—
“maybe 10 percent of cases . . . it’s happening more and more.”204 Today’s
Arkansas high court is “divided,” says the clerk, making it “impossible to do
anything with six,” so it’s “a time-saver on the front end.”205 The Governor
knows the case’s docket number, parties, counsel, and so on.206 But again, these
appointments happen early and every time there’s a recusal, not just when a
tie happens.207 The clerk cannot recall seeing a repeat appointee, who can be a
retired or active jurist or even merely a licensed attorney.208 And if the
Governor dawdles, the Lieutenant Governor gets to make the appointment.209
Delaware: Delaware also avoids ties on the front end by only hearing cases
at full strength. Under Delaware law, the Chief Justice designates a lowercourt judge to be a temporary justice.210 The Chief Justice has “lots of
discretion,” and this is how he describes his selection process:

See infra Appendix A.
Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Janet Johnson, Clerk, Ariz. Sup. Ct. (Oct.
2015-Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle with author).
203 See supra notes 157-161 (discussing Alaska).
204 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Stacey Pectol, Clerk of Cts., Ark. Sup. Ct.
(Oct. 2015-Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle with author).
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 ARK. CONST., amend. 80, § 13(A).
210 DEL. SUP. CT. R. 2(a) 4(a); DEL. CONST. art. IV, §§ 12, 38.
201
202
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The Chief Justice selects a trial judge after consultation with the presiding
judge of whatever trial court it is, solely to ensure that the trial judge is
current on her other work.
There was an old written rule that suggested we go to the presiding
judges of certain trial courts and then down the line in terms of seniority.
That has not been used for years.
No trial judge, of course, sits on an appeal from a colleague on his own
court.
To my knowledge, there has never been a controversy about this. But
there is a contextual reason for that, which is important to understand. We
have a bipartisan judiciary. Every other judge is of the other party by
Constitutional mandate. Since 1977, each Governor has employed a
bipartisan judicial nominating commission to help select judges, who are
nominated by the Governor and conﬁrmed by our Senate. As a result,
whatever diﬀerences have ever occurred on our Supreme Court have never
been partisan in nature. And we go en banc on any case where there is a
diﬀerence of opinion.

* * *
I have lots of discretion.
But we’ve had a lot of turnover recently and had to use lots of trial judges.
I have, as have prior CJs, tried to get a variety of trial judges in the mix.
I don’t recall ever thinking about political aﬃliation.
I do think about getting a diverse array of trial judges in the mix, and in
some particular cases (complicated business law cases) having judges with
experience. That is also true in criminal cases, though. I do always want to
make sure the trial judge is current in her work and not burdening colleagues
by joining us.
We are a small state. In the past two years, I would bet I have asked 2030 trial judges at least to serve. Half come from Chancery, the Superior
Court, Family Court, and the Court of Common Pleas.
I have actually opened it up a bit, b[y] appointing more Family Court
and CCP judges to serve.211

211 E-mail Correspondence with Leo Strine, Chief Just., Del. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 26, 2015) (on ﬁle
with author).
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Georgia: A tie vote “has never occurred” in Georgia, says the clerk, because
the Court names a substitute pre-argument. 212 “We rarely operate at less than
full strength” and “have never had to appoint someone to break a tie.”213
Idaho: Avoiding ties is also the priority in Idaho, where the Idaho Supreme
Court clerk says, “If a justice recuses, I appoint a retired justice to sit so we
don’t end up in a tie.” 214
Missouri: Missouri likewise ﬁlls any holes on the front end, before
argument, to avoid charges of gamesmanship.215 What’s more, while the
Constitution’s “wording is the Court does it . . . the practice is for the Chief
Justice to do it as the Court’s agent,” explains the clerk:
If the appointment is solely by the chief justice and made only when the court
is tied, there will be considerable discussion that the process was manipulated
to secure a particular result. If the appointment is earlier in the process, it
can be by the chief justice as there is no way to know how the case will turn

212 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Therese Barnes, Clerk, Ga. Sup. Ct. (Oct.
2015-Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle with author).
213 Id.
214 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Stephen Kenyon, Clerk, Idaho Sup. Ct. (Jan.
2016) (on ﬁle with author).
215 Sometimes eﬀorts to quell substitution-related criticism fall short. In Missouri recently,
the Supreme Court issued on the same day conﬂicting decisions involving wrongful-death claims—
one case decided by the court’s seven regular members, the other using a substitute justice. Compare
State ex rel Beisly v. Perigo, 469 S.W.3d 434, 436 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (allowing a wrongful death
claim to go forward despite the statute of limitations under the doctrine of equitable estoppel) with
Boland v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Inc., 471 S.W.3d 703, 705 (Mo. 2015) (holding, to the contrary, that
courts “may not add exceptions to a special statute of limitations”). “The bar was understandably
confused,” said the clerk. Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Clerk, supra note 198. A
dissenting justice shared the bar’s discomfort:

[T]his Court should not have issued the majority opinion in this case that is contrary
to the position taken by a majority of the regular members of this Court in Boland,
especially as the majority in this case was only possible with the assistance of a special
judge from the Court of Appeals, Western District.
* * *
In my view, there is no practical or legitimate reason to issue an opinion in Beisly
which is in conﬂict with Boland on the same day and that required a special judge to
garner a majority. As noted, the proper approach would have been to retransfer, which
requires a majority vote of the judges on the case.
Beisly, 469 S.W.3d at 445-46 (Fischer, J., dissenting); see also Jeﬀ Lehr, State’s High Court Provides
Latest Twist in Beisly Murder Case: State’s High Court Issues Conflicting Rulings in Beisly, Boland
Decisions, JOPLIN GLOBE (Aug. 22, 2015), http://www.joplinglobe.com/news/local_news/state-shigh-court-provides-latest-twist-in-beisly-murder/article_e34bd8e6-61c2-56bb-8bba02558a278ab5.html [https://perma.cc/7L96-TU6N] (quoting one lawyer as saying, “the disparity
between those two decisions makes following the law in the future impossible”).
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out. If the appointment is only after the vote is known, it may be better to
have the whole panel or court make the appointment.216

Montana: Montana similarly aims for tie avoidance. The seven-member
Montana Supreme Court hears most of its cases in ﬁve-judge panels.217 But
when the Court is sitting en banc and there’s a temporary vacancy, a district
judge is appointed before oral argument.218 (Montana has no intermediate
appellate court.219) “We always have a full complement,” says the clerk, and
“it’s taken care of up front.”220 The Chief Justice appoints with “wide
discretion.”221 There is “no criteria,” but the chief “tries to give everybody a
shot.”222 The clerk describes the chief ’s temp-picking authority as “probably
the biggest power a chief justice has” and, with commendable candor, says he
favors “the clerk picking on a lottery basis.”223 Letting the chief pick with
boundless discretion—prompting questions like, “Why should someone have
two votes?”—invites public qualms.224 “You want people to have conﬁdence
in the court system.”225
Nebraska: The Nebraska Supreme Court likewise names someone “prior
to argument,” says the clerk, “to avoid a tie, not to break one.”226 The process
is “not controlled by rule and is relatively informal.”227 Nor is it “case
dependent as to the issues or type of case involved.”228 But it happens fairly
often, says the clerk, adding, “We’ve had some retirements lately.”229 Basically,
“[i]f the Chief learns that there will be a vacancy for any reason (conﬂicts,
illness, etc.) the practice is to attempt to ﬁll out all cases with a full Court of
seven, even if a full Court is not constitutionally required.”230

Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Mo. Clerk, supra note 198.
William P. McLauchlan, An Empirical Examination of the Business of the Montana
Supreme Court, in O PEN J UDICIAL P OLITICS (Rorie Spill Solberg, Jennifer Segal Diascro &
Eric Waltenburg eds., 2020), https://open.oregonstate.education/open-judicial-politics/
chapter/mclauchlan [https://perma.cc/JH5G-LE4J].
218 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Ed Smith, Clerk, Mont. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle with author).
219 See McLauchlan, supra note 217.
220 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Ed Smith, supra note 218.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Teresa Brown, Clerk, Neb. Sup. Ct. (Oct.
2015-Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle with author).
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id.
216
217
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New Mexico: A similar tie-avoiding procedure occurs in New Mexico, where
the clerk says temporary assignments happen “all the time.”231 There’s “no set
or written policy.”232 “It changes from chief to chief,” who has wide selection
discretion and may “focus on subject-matter expertise and geographical
variety” or “go back and forth between trial and appellate judges to get
variety.”233 But appointments have occurred “with frequency the past few years,
especially when we get a new justice with lower court experience who has to
recuse a lot.”234 The current Chief Justice is “careful not to be seen as courtpacking,” particularly in “cases of political notoriety,” and “might look to a judge
of another party to avoid the appearance of slanting the case.”235 When
appointing an appellate judge, the current chief justice has a list “and goes down
the list on a seniority basis.”236 There is no such list for trial-judge appointees.237
North Dakota: In North Dakota, the Chief Justice (actually, the clerk)
names someone “at the ﬁrst possible moment,” says the clerk, who says swift,
pre-deadlock appointments “avoids the suggestion that someone was
handpicked due to subject matter.”238 When the North Dakota Supreme
Court is short-staﬀed, the clerk sends an email to trial court judges outside
the district where the case arose. “The ﬁrst to respond gets it,” says the clerk,
adding, “Frankly, we don’t get a lot of responses back because our trial courts
are too busy.”239 And if no trial judge responds, “we then go to senior
judges.”240 The prior Chief Justice wanted to approve substitute judges, but
“the current chief wants to avoid accusations of political [maneuvering] if
there’s a hot topic.”241 Such appointments happen frequently—”happens
every month,” reports the clerk—since one Justice is married to a trial judge,
and another is “married to a big-ﬁrm lawyer” whose law ﬁrm often appears
before the Court.242
Ohio: Ohio has a front-loaded system, too, explains longtime Chief Justice
(and former Lieutenant Governor) Maureen O’Connor.243 If a 3–3 split arises
231 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Joey Moya, Clerk, N.M. Sup. Ct. (October
2015-February 2016) (on ﬁle with author).
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Penny Miller, Clerk, N.D. Sup. Ct. (Oct.
2015-Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle with author).
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Telephone Interview with Maureen O’Connor, Chief Just., Ohio Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015-Feb.
2016) (on ﬁle with author).
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at the “jurisdictional” phase, when the Court is deciding whether to grant a
case, she will name a judge from the court of appeals.244 “It’s simple and
expeditious,” she says, adding, “My predecessor did it the same way.”245 If the
case is granted, Chief Justice O’Connor will designate another appellate judge
from around the state.246 Appointments are relatively infrequent, she says:
“[T]hree a year would be a lot.”247 She tries to spread appointments “evenly,”
doesn’t use brand-new judges, and doesn’t factor in a case’s subject matter.248
“The process is not random, but it is equitable.”249
Oregon: Oregon recently altered its impasse-resolution procedure.
Formerly, the Oregon Supreme Court “would not bring on judges at the outset
unless it was a death sentence or a case of significant public importance.”250
Today, the court does so “at the beginning of a case if we’re not at full strength,”
says the clerk, after review is granted but before argument, adding “we’ll go
ahead and appoint regardless of perceived magnitude.”251
Utah: The Utah system also aims to avert stalemate on the front end. As
soon as the ﬁve-member Utah Supreme Court is operating at less than full
strength, the Chief Justice “shall call an active judge from an appellate court
or the district court.”252 Says the clerk: “We avoid the tie-break scenario
altogether by maintaining an odd number . . . for all matters.”253 The clerk’s
oﬃce turns to the Presiding Judge of the court of appeals, sends along basic
case information, and it’s based on availability—“whoever volunteers ﬁrst.”254
Vermont: Vermont likewise tries to avoid stalemate by appointing someone
early. But the process is “haphazard,” says the clerk’s oﬃce, “no guidelines at
all”—and also “fairly rare, maybe 4–5 times in 26 years.”255 The relevant
statute merely says the Chief Justice may “appoint and assign . . . to a special
assignment.”256 And if the court “knows about a recusal ahead of time, it’ll go
ahead and appoint to avoid a tie.”257 But if recusal occurs later and the Court
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Lisa Norris-Lampe, Clerk, Ore. Sup. Ct.
(Oct. 2015-Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle with author).
251 Id.
252 UTAH CONST., art. VIII, § 2.
253 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Andrea Martinez, Clerk, Utah Sup. Ct. (Oct.
2015-Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle with author).
254 Id.
255 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Deb Laferriere, Program Adm’r, Vt. Sup. Ct.
(Oct. 2015-Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle with author).
256 4 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 22.
257 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Deb Laferriere, supra note 255.
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
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thinks a 2–2 vote is possible, then “an administrative person, not the chief,
will pick a retired Supreme Court justice or a sitting superior court judge.”258
The Chief Justice prefers that administrative personnel do the picking—
which creates “nervousness” in the clerk’s oﬃce when asked who they plan to
call “because I know their tendencies.”259 The Court always informs the
parties but does not reargue the case.260 The selection process is “convoluted,”
says the clerk, who cites a generic “potential for interference” but says
selection turns on “factors unrelated to the nature of the case, like who might
be available or who’s close by,” adding, “budget may also be a factor because
we don’t have to pay a superior court judge.”261
Virginia: In Virginia, the Chief Justice designates and assigns retired
members of the Virginia Supreme Court—and only retired members of the
Virginia Supreme Court—“to perform the duties of a justice of the Court.”262
He bases his selection on “whatever reasons he wishes,” says the clerk, who
adds that appointments “happen frequently” and “as soon as the Court is less
than full strength.”263 If for some reason a retired member of the Court is
unavailable—which is “rare,” according to the clerk—a 3–3 tie aﬃrms the
lower-court judgment.264
Also notable is that while various appointment provisions seem to impose
certain criteria, appointers sometimes interpret such provisions loosely. For
example, in Idaho, the Constitution says the Idaho Supreme Court “may call
a district judge,”265 but the clerk says the court reaches outside the district
judge pool to use retired Supreme Court justices “for most recusals, with an
occasional district judge if needed, primarily because of travel issues.”266
According to the clerk, “each retired justice is budgeted a certain number of
days to sit with the Supreme Court. We track their days to make sure we’re
staying within our budgeted days for each retired justice, and make the
selection based on availability of the justice’s personal calendar.”267

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-302(B) (2020) (“Any Chief Justice or justice who has retired from
active service . . . may be designated and assigned by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Virginia to perform the duties of a justice of the Court.”).
263 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Trish Harrington, Clerk, Va. Sup. Ct. (Oct.
2015-Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle with author).
264 Id.
265 IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 6.
266 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Stephen Kenyon, supra note 214.
267 Id.
258
259
260
261
262
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2. Roughly Two-Thirds of Anti-Stalemate States Rely on the Chief Justice
to Select Substitute Justices
Broadly speaking, there are three methods for tiebreaking. The ﬁrst
category maximizes judicial discretion; the Chief Justice appoints the ﬁll-in
justice. The second is all about executive discretion. In those states, the
Governors pick a temporary, replacement jurist. In the third category, the
court’s administrative personnel handles substitute-justice selection.
a. Twenty-Three Courts Rely on the Chief Justice
Almost seventy percent of states with a mechanism to avoid or break ties let
the chief justice appoint the replacement justice. In some states, the chief justice’s
pick isn’t really a “pick” at all; rather, appointees are chosen alphabetically,
rotationally, or drawn at random from eligible appointees. In other states, the
chief justice has unfettered discretion to select whomever he wishes.
i. In Some States, the Chief Justice Selects Neutrally or Randomly
California: The Golden State’s system is unique. The Chief Justice has
“almost total discretion” in appointing a temporary justice268—whether to
appoint, when to appoint, how to appoint, and whom to appoint.269 No
procedure is speciﬁed, and no consultation is required. The power is
unbounded. And because it takes ﬁve justices to decide for the seven-member
court, the various chief justices have wielded it often. In the quarter century
between 1977 and 2003, 408 cases involved a temporarily assigned justice.270
Between 1954 and 1984, a temporary justice cast the deciding vote seventythree times.271
Not only have California’s chief justices exercised their power frequently,
they have exercised it diﬀerently. Chief Justice Rose Bird, for example,
handpicked the ﬁll-in justice, a practice that critics say smacked of
manipulation to achieve preferred results.272 Sensitive to these charges of

268 Stephen R. Barnett & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Assignment of Temporary Justices in the
California Supreme Court, 17 PAC. L.J. 1045, 1047 (1986).
269 CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6; see also Fay v. Dist. Ct., 254 P. 896, 899 (Cal. 1927) (holding that
this provision confers on the chief justice the power to make temporary assignments to the Supreme
Court as well).
270 See James C. Brent, Stacking the Deck? An Empirical Analysis of Agreement Rates Between Pro
Tempore Justices and Chief Justices of California, 1977-2003, 27 JUST. SYS. J. 14, 21 (2006) (showing that
the rate of temporary judge appointments accelerated under Chief Justice Bird’s ten-year tenure,
with 271 votes cast during that time).
271 Barnett & Rubinfeld, supra note 268, at 1049.
272 Id. at 1183-84 (“This study has found enough evidence of pro-chief-justice bias in the votes,
and possibly the selection, of temporary justices sitting with the California Supreme Court to

2021]

Supreme Stalemates

487

cherry-picking, her successors, while possessing no less discretion, have
adopted an “alphabetical, rotational assignment procedure,” which the clerk
described this way: “The Chief Justice assigns in alphabetical order a court of
appeals justice with at least one year of experience. If the justice is not able
to serve, they will be next in line for the next appointment, and then the
process returns to alphabetical order.”273 The clerk said the Court “always
brings in a seventh for oral argument and will bring in a pro tem at the
petition phase to break a tie.”274
At the petition for review stage, when “four justices cannot agree on a
disposition,” the Chief Justice “assigns in alphabetical order . . . a Court of
Appeal justice as a pro tempore justice . . . .”275 The pro tem justice must have
served on the Court of Appeal for at least one year, and if the justice is unable
to serve as pro tem, “the next justice on the alphabetical list will be assigned,
and the Court of Appeal justice who was unable to serve will be assigned in
the next case in which a pro tempore appointment is required.”276 Here’s what
happens if a justice recuses or is otherwise unavailable post-petition:
When it is known after a case is granted but before argument that a justice
for any reason is unable to participate in a matter, the Chief Justice
pursuant to constitutional authority . . . assigns on an alphabetical
rotational basis . . . a Court of Appeal justice to assist the court in place of
the nonparticipating justice.277

California, like a few other states, tries to bypass impasse, adding a pro
tem justice early in the process, whenever the court is shorthanded, not
waiting for deadlock to arise.
Florida: Many states operate their tiebreakers loosely based on custom,
tradition, and history, but the Sunshine State has reduced its appointment
system to writing. If four justices “cannot ultimately agree to a disposition,
the chief justice may in certain cases assign a judge or senior judge to the case
as a temporary ‘associate justice’ under the procedures below.”278 The
prepositional phrase “in certain cases” is key. In discretionary review cases, a
3-3 tie means “the Court will discharge jurisdiction” (tie goes to the status
quo)—except if four justices agree that “extraordinary circumstances exist
conclude that the present system of appointing those justices, a system of virtually unlimited
discretion in the chief justice, threatens the reputation and integrity of the court.”)
273 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Frank McGuire, Ct. Admin. & Clerk, Cal.
Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015-Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle with author).
274 Id.
275 CAL. SUP. CT., INTERNAL OPERATING PRACS. & PROCS. § IV.J.
276 Id.
277 Id. § XIII.B.
278 FLA. SUP. CT. INTERNAL OPERATING PROC. § X, http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/
pub_info/documents/IOPs.pdf [https://perma.cc/JG6Z-JM3X].
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that would justify deciding the case . . . .”279 In mandatory review cases, the
Chief Justice (or Acting Chief Justice) will always assign a temporary
justice.280 The “Method of Selection” is prescribed in detail:
Associate justices shall be the chief judges of the district courts of appeal
selected on a rotating basis from the lowest numbered court to the highest
and repeating continuously. A district court shall be temporarily removed
from the rotation if the case emanated from it. If more than one associate
justice is needed, they shall be selected from separate district courts according
to the numerical rotation. If the chief judge of a district court who would be
assigned under this procedure is recused from the case or otherwise
unavailable, the next most senior judge on that court (excluding senior
judges) who is not recused shall replace the chief judge as associate justice.281

In sum, the chief judges of the courts of appeal are assigned by
numerical rotation.
Hawaii: In the Aloha State, the Constitution gives the Chief Justice wideopen discretion when naming a temporary justice. But “to avoid any appearance
of anything,” the Supreme Court of Hawaii has adopted a rotational system,
says a lawyer in the Chief Justice’s office.282 The Court maintains a list of trial
court judges, and when an appointment is needed, we “go down in order.”283
The list started off alphabetically, but “names get added to the bottom as new
judges are appointed.”284 Moreover, the Court appoints as soon as full strength
is lost, even before the case is granted.285 Appointees, though, are only drawn
from Oahu, where the Supreme Court is.286 Excluding other islands is “not
intentional, but more for financial and logistical reasons.”287
New Hampshire: The Granite State is a rarity, the only one where state
law, not merely court custom or internal procedure, requires that substitute
justices be selected “on a random basis.”288 The statute speciﬁes who can be
appointed, and the order of preference (retired supreme court, retired
superior court, active superior court, active district, or probate court). The
statute is silent on timing, meaning “there’s discretion on when to appoint,”
says the clerk, adding, “there’s no temporary justice in most cases where the
Id. § X(B).
Id. § X(C).
Id. § X(D).
Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Public Aﬀairs Oﬃce, Hawaii State Judiciary
(Oct. 2015-Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle with author).
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §490:3 (2020).
279
280
281
282
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Court has three or four.”289 Generally, “a temporary justice is only appointed
if needed to meet the quorum requirement of three justices, or if there is a
quorum, once the tie presents itself.”290 And when the need arises, says the
clerk, “the chief authorizes me to go forward, so we start with retired supreme
court justices—we put their names on slips of paper and put them in an
envelope.”291 Why the statutory randomness requirement? “It was added in
2004 in response to concern that a temporary justice could be assigned to
reach a particular result.”292
New Hampshire’s move toward randomness resulted from an
extraordinary crisis: the 2000 impeachment (but not conviction) of Chief
Justice David Brock amid accusations he had abused his discretion in making
temporary assignments (among other ethical lapses).293 It was the ﬁrst
impeachment of a Granite State public oﬃcial since 1790 and arose from a
bitter divorce involving one of the Court’s other members—Justice Stephen
Thayer.294 The divorce proceedings reached the New Hampshire Supreme
Court on an emergency motion ﬁled by Justice Thayer’s wife.295 The upshot
of Justice Thayer’s divorce landing in the lap of the Supreme Court was that,
naturally, every single justice needed to be recused.296 So Chief Justice Brock
was required to appoint replacement judges for the entire bench.297 The Chief
Justice announced the replacements at a conference at which Justice Thayer
was present, and Justice Thayer vigorously protested one of Justice Brock’s
appointees.298 The Chief Justice was then accused of inviting Justice Thayer’s
input. Justice Thayer later resigned to avoid criminal misconduct charges
stemming from, among other things, his alleged attempt to inﬂuence his
colleagues’ handling of his case.299
Washington: Washington’s system—names drawn at random from a fancy
chalice—seems as ministerial as can be. The names of eligible appointees are
“put on separate slips and drawn from a container by the Clerk to ensure that
selection is random.”300 Roughly six names are drawn, says the clerk, and “if

289 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Eileen Fox, Clerk, N.H. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle with author).
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 David Steelman & John Cerullo, Judicial Accountability in a Time of Tumult: New Hampshire’s
Impeachment Crisis of 2000, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1357, 1384-85.
294 Id. at 1366, 1384-85.
295 In re David Brock, No. JC-00-010A, (N.H. Sup. Ct. Comm. on Judicial Conduct).
296 Steelman & Cerullo, supra note 293, at 1384.
297 Id.
298 Id. at 1384-85.
299 Id. at 1385-86.
300 WASH. SUP. CT. ADMIN. R. 21(c).
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the ﬁrst declines, we just go to the next.”301 The Chief Justice does not
“approve” the selection, which “avoids charges of picking people who’ll vote
a preferred way.”302 Eligible pro tem appointees include active and retired
court of appeals judges. Interestingly, former Washington Supreme Court
justices are not eligible (unless the justice had participated in the case before
leaving the Court).303
The Court doesn’t wait for deadlock to arise. If the number of those not
participating reduces the nine-member Court to an even number, the default is
that “a pro tempore justice shall be appointed by the Chief Justice, unless a
majority of the court directs otherwise” but when the Court, though shorthanded,
is still operating with an odd number, the Chief notifies the others, “and the
majority shall direct whether a pro tempore justice should be appointed.”304
ii. In Other States, the Chief Justice Selects Non-randomly
Oklahoma: Like Texas, Oklahoma has a bifurcated high-court system (the
nine-member Oklahoma Supreme Court for civil matters, the five-member
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals for criminal matters). Chief Justices of
the Supreme Court name substitute judges, not only to their own civil high
court but also to the criminal high court.305 Timing-wise, says the clerk, “the
situation is assessed after the initial vote is taken on a case by the reduced
panel.” If there’s a tie, the Chief Justice will appoint a member of the bench—
“the chief can pick whoever he wishes”—either a lower-court judge or a
member of the sister high court.306 The clerk says tie-vote situations “hardly
ever happen” on the five-member court of criminal appeals, though if they did,
the supreme court’s Chief Justice would name someone, quite possibly a
supreme court justice, “if the presiding judge of the criminal high court
requests it.”307

301 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Ron Carpenter, Clerk, Wash. Sup. Ct. (Oct.
2015-Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle with author).
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 WASH. SUP. CT. ADMIN. R. 21(a).
305 In Texas, the dual high courts are constitutional twins, but in Oklahoma, the Supreme Court
has general superintending control over the Court of Criminal Appeals. OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 6.
306 Several years ago, eight of nine Oklahoma Supreme Court justices were recused, and the
remaining justice made eight appointments. Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Michael
Richie, Clerk, Okla. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015-Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle with author) (discussing Musgrove Mill,
LLC v. Capitol-Medical Ctr. Improvement & Zoning Comm., 2009 OK 19, 210 P.3d 835).
307 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Michael Richie, supra note 306; see, e.g., Order
of Appointment, Gandy v. Oklahoma, No. C-2009-720 (Okla. Crim. App. Apr. 20, 2009),
https://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db=appellate&number=2009-720
[https://perma.cc/HC2N-U4AJ] (Vice Chief Justice Steven Taylor assigned to sit on the Court of
Criminal Appeals due to the retirement of a judge).
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South Carolina: The practice in South Carolina is multi-layered, and the
timing of appointments “depends on what we’re dealing with,” explains the
clerk.308 “For routine motions or petitions that will be decided without oral
argument, the Court will determine that it is deadlocked before appointing a
substitute.”309 But for cases set for oral argument, “a substitute will be appointed
well before the argument is commenced.”310 The Chief Justice may appoint a
“retired judge or justice from the Supreme Court or court of appeals,”311 but the
clerk says using retired high-court justices has proven “very effective” and that
using court of appeals judges “disrupts the schedules of those courts.”312 The
Chief Justice has unfettered discretion, but the clerk reports no criticisms of
strategic selection. “It usually turns on who’s available and close by.”313
South Dakota: The state constitution gives the Chief Justice “power to
assign any circuit judge to sit . . . on the Supreme Court in case of a vacancy
or in place of a justice who is disqualiﬁed or unable to act.”314 The ﬁvemember high court has no discretionary review, and the clerk says
appointments happen regularly and as soon as the Court is operating at less
than full strength. How does it work? The clerk is unsure, calling it “random,”
saying “word comes down from the chief who he has selected.”315
Virginia: The Chief Justice assigns retired members of the Supreme Court
and has freewheeling discretion to pick for “whatever reasons he wishes,” says
the clerk.316 Appointments are frequent and occur up front, whenever the
Court dips below full strength.317 And in the rare event a retired supreme
court justice is unavailable, a 3–3 split aﬃrms the lower court.318
West Virginia: In the Mountain State, the Chief Justice has “absolute
discretion” says the clerk, “but decisions are often made collaboratively.”319
While selection “isn’t random,” the inquiry is more, “Who would be good on
this case and hasn’t been up here before?”320 And because the chief justiceship
rotates every year in West Virginia, “responsibility isn’t lodged in someone
308 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Dan Shearouse, Clerk, S.C. Sup. Ct. (Oct.
2015-Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle with author).
309 Id.
310 Id.
311 S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-1-215.
312 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Dan Shearouse, supra note 308.
313 Id.
314 S.D. CONST. art. 5, § 11.
315 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Laura Graves, Clerk, S.D. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle with author).
316 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Trish Harrington, supra note 263.
317 Id.
318 Id.
319 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Rory Perry, Clerk, W. Va. Sup. Ct. App. (Oct.
2015-Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle with author).
320 Id.
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permanently, which fosters goodwill people not wanting to spoil the well.”321
Appointments happen “when we reach a critical stage of the proceedings,”
says the clerk, speciﬁcally “once the Court has voted and a tie vote presents
itself for the ﬁrst time.”322 The Court gets a “good read” on votes at the
Decision Conference, which occurs pre-argument in every case.323 Again, the
Chief Justice has “wide discretion” but is “good about keeping those
appointments as neutral and fair-minded as possible, and spreading work”
among the seventy to eighty jurists who are in the eligible pool.324
Interim appointments in West Virginia weren’t always so
noncontroversial. In 2000, when the West Virginia Supreme Court frequently
split 3–2, a prominent West Virginia lawyer lamented the Chief Justice’s “vast
discretion (comparable, say, to that of an Oriental potentate),” able to dole
out appointments “to those who were personally or ideologically
simpatico.”325 Citing the scandal then engulﬁng the similar appointment
system in New Hampshire, the lawyer decried the arbitrariness and risk of
abuse: “Not infrequently, it is the substitute justices, voting with the chief,
who constitute the majority. Thus, under this rule, as a de facto matter the
Chief Justice is given a second, and occasionally a third, vote.”326 The lawyer
predicted, “A New Hampshire-style wreck is just waiting to happen.” The
issue isn’t, he continued, whether the Chief Justice actually stacked the deck,
but whether a reasonably prudent person might think so.327 A better system,
he proposed, would be to simply put the names of eligible judges in a
proverbial hat and draw one. Unfettered discretion enables “backroom
politics[] that never sees the light of day” and risks “the crassest of cronyism,”
he contended. “More sinister, it can be part of a scheme to inﬂuence the
result,”328 noting a report that “a chief justice in years past would call
prospective appointees and pose ‘hypothetical’ questions.”329
Wyoming: The current Wyoming Supreme Court makes frequent use of
temporary justices. “It happens quite often,” says the clerk.330 It’s a ﬁvemember court with no discretionary review, and the newest member was a

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
John Rogers, Appointment of Substitute Judges: The Proverbial Train Wreck Looking for a Place
to Happen, W. VA. LAW., Oct. 2000, at 14.
326 Id.
327 Id.
328 Id.
329 Id.
330 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Carol Thompson, Clerk, Wyo. Sup. Ct. (Oct.
2015-Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle with author).
321
322
323
324
325
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22-year trial court judge in a district with a prison.331 Translation: He recuses
a lot. And while the Constitution says the Chief Justice “may appoint,” the
current chief (an oﬃce that rotates every four years) treats it as “shall
appoint.”332 Geographically, chiefs “try to move it around,” says the clerk,
adding, “It’s done on the front end before anything happens.”333 The clerk’s
oﬃce is uninvolved.334 The Chief Justice picks a list of 23 trial court judges
and one former Supreme Court justice.335 The Chief Justice says, “chiefs have
probably done it diﬀerently over the years,” but his practice is to send an
email to trial judges and “ask if they want to take a turn.”336 He tries to go
through that list and says he has never tried to pick “selectively,” noting that
“[s]ome cases are more signiﬁcant than others, thus you’d want a more
seasoned judge to participate.”337 Also, “weather is a real issue, so you try to
get judges from diﬀerent parts of the state during times of the year when it’s
easier to travel.”338 And when the chief himself is recused, the most senior
justice picks “and always picks the retired Supreme Court justice.”339
b. Four Courts Rely on the Governor
Four states involve the Governor in selecting the tiebreaking justice:
Arkansas, Nevada, Tennessee, and Texas.340
Arkansas: As noted above, the Governor names a substitute in “maybe 10
percent of cases.” He does so on the front end, says the clerk, which saves
time given the current division on the high court.341 The Governor knows the

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with E. James Burke, Chief Justice, Wy.
Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015-Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle with author).
336 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with E. James Burke, supra note 335.
337 Id.
338 Id.
339 Id.
340 I do not count Alabama among the governor-picks group. True, a statute says the governor
will name a temporary, tiebreaking justice when “there is equal division among [the judges] on any
question material to the determination of the case.” ALA. CODE § 12-2-14. But the nine-member
Alabama Supreme Court considers that law unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds. See
City of Bessemer v. McClain, 957 So. 2d 1061, 1093-95 (Ala. 2006) (holding that § 12-2-14 is
unconstitutional insofar as it limits the chief justice’s right to ﬁll a court vacancy). The court
considers the chief justice head of the judicial branch of government, and the Chief Justice appoints
someone whenever the court is stymied, “typically a retired former justice,” says court staﬀ.
Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Brad Medaris, Cent. Staﬀ Att’y, Ala. Sup. Ct. (Dec.
2015) (on ﬁle with author). But the chief has “wide-open discretion” and could draw from a wider
judicial pool. Id.
341 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Stacey Pectol, supra note 204.
331
332
333
334
335
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case speciﬁcs when he makes the assignment, but again, it happens early on,
before stalemate has arisen.342
Nevada: The Silver State bifurcates the power to name temporary justices.
In other words, the power to unlock a divided court is itself divided—or
rather, shared between the Governor and the Chief Justice. Once the Nevada
Supreme Court votes and a tie arises, the Governor may designate a lowercourt judge.343 But in practice the selection is made by the Chief Justice, who
draws a name at random from index cards—a “high-tech process,” says the
clerk.344 A letter then goes to the Governor asking him to appoint whoever
was drawn.345 “It’s courtesy that the governor defers to the Court’s request,”
the clerk says.346 “If the appointee is a district judge, the governor makes the
appointment,” deferring to whatever name the Chief Justice drew at
random.347 But “if the appointee is a senior (i.e., retired) justice, the Chief
Justice picks whoever he wants unilaterally, and the governor has no
involvement.”348 Nevada “only recently got a court of appeals,” but the clerk
suspects it would work the same as district judges—the Governor rubberstamping the Chief Justice’s random, index-card selection.349
Tennessee: In 2014, the Volunteer State amended its Constitution to adopt
the “Tennessee Plan” for choosing appellate judges: Governor appoints,
Legislature conﬁrms, voters retain.350 As for ﬁlling temporary vacancies,
things are a bit complicated, as authority is not vested solely in one branch.

Id.
NEV. CONST. art. 6, § 4 (“In case of the disability or disqualiﬁcation, for any cause, of a
justice of the Supreme Court, the Governor may designate a judge of the court of appeals or a
district judge to sit in the place of the disqualiﬁed or disabled justice.”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 1.225(5)
(2019) (“Upon the disqualiﬁcation of: . . . A justice of the Supreme Court . . . a judge of the Court
of Appeals or a district judge shall be designated to sit in place of the justice as provided in Section
4 of Article 6 of the Constitution . . . .”); NEV. R. APP. P. 25A(b)(2)(C) (“A senior justice, senior
Court of Appeals Judge, or active district court judge may be assigned to sit in place of a justice as
provided by law.”); see also NEV. SUP. CT. R. 10(8) (“The temporary assignment of a senior
justice . . . to the supreme court . . . shall be made by order signed by the chief justice or the chief
justice’s designee and ﬁled with the clerk of the supreme court.”)
344 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Tracie Lindeman, Clerk, Nev. Sup. Ct. (Oct.
2015-Feb. 2016).
345 Id.
346 Id.
347 Id.
348 Id.
349 Id.; see NEV. SUP. CT. R. 10(8).
350 TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 3. The 2014 amendment scrapped the Judicial Nominating
Commission and added conﬁrmation by the General Assembly. See Alexandra Martellaro, All 4 Tenn.
Constitutional Amendments Pass, RENO GAZETTE J. (Nov. 4, 2014, 8:35 PM),
https://www.rgj.com/story/news/politics/2014/11/04/november-election-tennesseeamendments/18489923 [https://perma.cc/AJ5C-AT23] (reporting on a voter-passed amendment that
changed the way judges are appointed in the state).
342
343
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The Tennessee Constitution gives appointment power to the Governor,351 but
the very next sentence authorizes the Legislature to pass laws for the
appointment of “special Judges” if someone is “unable . . . to attend or sit” or
is “incompetent.”352 And lawmakers have done just that, passing statutes that
confer power on the Chief Justice to appoint replacement judges.353 The
Tennessee Supreme Court put it this way in a 1999 case challenging the Chief
Justice’s power to name special supreme court justices: “We believe that
[these various statutes] were promulgated with the intent to empower both
the Governor and the Chief Justice to designate temporary judges.”354 Such
temporary appointments, however, are exceedingly rare, says the Court
clerk.355 And if a 2–2 deadlock results from a vacancy, rather than a recusal,
the Court agrees to hold the case until the permanent justice is named.356
Texas: The Lone Star State uses the uncommon—and in my view,
alarming—method described at the beginning of this Article. That is, the
Governor—the head of a separate branch of government—selects the
tiebreaking justice and does so with full knowledge of which case is
deadlocked and what the disputed issues are. He does not know which justices
have voted which way, but he knows the case is tied and that his appointee
will cast the tiebreaking vote. Texas law doesn’t require the case to be
revealed.357 The disclosure is simply a matter of longstanding tradition.
Unsurprisingly, no other state with a “governor-picks” designation system
thinks it a good idea to reveal which case is tied.
In recent history, the Texas Supreme Court has used judicial pinch-hitters
sparingly—only fourteen cases in the past quarter-century. Nine of these
351 TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 11 (“In case all or any of the judges of the Supreme Court shall
thus be disqualiﬁed . . . the governor of the state . . . shall forthwith specially commission the
requisite number of men, of law knowledge, for the trial and determination thereof.”). Twenty years
ago, the governor exercised his constitutional power to name replacements for the entire court when
they all recused themselves in a case challenging the way justices are elected. State ex rel. Hooker v.
Thompson, 249 S.W.3d 331, 335 (Tenn. 1996).
352 TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 11 (“The Legislature may by general laws make provision that
special judges may be appointed, to hold any courts the judge of which shall be unable or fail to
attend or sit; or to hear any cause in which the judge may be incompetent.”).
353 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 17-2-102 (giving the Governor the power to ﬁll vacancies if a judge
is “incompetent to sit”), 17-2-104 (same if a judge falls ill), and 17-2-110(a) (2019) (giving the Chief
Justice the power to ﬁll vacancies when a judge is “unable to try the docket”).
354 Hooker v. Sundquist, 1999 WL 74545 at *2-3 (Tenn. Feb. 16, 1999) (“We interpret the
reference to “appellate judge[s]” in TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-2-110(a) to include judges of the
Supreme Court.”).
355 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with James M. Hivner, Clerk, Tenn. Sup. Ct. (Oct.
2015-Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle with author).
356 Id.
357 See infra Section IV.D; see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.005 (West 2020) (giving the
governor the power to appoint justices in the event of a vacancy without requiring the Chief Justice
to reveal the speciﬁcs of the case).
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occasions arose during ﬁfteen-year tenure of Governor Rick Perry (2000–
2015),358 up from four during the ﬁve-year tenure of Governor George W.
Bush (1995–2000),359 up from one during the combined eight-year tenure of
Governor Bill Clements (1979–1983; 1987–1991).360
Unlike the twenty-four other states where a temporary justice is named as
soon as the court is operating at less than full strength, the Texas Supreme
Court usually doesn’t request a substitute justice unless the court is hopelessly
deadlocked post-argument. Some Texas high court justices report a general
reluctance to involve the Governor unless inescapably necessary, a view
plausibly understood as fostering greater openness and deference to the views
of colleagues (similar to how some SCOTUS Justices are reportedly more
“accommodating” in order to avoid a 4–4 split given the lack of any tiebreaker).
One point merits mention: It would be mistaken to describe all of the
Texas substitute appointees as “tiebreaking” justices. For example, in one
case, In re George,361 as a letter from then Chief Justice Phillips to then
Governor Bush makes clear, three justices were recused, meaning the Court
was markedly short-handed; they had to decide the case with only six justices,
making the ﬁve-vote majority “needed to render judgment” tougher to
reach.362 But the tie-vote impasse was obvious in other cases, as well. For
example, in In re Masonite Corp.,363 Chief Justice Phillips’s letter frankly states,
“[w]ith eight justice[s] participating, ﬁve justices have not been able to agree
on the proper disposition.”364 Same with In re Epic Holdings,365 where, with
358 The cases during Governor Perry’s tenure include: DiGiuseppe v. Lawler, 269 S.W.3d 588
(Tex. 2008); Igal v. Brightstar Info. Tech. Grp. Inc., 250 S.W.3d 78 (Tex. 2008); In re BP Prods. N.
Am., Inc., 244 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. 2008); Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Tr., 268 S.W.3d 1
(Tex. 2008); Energy Serv. Co. of Bowie, Inc. v. Superior Snubbing Servs., Inc., 236 S.W.3d 190
(Tex. 2007); Hyundai Motor Co. v. Vasquez, 189 S.W.3d 743 (Tex. 2006); Sultan v. Mathew, 178
S.W.3d 747 (Tex. 2005); St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolﬀ, 94 S.W.3d 513 (Tex. 2002); In re TXU Elec. Co.,
67 S.W.3d 130 (Tex. 2001).
359 In re George, 28 S.W.3d 511 (Tex. 2000); In re Masonite Corp., 997 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. 1999);
H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Bilotto, 985 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. 1998); In re EPIC Holdings, Inc., 985 S.W.2d
41 (Tex. 1998).
360 Hous. Lighting & Power Co. v. Reynolds, 765 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. 1988).
361 28 S.W.3d 511.
362 Collins v. Ison-Newsome, 73 S.W.3d 178, 183 (Tex. 2001) (holding that a minimum of ﬁve
justices is needed to render judgement); see also Letter from Thomas R. Phillips, Chief Just., Tex.
Sup. Ct., regarding In re EPIC Holdings, to George W. Bush, Governor, Tex. (Jan. 4, 2000) (on ﬁle
with the Texas Supreme Court).
Two historical tidbits. First, some of the letters from Governor Bush announcing his appointment
of tiebreaking justices were sent to then Secretary of State Alberto Gonzales, who served in that role
after his stint as Governor Bush’s first general counsel and before serving on the Texas Supreme Court.
Second, in In re George, Alberto Gonzales was himself one of the recused justices and later became
President George W. Bush’s White House Counsel and then U.S. Attorney General.
363 997 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. 1999).
364 Letter from Thomas R. Phillips to George W. Bush, supra note 362.
365 985 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1998).
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two recusals, “ﬁve justices have not been able to agree on the proper
disposition.”366 As these letters demonstrate, temporary justices are needed
whenever the Court is unable to reach a ﬁve-vote majority, whether or not
that corresponds to a 4–4 tie.
While infrequent, deadlock does arise in the Lone Star State, and when
it does, the Governor appoints a replacement justice.367 When the Texas
Supreme Court, the civil high court, is operating at less than full strength,
the Chief Justice may, but isn’t required to, “certify to the governor,” who
“immediately shall commission the requisite number of persons who are
active appellate or district court justices or judges and who possess the
qualiﬁcations prescribed for justices of the supreme court to try and
determine the case.”368
Notably, the Texas Supreme Court’s substitute-justice law changed in 1995
in three key ways.369 First, the prior law was phrased in mandatory terms,
stating, “[t]he chief justice shall certify to the governor . . . .” The new law
gives the Chief Justice discretion.370 Second, the prior law envisioned two
scenarios justifying a special appointment: lack of a quorum and equal
division.371 The new law scrapped the deadlock requirement, meaning the
Chief Justice may request substitute justices whenever someone is unable to
participate372—for example, if multiple recusals leave the Court short-staﬀed,
as happened in In re George, when three temporary justices were
commissioned.373 Third, the prior law didn’t require appointment of a sitting
judge, stating only that the appointee must “possess the qualiﬁcations
prescribed for justices of the supreme court[.]”374 The new law says
appointees must be “active appellate or district court justices or judges” who
are themselves constitutionally eligible to sit on the Supreme Court.375
These tweaks aside, the gamesmanship persists. Unsurprisingly, and
presumably, Governors will appoint temporary justices whose general judicial
philosophy tracks their own. And while a Governor cannot foretell his
permanent appointees’ behavior spanning thousands of cases in a judicial
Letter from Thomas R. Phillips to George W. Bush, supra note 362.
TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11; TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.005 (West 2019).
§ 22.005(a)-(b).
Act of May 19, 1995, ch. 428, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 3097, 3097 (codiﬁed as amended at
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.005 (West 2019)).
370 Id. (“The chief justice may . . . .”).
371 Id. (allowing a vacancy to be ﬁlled only when “at least ﬁve members of the supreme court
are disqualiﬁed . . . or the justices of the court are equally divided”).
372 Id. (allowing a vacancy to be ﬁlled whenever “one or more justices of the supreme court
have recused themselves . . . or are disqualiﬁed”).
373 28 S.W.3d 511 (Tex. 2000).
374 § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 3097, 3097.
375 Id. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.005 (West 2019) for the current version in its entirety.
366
367
368
369
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career, the dynamics are diﬀerent when the Governor is appointing a
tiebreaking justice for a single, speciﬁc case.376
c. Seven Courts Rely on Court Administration
Seven states let the court collectively select a tiebreaking justice. Here, too,
the specifics vary from state to state. And as with chief justice appointments,
many courts delegate the selection to administrative personnel at the court.
Connecticut: Connecticut uses an uncommon method of impasse
resolution. The seven-member Connecticut Supreme Court often hears cases
in five-justice panels, but what happens if a justice recuses, and the four
remaining justices split 2–2? Statute and court rule both state, “Whenever the
court is evenly divided as to the result, the court shall reconsider the case, with
or without oral argument, with an odd number of judges.”377 Who gets added
and how? The 1998 case Pesino v. Atlantic Bank of New York is instructive.378 A
justice recused post-argument, so another member of the court was added to
the panel (the mechanics of which sparked some disagreement).379 When
adding to a panel, the Supreme Court first looks to its seven active members
and then to retired members. If a panel can’t be constituted from active and
retired members of the court, a lower-court judge may be summoned, and that
selection, the clerk says, is “completely based on seniority.”380
Georgia: Georgia law gives appointment power to “the remaining
Justices,”381 and the mechanics are unique. The clerk has exclusive access to
the “designated judge list,” a spreadsheet of names of lower-court judges
submitted by all seven members of the court. “I’m the only person who
knows who’s up next,” says the clerk, “so there’s no appearance of cherrypicking. It’s all randomized.”382 Names are selected “in alternating order,

376 For an examination of the fourteen cases in which substitute justices were appointed in the
past quarter century, see infra Appendix B.
377 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-209; CONN. R. APP P. § 70-6; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51207 (permitting the Chief Justice to summon a Superior Court or Appellate Court judge to
temporarily sit in for a Supreme Court judge who is unavailable or disqualiﬁed).
378 709 A.2d 540, 542-43 (Conn. 1998) (providing an example in which a justice who was added
to an evenly divided panel participated in the decision after reviewing briefs and listening to a
recording of the oral argument).
379 See id. at 548 n.1 (McDonald, J., dissenting) (arguing the case should have been reargued).
380 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Pamela Meotti, Chief Admin. Oﬃcer, Conn.
Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015) (on ﬁle with author).
381 GA. CONST. art. VI, § 6, para. 1 (“If a Justice is disqualiﬁed in any case, a substitute judge
may be designated by the remaining Justices to serve.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-2-2 (“Whenever one
or more of the Justices of the Supreme Court are unable . . . to preside in any case and the parties
desire a full bench, it shall be the duty of the remaining Justices to designate a [trial] judge . . . to
preside in the place of the absent Justice or Justices . . . .”).
382 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Therese Barnes, supra note 212.

2021]

Supreme Stalemates

499

giving each justice the opportunity to extend an invitation.”383 This neutral
process has long been followed, though Justice David Nahmias, a former
law clerk to Justice Scalia, has “tightened things up” to ensure “randomness
and no influence.”384
Idaho: Appointments are discretionary and may factor in subject-matter
expertise. And while the Idaho Constitution vests authority in the court
collectively, the selection is delegated to the clerk. “In most cases, I select the
pro tem justice without input from the court,” the clerk says. “I discuss with
the Chief Justice who to select in about 10 percent of the cases. Most of these
discussions occur when the Court will be traveling for hearings, and I need
to ﬁnd a local district judge to sit with the Court.”385
Louisiana: Beﬁtting Louisiana’s quirky, fun-loving vibe—laissez les bons
temps rouler—the names of lower-court judges eligible for appointment are
written on small circular discs (like those attached to your car keys at a valet
stand) and thrown into a plastic Halloween Jack-o’-Lantern.386 The clerk
reaches in and plucks one. Actually, the clerk plucks three, “keeping in mind
the order of their selection,” says the clerk. If all three decline, “three more
names are pulled and the process continues until a judge accepts.”387
The court uses “ad hocs” both when determining its docket and when
deciding its docket. “When considering whether to grant or deny a writ, we
appoint if it’s a 3–3 tie,” says the clerk.388 But when the court sits to hear a
granted case, “we have a total of seven participate, ﬁlling any vacancies with
ad hocs prior to sitting.”389 The court will tell the clerk it needs a seventh
justice, and the clerk will take it from there. “The Court signs the order of
appointment but is removed from the decision of who will sit,” says the clerk,
who oﬀers this advice for states: “Have a pre-selected pool of potential
appointees so that the appointment can be random without a perception of
manipulation for a desired result.”390

Id.
Id.
Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Stephen Kenyon, supra note 214.
Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with John Olivier, Clerk, La. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015Jan. 2016) (on ﬁle with author). Louisiana’s Constitution gives its Supreme Court general
supervisory jurisdiction over all other courts and authority to establish procedural and
administrative rules not in conﬂict with law and to assign a sitting or retired judge to any court. LA.
CONST. art. V, § 5.
387 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with John Olivier, supra note 386.
388 Id.
389 Id.
390 Id. Not all lower-court judges’ names go into Louisiana’s Jack-o’-Lantern. There is a
preapproved list, and Supreme Court justices have discretion to remove certain jurists from
consideration. So only “eligible” judges are potential appointees. Id.
383
384
385
386

500

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 441

Nebraska: Since 1991, the process has worked this way: The Chief Justice’s
administrative assistant calls the chief judge of the court of appeals, who seeks
a member of that court to sit on the Supreme Court. “The Chief Justice is
not involved in that process within the Court of Appeals. We are fairly certain
that the Court of Appeals selection is on a rotational basis.”391
New York: The Empire State has “no set rule in place,” says the clerk.392
The Constitution authorizes the high court to designate a trial court judge in
times of “temporary absence or inability to act,” and the court only does so
when it is hopelessly deadlocked.393 Interestingly, the court only names a
temporary justice if the 3–3 tie is due to recusal, not if it’s due to a vacancy
(which doesn’t ﬁt within what the Constitution calls a “temporary absence or
inability to act”).394 If the former, “someone can vouch in”; if the latter, “the
Court might reargue.”395 Appointments are made by the court, “under
leadership of the chief judge,” says the clerk, adding, “They spread it around,
but beyond that, I can’t be more speciﬁc.”396
Oregon: The pool of appointees varies depending on the type of case. “In
non-capital cases, we select from the court of appeals,” says the clerk.397 “We
have a list by seniority and just go down the list. It’s rotational.”398 In “death
cases,” however, “we tend to pull from retired Supreme Court justices.”399
And if the court still winds up 3–3—”we may end up with six even if we didn’t
start with six”—“we’ll probably aﬃrm by an equally divided Court,” says the
clerk, though if it’s a mandatory-appeal case, “we might evaluate our options
and work hard to avoid a tie.”400 When asked why the court switched
procedures, which the court has used “probably three times so far,” the clerk
replied, “It avoids the danger of six so you know you have seven going in.
And pulling a court of appeals judge just means walking across the alley.”401

Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Teresa Brown, supra note 226.
Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Andrew Klein, Clerk, N.Y. Ct. App. (Oct.
2015-Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle with author).
393 Id.
394 Id.
395 Id.
396 Id.
397 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Lisa Norris-Lampe, supra note 250.
398 Id.
399 Id.
400 Id.
401 Id.
391
392
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III. YOU CAN’T PLEASE EVERYBODY: DRAWBACKS TO STATES’
DIVERGENT TIEBREAKING APPROACHES
Naturally, the various tiebreaking systems have naysayers. As the Illinois
Supreme Court put it a generation ago, “No solution is wholly free from
objection.”402 No matter how a state deals with impasse, there is no shortage
of deadlock dramas in state high courts. This section will highlight examples
of the heartburn that may result when (1) there is no tiebreaker, (2) the high
court collectively selects someone, (3) the Chief Justice picks a replacement
justice, or (4) the Governor chooses.
A. Angst When There Is No Tiebreaker—Pennsylvania and Wisconsin
At full strength, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is a septet—but it spent
nearly all of 1995 as a sextet. Shorthanded, the six-justice court deadlocked 3–
3 in several cases. One case concerned a couple trying to adopt a sickly toddler
they had nurtured since infancy. Another involved a company trying to stop
union organizing at one of its stores. A third case concerned a criminal
defendant seeking to overturn a drug conviction and long prison term. As at
the U.S. Supreme Court, a tie vote on the Pennsylvania high court means the
lower-court judgment stands.403 Said one Philadelphia lawyer: “Those 3–3
splits are so disheartening. It’s such a long journey just to get there in the ﬁrst
place, and to lose because of a missing justice is devastating.”404 Said another:
“A 3–3 vote is like kissing your sister. You don’t get anywhere, and the state
of the law is not advanced at all.”405 A former member of the court added,
“The state’s highest court should be in a position, at all times, to make
deﬁnitive decisions on the laws of the land.”406
A few years ago, the Wisconsin Supreme Court justices deadlocked 3–3
over whether their colleague’s 2008 campaign ad violated judicial ethics rules.
The impasse left everyone befuddled, though the accused justice declared
victory, saying the stalemate meant the state had failed to satisfy its burden.
A former member of the court confessed, “It’s an anomaly and I don’t know
of anything like it. I don’t have the foggiest idea of where they go next.”407

Perlman v. First Nat’l Bank of Chi., 331 N.E.2d 65, 66 (Ill. 1975) (per curiam).
See infra Appendix A.
Larry King, Some Want Full House in High Court, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 7, 1996, at A1.
Id. at A10.
Id. (quoting former Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Bruce W. Kauﬀman).
Jason Stein, State Supreme Court Deadlocks on Gableman’s Ethics Case, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL
(July
1,
2010),
http://archive.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/97557794.html
[https://perma.cc/V5PZ-ACJ7] (quoting former Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Janine Geske).
402
403
404
405
406
407
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B. Angst When a Former Member Is the Tiebreaker—Maryland
The seven-member Maryland Court of Appeals (the name for the high
court) ﬁlls temporary vacancies with retired Court of Appeals judges, though
virtually “any former judge” is eligible.408 In fact, because the state
constitution mandates retirement at age 70 and also permits retired judges to
be recalled into service, “the Court may have more provisional, retired
members than it has active members.”409 Some Maryland lawyers lament the
outsized role these retired judges exert, particularly “in some of the Court’s
most prominent and controversial decisions.”410 It’s true. Retired ﬁll-in judges
often provide the decisive votes and author the majority opinions in highstakes cases.411 The replacement judges don’t vote on whether to grant the
case, but their vote often decides the outcome. Some appellate specialists
contend that retired judges should not wield such inﬂuence, particularly in
cases of great public importance: “[A]s the Court’s membership shifts with
retired judges pinch-hitting for active members, the Court undermines its
ability to enunciate a consistent and coherent view of the state’s public
policy.”412 The high court, some lawyers complain, “should be more than just
a collection of diﬀerent panels of disparate decision-makers.”413
C. Angst When the Chief Justice Picks the Tiebreaker—New Jersey and
California
New Jersey has been ﬁghting over temporary New Jersey Supreme Court
appointments for years.414 This political tug-of-war over the makeup of the
court has spilled over into how the court handles temporary assignments,
though such assignments are never used to break ties.
408 MD. CONST. art. IV, § 3A (“[A]ny former judge, except a former judge of the Orphans’
Court, may be assigned by the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, upon approval of a majority of
the court, to sit temporarily in any court of this State.”).
409 Kevin Arthur, Who Is on the Court of Appeals: The Role of Retired Judges, MD. APP. BLOG
(Mar. 4, 2015), http://mdappblog.com/2014/01/07/who-is-on-the-court-of-appeals-the-role-ofretired-judges [https://perma.cc/P22P-C98B].
410 Id.
411 Id.
412 Id.
413 Id.
414 The New Jersey Senate President lambasted Governor Chris Christie, alleging he
“absolutely, 1,000 percent” broke a longstanding deal to leave unﬁlled a six-year-old vacancy on the
New Jersey Supreme Court. See Brent Johnson, Sweeney: Christie A
‘ bsolutely’ Broke Deal on N.J.
Supreme Court, NJ.COM (Jan. 16, 2019) https://www.nj.com/politics/2016/03/sweeney_
christie_absolutely_broke_deal_on_nj_supre.html [https://perma.cc/9GWC-RFZ3]; see also Brent
Johnson, Sweeney Slaps Down Christie over N.J. Supreme Court Nominee, NJ.COM (Jan. 16, 2019),
https://www.nj.com/politics/2016/03/sweeney_slaps_christie_over_nj_supreme_court_nomin.html
[https://perma.cc/4ZBQ-ZWFG] (calling the State Senate President’s refusal to grant a
conﬁrmation hearing to Governor Christie’s judicial nominee “the newest standoﬀ in an old feud”).
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Under the New Jersey Constitution, the Chief Justice “shall assign”
temporary replacements for absent justices “[w]hen necessary.”415 But when
is a temporary assignment “necessary”? Necessary to what? Are we talking
sort of “necessary” or urgently “necessary”? “Necessary” to reach a quorum
or “necessary” to reach the court’s full membership of seven? One scholar
contends the state constitution’s substitute justice provision “should be
interpreted as a narrow, mandatory duty applicable only when the court
would otherwise lack a quorum.”416 He insists that loosey-goosey
appointments to achieve anything that advances the court’s broad judicial
power are not “necessary” and “take license with the constitution,” especially
with language “designed to cabin its own members’ powers.”417 Since 1968,
however, a court rule has provided that assignments are permissible “to
replace a justice who is absent or unable to act, or to expedite the business of
the court,”418 a provision that some observers, including a former member of
the court,419 believe departs from the Constitution’s “[w]hen necessary”
restriction, thus “empowering a wily Chief Justice . . . to thereby assign the
particular judge she desires.”420 And even if the selection were wholly
aboveboard, “there is a considerable risk of suspicion, especially in a
‘politically critical’ case, that it was not,” particularly in cases “where the

415 N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 2, para. 1 (“The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and
six Associate Justices. Five members of the court shall constitute a quorum. When necessary, the
Chief Justice shall assign the Judge or Judges of the Superior Court, senior in service . . . to serve
temporarily in the Supreme Court.”)
416 Edward A. Hartnett, Ties in the Supreme Court of New Jersey, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 735,
749 (2003). This quorum-focused view is echoed by Professor Maltz, who notes that “by its terms
the language of the New Jersey constitution seems consciously designed to limit the discretion of
the chief justice” and “[w]hen necessary” should be read as “when necessary to the fulﬁllment of the
court’s constitutional responsibilities.” Earl M. Maltz, Temporary Assignments to Fill Vacancies on the
New Jersey Supreme Court 6 (The Federalist Soc’y, White Paper, Sept. 20, 2010), https://fedsoc-cmspublic.s3.amazonaws.com/update/pdf/CXnqMXdc7TUCI6wpm6xfdrWDHYDWQyUAHvSPMu
gU.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FQR-AS6X].
417 Hartnett, supra note 416, at 761.
418 N.J. R. 2:13-2(a).
419 Before leaving the court, former Justice Rivera-Soto wrote a long opinion explaining his
decision to abstain in a case in which the chief justice had assigned a temporary justice. Justice RiveraSoto’s spirited opinion concluded that “[t]he Court as so constituted is unconstitutional and its acts are
ultra vires.” He pledged that he “will continue to abstain from all decisions of this Court for so long as
it remains unconstitutionally constituted,” though he later tempered his stance, saying he would vote
when the temporary justice’s participation didn’t affect the outcome, and perhaps others. Henry v. New
Jersey Dep’t of Human Svcs., 9 A.3d 882, 903-14 (N.J. 2010) (Rivera-Soto, J., abstaining).
420 Hartnett, supra note 416, at 761.
420 Id. at 761 (citing In re Registrant M.F., 776 A.2d 780 (N.J. 2001)) (concerning sex offender
registration, in which three justices did not participate, but only one judge was temporarily assigned);
see also Michael Booth, Lawyers Beg for Leniency in Cases of Flubbed Affidavits of Merit, N.J.L.J., Sept.
29, 2003, at 4 (discussing cases argued the same day and noting that a replacement was named in cases
in which Justice Verniero was recused but not in a case in which Justice Wallace was recused).
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Supreme Court is otherwise equally divided.”421 Ever since the rule was
adopted, the court’s assignment practice has been labeled “erratic” and
“lawless,” with “little rhyme or reason . . . as to when a temporary
replacement will be used for an absent justice.”422 In any event, the clerk says
the Chief Justice assigns no one just to break a tie. “We’re not bringing anyone
up if we have a quorum. Many high-proﬁle cases have tied 3–3.”423
The California system grants the Chief Justice near absolute discretion.424
And in years past, it came under particular criticism—namely, that the
process “has been manipulated to favor replacements that will vote with the
Chief Justice.”425 The knock is that a willful Chief Justice could succumb to
the temptation to put a ﬁnger on the scale by stacking the court with likeminded allies.426 Some scholars insist the process is prone to manipulation
and gamesmanship, ﬁnding “substantial evidence of vote bias” in how
replacement justices are picked.427 Chief Justice Bird was accused of exactly
that—abusing her appointment power to achieve a preferred agenda.
Researchers have tried to move the debate from the anecdotal to the
empirical, studying whether Chief Justice Bird was indeed strategically
picking judges who would give her a second vote. Three major scholarly
investigations examined the agreement rates between Chief Justice Bird and
the temporary justices she appointed and compared that data with the
agreement rates between Bird’s predecessors and their appointees.428
Although the studies yielded what the most recent analysis called “mixed
results,”429 popular distrust of Bird’s neutrality spurred her successors to take
a more mechanical, nondiscretionary approach: by picking pro tempore
justices alphabetically.430

Hartnett, supra note 416, at 761.
Id. at 738, 752.
Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Gail Haney, Clerk, supra note 148.
See supra notes 268-277 and accompanying text (discussing the powers of the chief justice).
Schubert, supra note 78, at 226. See also Brent, supra note 270, at 16-17.
Brent, supra note 270, at 16-17.
Barnett & Rubinfeld, supra note 268, at 1155.
Comment, The Selection of Interim Justices in California: An Empirical Study, 32 STANFORD
L. REV. 433, 435 (1980) (examining cases decided between June 1, 1954 and May 31, 1979, calculating
an average agreement rate of eighty-seven percent, and concluding “the power to ﬁll temporary
vacancies may indeed have been used to assign judges likely to agree with the chief justice”);
Stephanie M. Wildman & Denise Whitehead, A Study of Justice Pro Tempore Assignments in the
California Supreme Court, 20 UNIV. S.F. L. REV. 1, 7 (1985) (“The charge that the Chief Justice assigns
pro tem justices in order to inﬂuence the judicial process lacks any evidentiary support.”); Barnett
& Rubinfeld, supra note 268 (examining the tenures of several Chief Justices and discussing
commentary surrounding the role of the chief judge).
429 Brent, supra note 270, at 15.
430 Id. at 18.
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
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The most expansive study, in 1986, looked at voting behavior during years
1954–1984 (spanning four Chief Justices: Gibson, Traynor, Wright, and Bird)
and found that overall, assigned justices were more than twenty percent more
likely to side with the Chief Justice in cases where the replacement justice’s
vote was decisive.431 Looking at the Bird court speciﬁcally, the authors
discerned manipulation in her assignments, noting that (1) temporary justices
were more likely to vote with her than were other justices, and (2) this
tendency vanished after she instituted a procedural change in April 1981.432
The agreement percentage spiked during Chief Justice Bird’s tenure, who
was accused of wielding the appointment power to manipulate outcomes.
Initially, she would assign justices for an entire calendar (up to eighteen
cases), not for a single case, and the replacements were forty nine percent
more apt to agree with her in cases where they cast the deciding vote.433 After
April 1981, when she limited assignments to a single day, the bias vanished.434
The most recent study, in 2006, is the only one that looks at voting
behavior since the post-Bird Chief Justices made the selection procedure less
discretionary. This study picked up where the 1986 study left oﬀ and
examined years 1977–2003, comparing agreement rates between ﬁll-in justices
and Chief Justices Bird, Malcolm Lucas, and Ronald George. If Bird was
indeed gaming the system, then the shift to alphabetical selection would
presumably result in lower levels of agreement.
Bird’s successors opted for nondiscretionary methods of filling temporary
vacancies. Chief Justice Malcolm Lucas (1987–1996), adopted a random,
alphabetical rotation system.435 Chief Justice Ronald George (1996–2011) kept
the rotational system, and also stopped designating trial-court judges, instead
choosing only to name appeals court presiding judges.436 The agreement rate
between the Chief Justices and their appointees plummeted, suggesting that
randomly selected replacements defer less to the Chief Justice.437
Obviously, court decisions that involve a temporary justice carry the same
force of law as decisions cast by all-permanent justices. And in California, fillin justices often cast tiebreaking votes, sometimes in the most contentious,
high-stakes cases.438 Their votes pack no less of a punch, but it’s interesting that
in California, a temporary replacement is unlikely to author an opinion—
Barnett & Rubinfeld, supra note 268, at 1142.
Barnett & Rubinfeld, supra note 268, at 1141.
Id. at 1142.
Id.
Brent, supra note 270, at 18.
Id.
Id. at 17.
See, e.g., People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194 (Cal. 1969) (considering the constitutionality of a
law criminalizing abortion); DeRonde v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 625 P.2d 220 (Cal. 1981)
(deciding the constitutionality of aﬃrmative action in public universities).
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
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whether majority, concurring, or dissenting. One study looked at 1954–1984 and
found that fill-in justices wrote majority opinions in only four percent of cases,
compared to thirteen percent for permanent justices.439 As for concurring or
dissenting opinions, replacements were only half as likely to write them, in
eight percent of cases compared to sixteen percent for permanent justices.440
D. Angst When the Governor Picks the Tiebreaker (and Knows Which Case is
Tied)—Texas
As noted above, the Lone Star State has a bifurcated high-court system: a
Supreme Court for civil matters and a Court of Criminal Appeals for criminal
matters. But while Texas’s dual high courts are constitutional twins, their
statutory tiebreaking mechanisms, and the courts’ use of them, differ markedly.441

Barnett & Rubinfeld, supra note 268, at 1164.
Id.
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.005 (2020). Until 1995, the two courts operated under
generally comparable statutes, which empowered the Governor to designate non-judge lawyers. In
fact, Governor Clements’s lone Supreme Court substitute was a lawyer. Coincidentally, that same
year (1988) was the last time the sister high court, the Court of Criminal Appeals, used a substitute
judge. The Texas Legislature amended the SCOTX provision a few years later to limit appointments
to sitting lower-court judges constitutionally qualiﬁed to sit on the court.
Both high courts, however, operate under the same constitutional provision governing
disqualiﬁcations:
439
440
441

No judge shall sit in any case wherein the judge may be interested, or where either of
the parties may be connected with the judge, either by aﬃnity or consanguinity, within
such a degree as may be prescribed by law, or when the judge shall have been counsel
in the case. When the Supreme Court, the Court of Criminal Appeals, the Court of
Appeals, or any member of any of those courts shall be thus disqualiﬁed to hear and
determine any case or cases in said court, the same shall be certiﬁed to the Governor
of the State, who shall immediately commission the requisite number of persons
learned in the law for the trial and determination of such cause or causes.
TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11.
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The SCOTX and CCA provisions diﬀer in three main ways:

Type of vacancies
covered
Discretion to request
a substitute
Appointee
qualifications

Texas Supreme Court442

Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals443

Recusals and disqualiﬁcations.

Only disqualiﬁcations.

Chief Justice may certify to
the Governor.
Lower-court judge who is
qualiﬁed to sit on SCOTX.

Presiding Judge shall certify to
the Governor.444
Someone “learned in the law.”

There is another stark diﬀerence: frequency of use. Since 1988, SCOTX
has enlisted twenty-four specially commissioned justices, while the Court of
Criminal Appeals has used just one.445
Yet for all the diﬀerences in the two courts’ appointment provisions, the
courts share one consequential custom: revealing to the Governor the name
of the case in which a tie needs to be broken. This requirement is absent from
the Texas Constitution—even while the Texas Constitution itself authorizes
the Governor to appoint temporary high court jurists.446 Disclosure is just
how the court has always done it. Habit. Custom. Inertia.
442 § 22.005(a) (“The chief justice may certify to the governor when one or more justices of
the supreme court have recused themselves under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure or are
disqualiﬁed under the constitution and laws of this state to hear and determine a case in the court.”);
Id. § 22.005(b) (“The governor immediately shall commission the requisite number of persons who
are active appellate or district court justices or judges and who possess the qualiﬁcations prescribed
for justices of the supreme court to try and determine the case.”).
443 Id. § 22.105(a) (“The fact that a judge of the court of criminal appeals is disqualiﬁed under
the constitution and laws of this state to hear and determine a case shall be certiﬁed to the
governor.”); Id. § 22.105(b) (“The governor immediately shall commission a person who is learned
in the law to act in the place of the disqualiﬁed judge.”).
444 While the statute requiring notice to the governor is worded in mandatory terms, and not
limited to tie-vote situations, the Court of Criminal Appeals has long interpreted it to mean the
court need not seek a substitute justice unless the court is “evenly divided on the proper disposition.”
See, e.g., Letter from John F. Onion, Presiding Judge, Tex. Ct. of Crim. App., to William P.
Clements, Governor, Tex. (Jan. 8, 1988) (on ﬁle with Texas A&M University).
445 The letter from Presiding Judge Onion to Governor Clements’s oﬃce is pretty funny,
noting that he had requested the tiebreaking appointment eighteen months earlier, from a previous
governor—to no avail. The letter also underscored that the Court of Criminal Appeals has “no
appropriations to cover the pay of a special judge,” adding, “I tell you this in order that you might
make it clear to whomever is appointed that pay may be a problem.” Letter from John F. Onion,
Presiding Judge, Tex. Ct. of Crim. App., to James Huﬃnes, Dir. of Appointments (Jan. 8, 1988) (on
ﬁle with the Supreme Court of Texas). The letter cites the example of retired SCOTX Justice Meade
Griﬃn, who was once appointed a special Court of Criminal Appeals judge and “had to get special
legislation introduced in order to pay him for his services.” Id.
446 One could hardly fault any governor for adeptly ﬂexing the power constitutionally given
him on behalf of the State’s interests as he sees them—and some might well brand it political
malpractice not to select tiebreaking justices strategically, too.
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The result is that the Governor has lopsided power over the judicial
branch. After all, the case might well be one concerning the scope of executive
power, or one challenging the Governor’s policy initiatives, or one where the
Governor has expressed an opinion or even ﬁled an amicus brief urging the
court to rule a certain way.
Nobody has publicly lambasted the Lone Star State’s odd practice—
certainly not the Governors who do the appointing—but the separation-ofpowers tension seems both obvious and ominous: inviting a co-equal branch
of government to seize outsized inﬂuence over a core judicial function.
And the exercise of such a singular power—essentially the power to decide
a speciﬁc case—seems discordant under the lengthy Texas Constitution,
which is so verbose precisely because the Lone Star State’s Founders were so
persnickety about concentrated power.447 Indeed, the Texas Constitution
“takes Madison a step further by including, unlike the federal Constitution,
an explicit Separation of Powers provision to curb overreaching and to spur
rival branches to guard their prerogatives.”448
What do elite Texas appellate lawyers think about a system in which the
Governor is told not only that a case is deadlocked, but which case is
deadlocked? I interviewed several board-certiﬁed Texas appellate lawyers
who handled cases involving these substitution issues.449
One case, In re EPIC Holdings,450 featured the Governor’s post-argument
appointment of two justices. The losing party moved for reargument “based
on Governor George Bush’s recent decision to appoint two new justices to
hear and decide this case.”451 Counsel noted that “the newly appointed justices
have not had the beneﬁt of oral argument” and cited a case earlier that year
where the court indeed held a second oral argument after the Governor
commissioned a tiebreaking justice.452

447 ANTHONY CHAMPAGNE & EDWARD J. HARPHAM, GOVERNING TEXAS 91 (Ann Shin
ed., 1st ed., 2013) (“The framers of the Texas Constitution gave the state government speciﬁc powers
so that the government could not use ambiguity to expand its powers. As a result, the Texas
Constitution requires frequent amendments to address situations not covered speciﬁcally in the
original constitution.”).
448 In re Bd. for Educator Certification, 452 S.W.3d 802, 808 n.39 (Tex. 2014) (citing TEX. CONST.
art. II, § 1).
449 According to the Texas Board of Legal Specialization: “Board Certification is a mark of
excellence and a distinguishing accomplishment within the Texas legal community. . . . Board Certified
lawyers . . . hav[e] substantial experience, the respect of their peers, and proven specialized competence
in their select area of law.” Why Choose a Board Certified Lawyer?, TEX. BD. OF LEGAL SPECIALIZATION,
https://www.tbls.org/findlawyer [https://perma.cc/B2DS-P56M] (last visited Dec. 30, 2020).
450 985 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1998).
451 Motion for Reargument at 1, In re Epic Holdings, 985 S.W.2d 41 (Nos. 96-1131 & 96-1133)
(on ﬁle with the Texas Supreme Court).
452 Id. at 2 (citing H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Bilotto, 985 S.W.2d 22, 29 (Tex. 1998)).
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One lawyer who lost a Governor-picks-the-tiebreaker case put it bluntly:
“It was a travesty of justice in so many respects.”453 A former Assistant
Solicitor General of Texas involved in another deadlocked case describes the
current practice as “so wrong on so many levels. It gives me lots of angst.”454
When informed that the Governor will be naming a ﬁll-in justice, this lawyer
naturally wonders, “Is it a political case even if I don’t think so?”455
Another appellate expert, Wade Crosnoe, who lost a substitute-justice case
5–4, says his chief concern is structural: “the potential problem of executive
meddling in the judicial branch,” though he stresses he’s “not suggesting that
happened in my case.”456 He apprehends the risk that “a governor, if so
inclined, could study up on the appeal and appoint a justice in a manner
designed to achieve a desired result.”457 (For the same reason, Crosnoe does
not favor giving unfettered discretion to the Chief Justice, who “might also be
motivated to select a substitute inclined to see things the chief ’s way.”458)
Some extensive critique came from another board-certiﬁed appellate
specialist, Reagan Simpson,459 whose comments merit printing in full:
When I argued St. Joseph Hospital v. Wolff, the Court had 9 justices. The
decision came two years later. By that time, Greg Abbott had been elected
Attorney General, and his appointed successor on the Court was my partner
Xavier Rodriguez, who had been at our firm when we tried the case and during
the appeal. So Justice Moseley was appointed to fill his place. I do not recall
being told that Justice Moseley had been appointed for that reason to our case.
The opinion came out on Election Day. I remember getting the surprise
call while in a Miami airport. As you know, Xavier [Rodriguez] had not been
elected to the Court, so he was oﬀ the Court as soon as the election results
were certiﬁed. The certiﬁcation of the election then would put Steve Smith
on the Court, and Jim Moseley would disappear. I think that explains the
nature of the fractured opinions, with concurrences in the result only. The
sole holding in Wolﬀ by a majority was that, if you correctly object to the
charge, you are entitled to an evidentiary review based on what the charge
should have been.

E-mail from Pamela Baron, Solo Tex. App. Att’y (Feb. 18, 2016) (on ﬁle with author).
E-mail correspondence with a former Assistant Solicitor General of Texas (Mar. 2, 2016)
(on ﬁle with author).
455 Id.
456 E-mail Correspondence with Wade Crosnoe, Partner, Thompson Coe Cousins & Irons,
LLP (Mar. 3, 2016) (on ﬁle with author).
457 Id.
458 Id.
459 Mr. Simpson represented the Petitioner in St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolﬀ, 94 S.W.3d 513 (Tex.
2002). See id. at 517 (naming Mr. Simpson as counsel for the petitioner).
453
454
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I really never want to argue to a Supreme Court with only 8 justices. That
raises the problem of a tie, of course. I do not like a system where the tie is
broken by an appointment made for the reason of breaking the tie in that
speciﬁc case. That raises the problem of a result-based appointment.
Changes in judges is not new to me, of course. In courts of appeals, from
time to time, I face changes in the panel. . . . Obviously, I also beneﬁt or
suﬀer from reassignments for [docket] equalization purposes.
But I have never gotten the idea that an appointment was being made
speciﬁc to a case to aﬀect the result. I would certainly not want that, either
for or against me.
So I would prefer to argue always with a full court. If the full court cannot
decide the case, I would prefer an appointment before a tie comes up. I would
prefer some sort of blind appointment.
I had not thought of this before, but Texas really has an easy way to deal
with this. We have two courts elected by the people statewide to make the
ultimate decision on important cases. Some justices on both courts have
served in the courts of appeals, so they have decided both civil and criminal
cases. But a judge is a judge, so civil judging experience is not necessary in
my view. Thus, a random appointment from the Court of Criminal Appeals
to the Supreme Court would be an idea. Another option would be a random
appointment, perhaps based on seniority, from the courts of appeals. I would
prefer it to be done by the Chief Justice, not the Governor; it is a matter of
court administration.460

Opposing counsel’s motion for rehearing in Wolﬀ stated plainly her
dissatisfaction. Counsel was irked that the court’s opinion was written by a
temporary justice named one year after oral argument, joined by another
justice who also had not participated in argument.461 Most upsetting: “No
notice was given to the parties that this appointment had taken place.”462

460 E-mail Correspondence with Reagan W. Simpson, Partner, Yetter Coleman LLP (Feb. 20,
2016) (on ﬁle with author).
461 Id.
462 Id. From the motion for rehearing:

The makeup of the Court has changed considerably since oral argument in this case.
Of the four justices that made up the plurality, only two participated in oral argument.
The justice who wrote the plurality opinion, Justice Moseley, was appointed by
Governor Perry on October 19, 2001, more than a year after oral argument was heard.
November 5, 2002—the day the opinion issued—was the last possible day that Justice
Moseley could participate in the decision, because Justice Rodriguez, who had lost to
Justice Smith in the primary election, resigned from the Court the following day.
Resp.’s Mot. for Reh’g at 2-3, St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolﬀ, 94 S.W.3d 513 (No. 99-1192) (on ﬁle with
the Texas Supreme Court).
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David Keltner, one of the state’s top appellate lawyers and a former court of
appeals justice, described his experience with the Texas tiebreaker system this way:
It was always strange to me that we went to another branch of government to
pick the tiebreaking justice. My initial reaction was “Oh, my goodness.
What’s gonna happen?” Also, I probably need to ﬁgure out what this judge
has done on similar cases. And why in heaven’s name is the governor doing
it? It might be better to appoint someone up front. That seems more fair,
though it’s not the most eﬃcient use of judicial resources.463

Keltner concedes that “the Governor properly made the appointments
according to the process that was in place” but ﬁrmly believes “the process
could stand a signiﬁcant revision.”464 As Keltner put it:
When Hyundai reached the Supreme Court, the petition was granted and the
case was argued for the ﬁrst time. After resignations decimated the Court,
the Governor appointed two justices from intermediate courts of appeals and
we reargued the case. Ironically, one of the appointed justices wrote the
majority opinion.
* * *
The appointment of justices by the Governor seems strange. At the
outset, it seems odd for appointments of replacement justices to be made by
one who is not part of the judiciary. If the appointment of additional justices
were to occur in a case in which the State is a party or in which a sensitive
political issue is involved, certainly the appointments would be suspect.
Fortunately, in Hyundai, neither of those problems was involved and the
appointment of two well-qualiﬁed justices—one from Mike’s hometown of
Houston and the other from my hometown of Fort Worth—made sense.465

463 E-mail Correspondence with David Keltner, Partner, Kelly Hart & Hallman LLP (Feb. 29,
2016) (discussing Hyundai Motor Co. v. Vasquez, 189 S.W.3d 743 (Tex. 2006)) (on ﬁle with author).
464 Id.
465 Keltner also noted an interesting tie-vote frustration at the court of appeals level:

Ironically, I have had problems with tie votes before. In a case before the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals, the panel decision was against me on a 2 to 1 vote, with one justice
“aging-out” after the opinion was issued. That justice was not the author but had been
in the majority.
On our motion for rehearing en banc, I pulled three of the remaining justices, for
what appeared to be a 4 to 3 win. However, under the rules, the “aged-out” justice was
allowed to remain as the eighth justice on the seven-justice court and the rehearing
vote was 4 to 4. Because of the tie vote, rehearing was denied.
On further motion for rehearing, I raised the propriety of allowing a justice,
whose term had expired, to sit as the eighth justice on a statutorily created sevenmember court. Rehearing and petition for review were denied.
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Another appellate specialist said, “The procedure is so unusual,” adding,
“If I’m lead counsel, I’ll try to do some digging. ‘What makes this substitute
judge tick?’ ” Overall, though, this lawyer was
inclined to let it be [and not ﬁle supplemental brieﬁng focused on the ﬁll-in
justice] unless I found something really signiﬁcant. I’d be reluctant to get in
there and stir the pot. It’s not like the Court is hermetically sealed. The
justices all talk to each other. I’d likely just let the process unfold.466

Another point bears mentioning: Texas’s current Governor, Greg
Abbott—possibly owing to his prior service as a justice on the Texas Supreme
Court and as Attorney General—has created an amicus curiae practice run
out of his general counsel’s oﬃce. Since January 2015, Governor Abbott’s
oﬃce has submitted twelve court briefs, including four in the Texas Supreme
Court, three in the United States Supreme Court, ﬁve in various other state
and federal courts, plus ﬁve briefs to the attorney general’s oﬃce.467 Governor
Abbott is an experienced, gifted lawyer who well understands the Texas
Supreme Court’s unique power to shape state law. As Governor, he has
distinct interests, both institutionally and on a policy level, that naturally lead
to his eﬀort to steer the law in a discrete direction.
And that unprecedented amicus practice raises interesting questions in
the realm of tiebreaking votes. As noted above, high court cases sometimes
deal with ﬁrst-principles disputes about the architecture of government. As
head of the executive branch, the Governor—particularly this justice-AGGovernor—has sophisticated ideas about how governing power should be
allocated. What if a case posed a question going to the core of executive
power? What if it involved the most high stakes of state disputes, like school
ﬁnance? What if the deadlocked case has attracted an amicus brief from
someone who now wields the power to select the tiebreaking justice—an
advocate picking “the decider”?

As you can imagine, my clients felt they had won their case but were denied a
victory by the vagaries of nonsensical rules.
Id.
466 Telephone Interview with anonymous Texas lawyer (Oct. 2015-Mar. 2016) (on ﬁle with
author). Despite these concerns, the lawyer noted that “historically, the system doesn’t seem to be
causing a lot of mischief—it hasn’t caused terrible harm—but it’s certainly not the way you’d do it if
designing from scratch.”
467 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Jimmy Blacklock, Justice, Tex. Sup. Ct. (Oct.
2015-Mar. 2016) (on ﬁle with author); Telephone Correspondence with James Sullivan, Deputy Gen.
Counsel, Oﬀ. of Tex. Governor Greg Abbott (Nov. 19, 2020).
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IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM IN TEXAS (AND BEYOND?)
I confess up front: I haven’t cracked the code on the perfect method for
selecting substitute justices. As with judicial selection generally, there’s no
glitch-free method, just varying degrees of imperfection. Whether picking
temporary judges for one case or permanent judges for all cases, every approach
has distinctive pros and cons. But the Governor-picks-the-decider method used
in Texas and a handful of other states is fundamentally worrisome.
I favor for Texas an approach that honors both structural principles and
prudential goals: separation of powers, judicial independence, neutrality, and
judicial economy. My modest proposal: before each Term, have the court
name ﬁve potential appointees who would be appointed in random order
whenever deadlock arises. My fundamental concern—judicial
independence—is neither new nor novel. Harken back to Sir Edward Coke.
A. Classic Coke: Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law468
In the turbulent Elizabethan Age, Sir Edward Coke’s consequential life
“uniquely contributed to the foundation of the law as an institution
independent of the political powers of the state.”469 Indeed, as one leading
Coke scholar avers, “no one has contributed more to create the modern notion
of the rule of law” than Coke.470
Coke, who served Elizabeth I as Attorney General and James I as Chief
Justice, steadfastly resisted the King’s dabbling in judicial matters—and was
later removed for it.471 Coke inhabited an age when the feudal order was waning
and commercialism was waxing. Conflicts galore arose that needed solutions
imposed by a predictable and no-favorites system of legal rules and remedies.472
Coke the jurist, “incorruptible and respected,” believed that Parliament
and the common law were law’s sole legitimate sources and that only courts
of law, not other arbiters, not even kings, should decide disputes.473 He
believed judges must be allegiant to the dictates of law, not the royal

468 The discerning reader will note that “Coke” in this instance is pronounced not like the
beverage but instead like “cook.” See generally Liberty Fund Books, Steve Sheppard and the Writings of
Sir
Edward
Coke,
YOUTUBE,
at
0:23
(May
18,
2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NCSjjxdWIEM (discussing the signiﬁcance of Sir Edward
Coke in English history and his profound inﬂuence on the development of the common law).
469 1 THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE xiii (Steve
Sheppard ed. 2003) [hereinafter COKE SELECTIONS].
470 Id.
471 Id. at xxiii; accord Gareth H. Jones, Sir Edward Coke, ENCYC. BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Edward-Coke.
472 COKE SELECTIONS, supra note 469, at xxiii-xxiv.
473 Id. at back cover.
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prerogatives of monarchs.474 The crown was often unamused at Coke’s
impertinence, preferring unchecked control over peoples’ aﬀairs.475
I share Coke’s view that a judge should do as a “judge ought to do” free of
royal command.476 The outcome of the law should not be dictated by imperial
power. Coke contributed mightily to the modern notion of the rule of law,
which, in our enlightened system of three rival branches, requires separation
of powers, not integration. Coke’s inﬂuence in resisting abuses of power,
including the Crown’s power (both James and Charles), continued in his postjudicial life as a member of Parliament, when he secured the Petition of
Right,477 an anthem of liberty for the English people that a century and a half
later took deep American root in our own Bill of Rights.478
Coke’s bold advocacy for judicial independence, a death-defying stand in
those days, also manifests in American law through the power of judicial
review—most famously articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v.
Madison,479 but exercised twenty-one years earlier by Marshall’s former law
teacher George Wyeth, a venerated state court judge, in Commonwealth v.
Caton.480 The jurisprudential genealogy is evident: Marshall was doubtless
inﬂuenced by Wythe (who also taught future presidents Jeﬀerson and
Monroe), and Wythe was doubtless inﬂuenced by Coke.
Governors are not Stuart monarchs. Judicial decision-making must be
independent and free of assertions of raw executive power. It is one thing for a
Governor to appoint judges who will decide the whole of a court’s docket. It is
quite another for a Governor to handpick the tiebreaking jurist in discrete cases.
Shortly before Watergate, Senator Sam Ervin reminded America that “an
independent judiciary is perhaps the most essential characteristic of a free
society.”481 This aversion to executive oppression is anchored deeply in
American tradition but was advanced long before the Revolution. As
discussed above, our English forebears pushed back against executive
oppression. Our Founders continued the ﬁght, listing among the
Declaration’s grievances George III’s habit of making judges “dependent on
his [w]ill alone.”482 The Federalist Papers underscore the bases for Article III’s
Id. at xxv-xxvi.
Id. at xxiii, xxvi.
Id. at xxvi.
Id. at xxiii. The Petition of Right was the ﬁrst of three constitutional documents of English
civil liberties, along with the Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights 1689.
478 COKE SELECTIONS, supra note 469, at xxiii.
479 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
480 8 Va. (4 Call) 5 (1782); accord William Michael Treatnor, The Case of the Prisoners and the
Origins of Judicial Review, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 491 (1994).
481 Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Separation of Powers: Judicial Independence, 35 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
108, 121 (1970).
482 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 11 (U.S. 1776).
474
475
476
477
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independent judicial branch, to serve as an excellent barrier both “to the
despotism of the prince,” and “to the encroachments and the oppressions of
the representative body.”483
In my view, a Governor’s post-deadlock appointment of a tiebreaking justice,
after getting the chance to examine the case and form an opinion about how it
should be decided, puts the court at risk of undue politicization. The judicial
branch letting the executive branch decide a case by proxy? This arrangement
resembles a modern-day prerogative court, something akin to a divine-rights
theory of kingship/governorship.484 What if the deadlocked case involves
gubernatorial power or the validity of the Governor’s actions or policies?485
I believe high courts should have a tiebreaking mechanism and, for
separation-of-powers purposes, it should rest within the judiciary.
B. Possible Paths for Texas
Texas could implement myriad reforms that would enhance judicial
independence. The ideal solution—nixing the Governor’s outsized role and
housing the tiebreaking system entirely within the judiciary—would require
a constitutional amendment, meaning that the legislature, and then the
voters, must approve it. Doable, but a non-minor undertaking. That said, the
most mischievous feature of the Texas approach—divulging to the Governor
which case is tied—can be cured immediately and unilaterally. Nothing in
Texas law requires such disclosure. I will brieﬂy address each option.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
This is a matter of constitutional dimension, as the Alabama Supreme Court held in 2006.
City of Bessemer v. McClain, 957 So.2d 1061, 1092 (Ala. 2006). The court confronted the judicialexecutive tension head-on in a dispute over who constitutionally has the power to appoint substitute
high court justices. Throughout much of Alabama history, the Governor appointed special justices,
but in 1973, Alabama amended its Constitution to establish the Chief Justice as the administrative
head of the State’s judicial system, and to give the Chief—and only the Chief—the power to “assign
appellate justices and judges to any appellate court for temporary service.” ALA. CONST. art. VI,
§ 110. But Alabama had a preexisting statutory scheme that vested sole power in the governor to
appoint a tiebreaking justice if there was “equal division.” ALA. CODE § 12-2-14 (1975). There was a
direct conﬂict between the code and the constitution, and the constitution wins such battles—
always. City of Bessemer, 957 So.2d at 1092 (“When the Constitution and a statute are in conﬂict, the
Constitution controls . . . .”) (quoting Parker v. Anderson, 519 So.2d 442, 446 (Ala. 1987)). There is
no way, the court said, to square a constitutional provision that confers appointment powers on the
chief justice with a statutory provision that constrains such power. The court thus held the statute
“invalid to the extent that it improperly restricts the Chief Justice’s constitutionally granted power
to assign Special Justices to serve temporarily on this Court.” Id. at 1095. Says the clerk’s oﬃce:
“The Chief Justice is the captain of the judicial boat in all respects.” Telephone and E-mail
Correspondence with Brad Medaris, supra note 340.
485 As the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal, “fears of bias can
arise when . . . a man chooses the judge in his own cause.” 556 U.S. 868, 886 (2009).
483
484
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1. Baby Steps: Tweak the Governor’s Role
Even if Texas retains its Governor-centered method and remains a
tiebreaking state and not a tie-avoiding state, one reform seems obvious: The
Texas Supreme Court should stop sharing internal vote information outside
the judiciary. This is the most harrowing feature of the Texas approach. And
it can be remedied instantly.
One rationale given for identifying the name of the case is to ensure the
Governor does not unwittingly name someone who might have participated
in the case below. But there are several ways to eliminate this concern short
of disclosing the case:
• Request the Governor not to appoint someone who hails from a
certain court of appeals;
• Tell the Governor nothing, and just alert the Governor if the
appointee has a conﬂict;
• When deadlock arises, ask the Governor for a list of replacement
justices in preference order and simply pick the ﬁrst person eligible to sit;
• At the beginning of a Term, ask the Governor to submit three names
in preference order that the court will use as needed.
2. Swing for the Fences: Scrap the Governor’s Role
Fortune favors the bold, and I favor a top-to-bottom overhaul that severs
the Gordian knot clean through, keeping the process entirely within the
judicial branch.486
After examining all ﬁfty states, here is my modest proposal for that
judicial process: Before each term, the Texas Supreme Court should
collectively agree on ﬁve potential appointees who would be selected—in
random order—should deadlock arise. If the ﬁrst name drawn has a conﬂict,
another name would be chosen until someone is able and willing to sit.
Keeping appointee selection wholly within the judicial branch honors
separation of powers and judicial independence, underscoring the Supreme
Court’s institutional role as administrative head of the judicial branch.487 And
having ﬁve consensus names on the front end, plus the randomness of the
speciﬁc name chosen, promotes evenhandedness and ensures that one justice
cannot wield outsized inﬂuence by picking strategically. This method also
486 It is true the Texas Constitution, not merely a statute, confers this pro tem appointment
power on the governor. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11. So for Texas, adopting my proposal would take
a constitutional amendment—meaning the Legislature, and then ultimately the voters, must
approve any proposed reform.
487 See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.021 (2019) (“The supreme court has supervisory and
administrative control over the judicial branch and is responsible for the orderly and eﬃcient
administration of justice.”).

2021]

Supreme Stalemates

517

advances judicial economy, as it applies only when the court is deadlocked.
Finally, to give it a distinctive Lone Star ﬂavor (and inspired by Louisiana’s
Jack-o’-Lantern), names would be drawn from a ten-gallon Stetson:

Figure 9: Lone Star Stetson Hat488

Enhancing the role of the Texas Supreme Court in selecting judicial
replacements aligns with how most states approach avoiding or breaking ties.
And Texas law seems copacetic with this judiciary-led approach. As it currently
stands, the Chief Justice has judge-picking power in various special situations:
• Public school finance challenges—The Chief Justice, after being
petitioned by the attorney general, appoints a “special three-judge district
court” to hear challenges to “the ﬁnances or operations of this state’s public
school system.”489 One member is speciﬁed by statute (“the district judge of
the judicial district to which the original case was assigned”490), but the chief
has discretion in picking the other two.491
• Redistricting—As described immediately above, the Chief Justice
names a special three-judge trial court that “involves the apportionment of
districts” for various state and federal oﬃces.492

488 Don Willett, How the States Avoid Supreme Stalemates, JUDICATURE, Winter 2016, at 8,
https://law.duke.edu/sites/default/ﬁles/centers/judicialstudies/judicature/judicature-100.4willett.pdf.
489 See id. § 22A.001(a)(1).
490 Id.
491 Id. § 22A.002(a)(2)-(3).
492 Id. § 22A.001(a)(2) (outlining that the other two judges in the three-judge trial court will
consist of a district court judge from a diﬀerent judicial district than the one the case was assigned
and a judge from a court of appeals).
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• Judicial disciplinary proceedings—The Chief Justice appoints a threemember special court of review, a panel of court of appeals justices selected
by lot.493 Says the Supreme Court’s general counsel, “This is not
discretionary. We literally put all Justices’ names in a hat and pick three
out.”494 Separately, when the Judicial Conduct Commission recommends
removal or retirement of a judge, the Chief Justice selects by lot a sevenmember Review Tribunal of court of appeals justices.495 Each of Texas’s
fourteen courts of appeals designates one of its members for inclusion in the
pool, and the ﬁrst name drawn chairs the Review Tribunal.496
• Attorney disciplinary proceedings—Judges in attorney discipline
matters are appointed by the court as a whole.497 Says the Supreme Court
general counsel: “We rotate those assignments among active district judges
around the state, it’s pretty much random, but we do take into account
whether they’ve been on the bench at least a year, how long it’s been since
their last assignment, and we select from a diﬀerent administrative judicial
region than the attorney to reduce conﬂicts. I send these recommendations
to all Justices for review before the assignments are made.”498
• Certain other recusal-based vacancies—The Chief Justice has authority to
assign judges in certain other cases where recusals occur—e.g., the regional
presiding judge, who would normally oversee recusal motions, has recused
himself, meaning the Chief Justice must appoint the trial judge instead.499
On timing, Texas could model most states and strive to avert ties by ﬁlling
out the court as soon as it drops below full strength. “It might be better to
appoint someone up front,” according to one appellate specialist, although
that approach is “certainly not the most eﬃcient use of judicial resources.”500
Yet “up front” need not mean before a case is argued; it could also mean you
have a bullpen of potential appointees from which to draw if, and only if, the
short-staﬀed court locks up 4–4.

493 Id. § 33.001(11); see generally TEX. R. DISCIPLINARY P. 3.02 (discussing the assignment of
judges to preside in disciplinary cases).
494 Interview with Nina Hess Hsu, Gen. Counsel, Tex. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015-Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle
with author). The former Chief Justice, a proud graduate of the Michigan State University College
of Law, reportedly used a Spartan cap. The current hat is a nondescript wool chapeau.
495 GOV’T § 33.001(9).
496 TEX. CONST. art. V, § 1-a(9); see also Interview with Nina Hess Hsu, supra note 494.
497 TEX. R. DISCIPLINARY P. 3.02.
498 Interview with Nina Hess Hsu, supra note 494.
499 GOV’T §§ 74.049–.057.
500 E-mail Correspondence with David Keltner, supra note 463.
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CONCLUSION
When you seek fortune-telling advice from a Magic 8 Ball, the
icosahedron may well respond, “Ask again later” or “Better not tell you now”
or “Concentrate and ask again.” Out of twenty possible answers, ten are
positive, ﬁve are negative, and ﬁve are neutral.501 Yet courts ought never tell
litigants, “Reply hazy—try again.” It’s one thing for a supreme court to be
Delphic, providing gauzy pronouncements that leave people scratching their
heads. It’s another for a supreme court to be mute, providing no
pronouncement at all and leaving people shaking their ﬁsts. There’s a reason
Lady Justice is depicted with scales and not with a shrug.
Courts of last resort must be courts, and courts exist to decide cases. Every
state high court in America has an odd-numbered composition for good
reason: to avoid ties. But supreme courts inevitably confront temporary
vacancies—some long (unﬁlled vacancy, extended illness) and some short
(case-speciﬁc recusal)—that raise the risk of deadlock.
Federal law forbids a tiebreaking mechanism at the U.S. Supreme
Court.502 There is no such thing as a substitute SCOTUS Justice. The ﬁfty
states, however, handle the specter of stalemate in wildly diﬀerent ways.
In some states, ﬁll-in justices are selected neutrally; in other states,
intentionally. And in Texas, the appointer—the head of a separate branch of
government—wields an extraordinary power: He knows not only that a case
is tied, but which case, arguably enabling him to decide the case by deciding
who decides it.
But it was a nineteenth-century Texas Governor—Sul Ross—who
cautioned, “[L]oss of public conﬁdence in the judiciary is the greatest curse
that can ever befall a nation.”503 The judiciary’s power derives from a public
perception that courts operate above the political fray, that the judiciary (even
an elected one, as most state judiciaries are) is not merely another political
branch of government. Judicial legitimacy necessarily means that judges are
not perceived as politicians in robes, stacking the legal deck to impose
ideologically congenial results. And judicial independence should not require
dependence on another branch to break ties in known cases.
I have not devised a glitch-free mechanism for impasse resolution. Every
approach—pre-deadlock vs. post-deadlock, chief justice individually vs. court
501 See
Magic
8-Ball,
WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magic_8-Ball
[https://perma.cc/87JQ-V6M3] (last visited Mar. 2, 2016) (detailing the distribution of answers
provided by the Magic 8-Ball).
502 Hartnett, supra note 18, at 651-52.
503 Andrew Cohen, An Elected Judge Speaks Out Against Judicial Elections, ATLANTIC (Sept. 3,
2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/09/an-elected-judge-speaks-out-againstjudicial-elections/279263 [https://perma.cc/UD6Q-Y93A].
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collectively, unfettered discretion vs. randomized—has upsides and
downsides. For Texas, I propose letting the court, at the beginning of each
Term, designate ﬁve lower-court judges to be appointed in random order as
deadlock arises. In my view, this approach ensures that cases get decided but
in a manner that furthers separation of powers, judicial independence,
neutrality, and judicial economy.
The U.S. Supreme Court usually dominates the spotlight. But America
“boasts not one Constitution but 51, meaning American constitutionalism
concerns far more than what began in Philadelphia 232 years ago.”504 Justice
Brandeis memorably depicted states as laboratories of democracy.505 And when
it comes to impasse resolution, state-level innovations abound, some more jurisimprudent than others. My hope is that this Article sparks fruitful scrutiny of
state high courts’ tiebreaking systems and helps policymakers identify smart
refinements that honor judicial independence and the Rule of Law.

504 Thompson v. Dall. City Att’y’s Oﬀ., 913 F.3d 464, 471 (5th Cir. 2019); see also SUTTON, supra
note 22, at 16-21.
505 New State Ice. Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

2021]

Supreme Stalemates

521

APPENDICES
Appendix A—Summary Chart of State Approaches
State

No. of
justices

Tiebreaking
method, if
any

Who can
be a
tiebreaker?

Who
appoints
the
tiebreaker?

Ala.

9

Back-end
tiebreaking

Judge

Chief
Justice

Alaska

5

Aﬃrm by
equally
divided
court

n/a

n/a

Ariz.

5

Front-end
avoidance

Judge

Chief
Justice

Ark.

7

Front-end
avoidance;
Back-end
tiebreaking

Attorney

Governor

Primary Authorities

ALA. CODE § 12-2-14 (1975),
held unconstitutional in City of
Bessemer v. McClain, 957 So.
2d 1061, 1093-95 (Ala. 2006);
Telephone and Email
Correspondence with Brad
Medaris, Cent. Staﬀ Att’y,
Ala. Sup. Ct. (Dec. 2015) (on
ﬁle with author). See supra
notes 340 & 484 and
accompanying text.
ALASKA R. APP. P. 106;
ALASKA CONST. art. IV,
§ 16; Telephone and Email
Correspondence with
Marilyn May, Clerk of App.
Cts., Ala. Sup. Ct. (Oct.
2015–Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle with
author). See supra notes 15758 and accompanying text.
Telephone and Email
Correspondence with Janet
Johnson, Clerk, Ariz. Sup.
Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016)
(on ﬁle with author). See
supra note 202 and
accompanying text.
ARK. CONST., amend. 80,
§ 13(A); Telephone and
Email Correspondence with
Stacey Pectol, Clerk of Cts.,
Ark. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015–
Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle with
author). See supra notes 204208 & 341-342 and
accompanying text.
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State

No. of
justices

Tiebreaking
method, if
any

Who can
be a
tiebreaker?

Who
appoints
the
tiebreaker?

Primary Authorities

Cal.

7

Front-end
avoidance;
Back-end
tiebreaking

Judge

Chief
Justice

Colo.

7

Aﬃrm by
equally
divided
court

n/a

n/a

Conn.

7

Back-end
tiebreaking

Judge

Court

Del.

5

Front-end
avoidance

Judge

Chief
Justice

Fla.

7

Back-end
tiebreaking

Judge

Chief
Justice

CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6;
CAL. SUP. CT., INTERNAL
OPERATING PRACS. &
PROCS. §§ IV.J, XIII.B;
Telephone and Email
Correspondence with Frank
McGuire, Ct. Admin &
Clerk, Cal. Sup. Ct. (Oct.
2015–Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle with
author). See supra notes 273274 and accompanying text.
COLO. APP. R. 35(b);
Telephone and Email
Correspondence with Polly
Brock, Clerk, Colo. Sup. Ct.
(Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle
with author).
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 51207, 51-209; Conn. R. App. P
§ 70-6 ; see also Pesino v. Atl.
Bank, 709 A.2d 540;
Telephone and Email
Correspondence with Pamela
Meotti, Chief Admin.
Oﬃcer, Conn. Sup. Ct. (Oct.
2015) (on ﬁle with author).
See supra note 380 and
accompanying text.
Email Correspondence with
Leo Strine, Chief Just., Del.
Sup. Ct. (Oct. 26, 2015) (on
ﬁle with author). See supra
note 211 and accompanying
text. Telephone and Email
Correspondence with Cathy
Howard, Clerk, Del. Sup.
Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016)
(on ﬁle with author).
FLA. SUP. CT. INTERNAL
OPERATING PROC. § X;
Telephone and Email
Correspondence with John
Tomasino, Clerk, Fla. Sup.
Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016)
(on ﬁle with author).
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State

No. of
justices

Tiebreaking
method, if
any

Who can
be a
tiebreaker?

Who
appoints
the
tiebreaker?

Primary Authorities

Ga.

7

Front-end
avoidance

Judge

Court

Haw.

5

Front-end
avoidance

Judge

Chief
Justice

Idaho

5

Front-end
avoidance

Judge

Court

Ill.

7

Aﬃrm by
equally
divided
court

n/a

n/a

Ind.

5

Aﬃrm by
equally
divided
court

n/a

n/a

GA. CONST. art. VI, § 6,
para. 1; GA. CODE ANN.
§ 15-2-2; Telephone and
Email Correspondence with
Therese Barnes, Clerk, Ga.
Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb.
2016) (on ﬁle with author).
See supra notes 212 & 382-384
and accompanying text.
Telephone and Email
Correspondence with Public
Aﬀairs Oﬃce, Hawaii State
Judiciary (Oct. 2015–Feb.
2016) (on ﬁle with author).
See supra notes 282-287 and
accompanying text.
IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 6;
Telephone and Email
Correspondence with
Stephen Kenyon, Clerk,
Idaho Sup. Ct. (Jan. 2016)
(on ﬁle with author). See
supra notes 214, 266-267, 385
and accompanying text.
Perlman v. First Nat’l Bank of
Chi., 331 N.E.2d 65, 66 (Ill.
1975) (per curiam); ILL. CONST.
art. VI, § 16; Telephone and
Email Correspondence with
Carolyn Taft Grosboll, Clerk,
Ill. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015) (on file
with author).
IND. APP. R. 58(c);
Telephone and Email
Correspondence with Kevin
Smith, Clerk, Ind. Sup. Ct.
(Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle
with author).
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State

No. of
justices

Tiebreaking
method, if
any

Who can
be a
tiebreaker?

Who
appoints
the
tiebreaker?

Primary Authorities

Iowa

7

Aﬃrm by
equally
divided
court

n/a

n/a

Kan.

7

Aﬃrm by
equally
divided
court

n/a

n/a

Ky.

7

Aﬃrm by
equally
divided
court

n/a

n/a

La.

7

Front-end
avoidance

Judge

Court

Me.

7

Aﬃrm by
equally
divided
court

n/a

n/a

IOWA CODE § 602.4107; Polk
Co. Bd. of Review v. Village
Green Co-Op, Inc., No. 131205, 2014 WL 2619674, at *1
(Iowa June 13, 2014);
Telephone and Email
Correspondence with Donna
Humpal, Clerk, Iowa Sup.
Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016)
(on ﬁle with author). See
supra note 43 and
accompanying text.
KAN. CONST. art. 3, § 4;
Thornton v. Shore, 654 P.2d
475 (Kan. 1982); Telephone
and Email Correspondence
with Heather Smith, Clerk,
Kan. Sup. Ct. (Jan. 2016) (on
ﬁle with author).
Ky. Utils. v. S.E. Coal, 836
SW 2d 407, 409-410 (1992);
KY. CONST. § 110(5)(b);
Telephone and Email
Correspondence with Susan
Clary, Clerk, Ky. Sup. Ct.
(Feb. 24, 2016) (on ﬁle with
author). See supra notes 154,
178 and accompanying text.
Telephone and Email
Correspondence with John
Olivier, Clerk, La. Sup. Ct.
(Oct. 2015-Jan. 2016) (on file
with author). See supra notes
386-390 and accompanying
text.
Day v. State Tax Assessor,
942 A.2d 685, 686 (Me.
2008); Hale v. Antoniou, 820
A.2d 586, 586 (Me. 2003);
Telephone and Email
Correspondence with
Matthew Pollack, Exec.
Clerk, Me. Sup. Ct. (Nov.
2015) (on ﬁle with author).
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State

No. of
justices

Tiebreaking
method, if
any

Who can
be a
tiebreaker?

Who
appoints
the
tiebreaker?

Primary Authorities

Md.

7

Front-end
avoidance

Judge

Chief
Justice

Mass.

7

Aﬃrm by
equally
divided
court

n/a

n/a

Mich.

7

Aﬃrm by
equally
divided
court

n/a

n/a

Minn.

7

Aﬃrm by
equally
divided
court

n/a

n/a

MD. CONST. art. IV, § 3A;
Telephone and Email
Correspondence with Bessie
Decker, Clerk, Md. Ct. App.
(Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle
with author).
Fresh Pond Shopping Ctr.,
Inc. v. Rent Control Bd. of
Cambridge, 446 N.E.2d 1060,
1060 (Mass. 1983); Pacella v.
Milford Radio Corp., 476
N.E.2d 595, 595 (Mass. 1985);
MASS. R. APP. P. 27.1(g);
Telephone and Email
Correspondence with Francis
Kenneally, Clerk, Mass. Sup.
Ct. (Nov. 2015-Jan. 2016) (on
file with author).
MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 600.230; People v. Sullivan,
609 N.W.2d 193 (Mich.
2000); Telephone and Email
Correspondence with Larry
Royster, Clerk, Mich. Sup.
Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016)
(on ﬁle with author). See
supra notes 176-177, 180-182
and accompanying text.
State v. Retzlaﬀ, 842 N.W.2d
565, 565 (Minn. 2012);
MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 2;
Telephone and Email
Correspondence with Rita
DeMeules, Clerk, Minn.
Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb.
2016) (on ﬁle with author).
See supra notes 154, 200 and
accompanying text.
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State

No. of
justices

Tiebreaking
method, if
any

Who can
be a
tiebreaker?

Who
appoints
the
tiebreaker?

Primary Authorities

Miss.

9

Aﬃrm by
equally
divided
court

n/a

n/a

Mo.

7

Front-end
avoidance

Judge

Chief
Justice

Mont.

7

Front-end
avoidance

Judge

Chief
Justice

Neb.

7

Front-end
avoidance

Judge

Court

Nev.

7

Back-end
tiebreaking

Judge

Governor

MISS. CONST. art. 6, § 165;
Hewes v. Langston, 853 So.
2d 1237, 1243 (Miss. 2003);
Telephone Interview with Bill
Waller Jr., Chief Just., Miss.
Sup. Ct. (Jan. 15, 2016) (on
file with author); Telephone
and Email Correspondence
with Hubbard T. Saunders,
IV, Clerk, Miss. Sup. Ct.
(Oct. 2015-Feb. 2016) (on file
with author.
MO. CONST. art. V, § 6.;
Telephone and Email
Correspondence with Clerk,
Mo. Sup. Ct. (Mar. 2016) (on
ﬁle with author). See supra
notes 198, 216 and
accompanying text.
Telephone and Email
Correspondence with Ed
Smith, Clerk, Mont. Sup.
Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016)
(on ﬁle with author). See
supra notes 218-220, 225 and
accompanying text.
Telephone and Email
Correspondence with Teresa
Brown, Clerk, Neb. Sup. Ct.
(Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle
with author). See supra notes
226-230, 391 and
accompanying text.
NEV. CONST. ART. 6, § 4;
NEV. REV. STAT. § 1.225(5);
NEV. R. APP. P.
25A(b)(2)(C); NEV. SUP. CT.
R. 10(8); Telephone and
Email Correspondence with
Tracie Lindeman, Clerk, Nev.
Sup. Ct., (Oct. 2015-Feb.
2016). See supra notes 344-349
and accompanying text.
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State

No. of
justices

Tiebreaking
method, if
any

Who can
be a
tiebreaker?

Who
appoints
the
tiebreaker?

Primary Authorities

N.H.

5

Back-end
tiebreaking

Judge

Chief
Justice

N.J.

7

Aﬃrm by
equally
divided
court

n/a

n/a

N.M.

5

Front-end
avoidance

Judge

Chief
Justice

N.Y.

7

Back-end
tiebreaking

Judge

Court

N.C.

7

Aﬃrm by
equally
divided
court

n/a

n/a

N.D.

5

Front-end
avoidance

Judge

Chief
Justice

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 490:3; Telephone and
Email Correspondence with
Eileen Fox, Clerk, N.H. Sup.
Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016)
(on ﬁle with author). See
supra notes 289-292 and
accompanying text.
N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 2, para.
1; N.J. R. 2:13-2(a); Telephone
and Email Correspondence
with Gail Haney, Clerk, N.J.
Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb.
2016) (on file with author).
See supra notes 148, 423 and
accompanying text.
Telephone and Email
Correspondence with Joey
Moya, Clerk, N.M. Sup. Ct.
(Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016) (on file
with author). See supra notes
231-237 and accompanying text.
Telephone and Email
Correspondence with
Andrew Klein, Clerk, N.Y.
Ct. App. (Oct. 2015–Feb.
2016) (on ﬁle with author).
See supra note 392-396 and
accompanying text.
Forbes Homes, Inc. v.
Trimpi, 326 S.E.2d 30, 30
(N.C. 1985); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 7A-39.3, 7A-39.5;
Telephone and Email
Correspondence with
Christie Roeder, Clerk, N.C.
Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb.
2016) (on ﬁle with author).
See supra note 44 and
accompanying text.
Telephone and Email
Correspondence with Penny
Miller, Clerk, N.D. Sup. Ct.
(Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016) (on file
with author). See supra notes
238-242 and accompanying text.
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State

No. of
justices

Tiebreaking
method, if
any

Who can
be a
tiebreaker?

Who
appoints
the
tiebreaker?

Primary Authorities

Ohio

7

Front-end
avoidance

Judge

Chief
Justice

Okla.
(civil)

9

Back-end
tiebreaking

Judge

Chief
Justice

Okla.
(crim.)

5

Back-end
tiebreaking

Judge

Chief
Justice
(civil)

Or.

7

Front-end
avoidance

Judge

Court

Pa.

7

Aﬃrm by
equally
divided
court

n/a

n/a

Interview with Maureen
O’Connor, Chief Just., Ohio
Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015-Feb.
2016) (on ﬁle with author).
See supra notes 243-249 and
accompanying text.
Telephone and Email
Correspondence with Amy
Reitz, Clerk, Ohio Sup. Ct.
(Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle
with author).
OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 6;
Order of Appointment,
Gandy v. Oklahoma, No. C2009-720 (Okla Crim. App.
Apr. 20, 2009); Telephone
and Email Correspondence
with Michael Richie, Clerk,
Okla. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle with
author). See supra note 306307 and accompanying text.
Okla. Const. art. VII, § 6;
Gandy v. Oklahoma, No. C2009-720; Telephone and
Email Correspondence with
Michael Richie, Clerk, Okla.
Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015-Feb.
2016) (on ﬁle with author).
See supra note 306-307 and
accompanying text.
Telephone and Email
Correspondence with Lisa
Norris-Lampe, Clerk, Ore.
Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb.
2016) (on ﬁle with author).
See supra notes 250-251, 397401 and accompanying text.
Commonwealth v. Koch, 106
A.3d 705, 705 (Pa. 2014); PA.
SUP. CT. INTERNAL
OPERATING PROCS.
§ 4(B)(3); Telephone and
Email Correspondence with
John Vaskov, Clerk, Pa. Sup.
Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016)
(on ﬁle with author).
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State

No. of
justices

Tiebreaking
method, if
any

Who can
be a
tiebreaker?

Who
appoints
the
tiebreaker?

Primary Authorities

R.I.

5

Aﬃrm by
equally
divided
court

n/a

n/a

S.C.

5

Front-end
avoidance;
Back-end
tiebreaking

Judge

Chief
Justice

S.D.

5

Front-end
avoidance

Judge

Chief
Justice

Tenn.

5

Front-end
avoidance;
Back-end
tiebreaking

“[M]en . . .
of law
knowledge”
(justices);
lower-court
judge
(chief
justices)

Chief
Justice &
Governor

Meyer v. Meyer, 68 A.3d 571,
587 (R.I. 2013); 8 R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 8-3-8(d)
(2020); R.I. R. APP. P., art. I,
r. 25(a); Cahill v. Morrow, 11
A.3d 82, 86 (R.I. 2011); Ucci
v. Mancini, 387 A.2d 1056,
1057 (R.I. 1978); Telephone
and Email Correspondence
with Debra Saunders, Clerk,
R.I. Sup. Ct. (Dec. 2015) (on
ﬁle with author). See supra
notes 151, 171-173, 179 and
accompanying text.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-1-215;
Telephone and Email
Correspondence with Dan
Shearouse, Clerk, S.C. Sup.
Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016)
(on ﬁle with author). See
supra notes 308-310, 312-313
and accompanying text.
S.D. CONST. art. V, § 11;
Telephone and Email
Correspondence with Laura
Graves, Clerk, S.D. Sup. Ct.
(Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle
with author). See supra note
315 and accompanying text.
TENN. CONST. art. VI, §§ 3,
11; State ex rel. Hooker v.
Thompson, 249 S.W.3d 331,
335 (Tenn. 1996); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 17-2-102, 104, -110(a); Hooker v.
Sundquist, 1999 WL 74545 at
*3 (Tenn. Feb. 16, 1999)
(unpublished); Telephone
and Email Correspondence
with James M. Hivner,
Clerk, Tenn. Sup. Ct. (Oct.
2015–Feb. 2016) (on ﬁle with
author). See supra notes 355356 and accompanying text.
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State

No. of
justices

Tiebreaking
method, if
any

Who can
be a
tiebreaker?

Who
appoints
the
tiebreaker?

Primary Authorities

Tex.
(civil)

9

Back-end
tiebreaking

Judge

Governor

Tex.
(crim.)

9

Back-end
tiebreaking

“[A]
person who
is learned
in the
law . . . .”

Governor

Utah

5

Front-end
avoidance

Judge

Chief
Justice

Vt.

5

Front-end
avoidance

Judge

Chief
Justice

Va.

7

Front-end
avoidance

Judge

Chief
Justice

TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11;
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 22.005; Act of May 19,
1995, ch. 428, § 1, 1995 Tex.
Gen. Laws 3097, 3097;
Telephone and Email
Correspondence with Blake
Hawthorne, Clerk, Tex. Sup.
Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016)
(on ﬁle with author).
TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11;
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 22.105(a); Telephone and
Email Correspondence with
Abel Acosta, Clerk, Tex. Ct.
Crim. App. (Oct. 2015–Feb.
2016) (on file with author);
Letter from John F. Onion,
Presiding Judge, Tex. Ct. of
Crim. App., to William P.
Clements, Governor, Tex.
(Jan. 8, 1988). See supra notes
444-445.
UTAH CONST., art. VIII,
§ 2; Telephone and Email
Correspondence with Andrea
Martinez, Clerk, Utah Sup.
Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016)
(on ﬁle with author). See
supra notes 253-254 and
accompanying text.
Telephone and Email
Correspondence with Deb
Laferriere, Program Adm’r,
Vt. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb.
2016) (on ﬁle with author).
See supra notes 255, 257-261
and accompanying text.
VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1302(B) (2020); Telephone and
Email Correspondence with
Trish Harrington, Clerk, Va.
Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb.
2016) (on file with author).
See supra notes 263-264, 316318 and accompanying text.
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State

No. of
justices

Tiebreaking
method, if
any

Who can
be a
tiebreaker?

Who
appoints
the
tiebreaker?

Primary Authorities

Wash.

9

Front-end
avoidance

Judge

Chief
Justice

W. Va.

5

Back-end
tiebreaking

Judge

Chief
Justice

Wis.

7

Aﬃrm by
equally
divided
court

n/a

n/a

Wyo.

5

Front-end
avoidance

Judge

Chief
Justice

WASH. SUP. CT. ADMIN. R.
21(c); Telephone and Email
Correspondence with Ron
Carpenter, Clerk, Wash. Sup.
Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016) (on
file with author). See supra
note 301-303 and
accompanying text.
Telephone and Email
Correspondence with Rory
Perry, Clerk, W. Va. Sup. Ct.
(Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016) (on file
with author). See supra notes
319-324 and accompanying
text.
Sohn Mfg. Inc. v. Lab. &
Indus. Rev. Comm’n, 854
N.W.2d 371, 371 (Wis. 2014);
Telephone and Email
Correspondence with Diane
Fremgen, Clerk, Wis. Sup.
Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016)
(on ﬁle with author).
Telephone and Email
Correspondence with Carol
Thompson, Clerk, Wyo. Sup.
Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016)
(on ﬁle with author). See
supra notes 330-335 and
accompanying text.
Telephone and Email
Correspondence with E.
James Burke, Chief Justice,
Wy. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015-Feb.
2016) (on ﬁle with author).
See supra notes 335-339 and
accompanying text.

532

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 441

Appendix B—Texas’s Temporary-Justice Process
Since the late 1980s, the Texas Supreme Court has used judicial pinchhitters sparingly—in just fourteen cases: nine during the tenure of Governor
Rick Perry (2000–2015);506 four during the tenure of Governor George W.
Bush (1995–2000);507 and one during the tenure of Governor Bill Clements
(1979–1983 and 1987–1991).508
The relatively small number of Governors and deadlocks facilitates
empirical examination of how requests for substitute justices are handled in the
Governor’s Office and how those temporary appointees tend to vote. This
Appendix examines all fourteen cases and concludes that, even with the small
sample, Governors’ Offices have had polar-opposite views on how and whom to
pick. As a practical matter, how are requests for substitute justices handled in
the Governor’s Office? And how do those temporary appointees tend to vote?
1. Non-strategic Selection—A Generic Focus on “Capable, Qualiﬁed
Jurists”; “We Didn’t Try to Tip the Scales in a Big Way.”
a. Governor Bill Clements (1979–1983 and 1987–1991): One Appointee in One Case
Bill Clements was the 42nd and 44th Governor of Texas, but he appointed
just one substitute Justice, in 1988—a temporary chief justice, in fact.509
The Chief Justice at that time, Tom Phillips (whom Governor Clements
had appointed a few months earlier), was disqualiﬁed from sitting in a
personal-injury case being litigated by his former law ﬁrm.510 At that time,
Texas law did not require the substitute justice to be a sitting lower-court
judge, and Governor Clements appointed a prominent Dallas lawyer, Tom
Luce (who two years later ran, unsuccessfully, for Governor himself).511

See supra note 358.
See supra note 359.
See supra note 360.
Until this 1988 appointment, the most recent appointment was a full quarter-century earlier, in 1963.
Hous. Lighting & Power Co. v. Reynolds, 765 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. 1988) (listing Baker Botts
representation); cf. Thomas R. Phillips, Baker Botts, https://www.bakerbotts.com/people/p/phillipsthomas-r [https://perma.cc/D8KH-CEHJ] (last visited Nov. 21, 2020) (noting Phillips’ employment
at Baker Botts before and after his time on SCOTX).
511 The Legislature changed the statute after this case to require that temporary Supreme
Court justices be lower-court judges constitutionally qualiﬁed to sit on the court. Telephone
Interview with Tom Phillips, former Chief Justice, Sup. Ct. Tex. (August 21, 2015) (on ﬁle with
author); see also supra notes 369-376.
506
507
508
509
510
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b. Governor George W. Bush (1995–2000): Seven Appointees in Four Cases
Governor Bush appointed seven substitute Justices in four cases.512
Unfortunately, neither of the two Bush-era appointment directors, Clay
Johnson (for the ﬁrst three cases) and Ron Bellamy (for the ﬁnal case), recalls
how these requests were handled.513
Interviews with several of those appointed, however, reveal some details.
For example, Judge Stephen Ables recalls receiving a call from Clay Johnson,
with whom Judge Ables had some recent contacts.514 Governor Bush had just
appointed him presiding judge of one of Texas’s nine administrative judicial
regions. Judge Ables was a known and respected judge, also serving on the
Texas Judicial Council. He had also invited Johnson to speak at a
Philosopher’s Club meeting. Judge Ables recalls Johnson saying he “wanted
to get a trial judge and appellate judge.”515 He says Johnson described
generally what the case was about and asked Judge Ables to conﬁrm he had
no conﬂicts that would preclude his appointment. Johnson mentioned it was
a big case out of Dallas, and “everyone in the Dallas GOP was close to one
side or the other. He wanted someone far from Dallas to avoid accusations of
appointing someone with connections.”516 All in all, says Judge Ables, “it was
a very enjoyable experience,” though generally, he says, “the Bush/Perry
appointments oﬃces never had a great feel for the judiciary.”517
In the Bush era, only one of the appointed justices wound up in the
minority, writing the dissent, it turns out. In In re George, decided 5–4, the
dissent was penned by Scott Brister, then a trial judge but who a few years
later would himself be appointed to the Supreme Court. (Brister was also
commissioned a substitute justice while later serving on the court of appeals.)
Sometimes the replacement justice even authored the opinion for the court.518
See supra note 359.
Governor Bush’s ﬁrst appointments director, Clay Johnson, later headed the White House
Oﬃce of Presidential Personnel under President Bush, and then served as Deputy Director of the
Oﬃce of Management and Budget. Telephone Interview with Ron Bellamy, former Appointments
Dir. for Governor Bush (August 23, 2015) (on ﬁle with author).
514 Telephone Interview with Stephen Ables, Judge, Tex. 6th Admin. Jud. Region (Aug. 31,
2015) (on ﬁle with author).
515 Id.
516 Id.
517 Id.
518 Justice Jim Moseley, then a member of the Dallas-based court of appeals, authored a
plurality opinion in St. Joseph’s Hosp. v. Wolﬀ, 94 S.W.3d 514 (Tex. 2003). The Texas Supreme Court
experienced frenetic turnover in the early 2000s (ten new justices from 2000 to 2005), and was
actually decided with eight justices, as the opinion explains:
512
513

After the case was argued and while it was under submission, Justice Gonzales and
Justice Abbott resigned from the Court. Justice Rodriguez, who was appointed to
replace Justice Abbott, recused himself from participation in the decision of the case.
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c. Governor Rick Perry (2000–2015): Sixteen Appointees in Nine Cases
Rick Perry, the longest-serving Governor in Texas history, also holds the
record for most number of substitute justices appointed: sixteen in nine cases
(four cases in 2008 alone).519 Fourteen of the sixteen appointees were court
of appeals justices, and two were district court judges.
As during the Bush and Clements governorships, Governor Perry relied
exclusively on his appointments director. When it came to naming permanent
Supreme Court justices, Governor Perry’s appointments director assembled
a team of people, including lawyers outside the Governor’s Oﬃce, to help
interview top candidates. But when naming temporary, one-case-only
justices, the appointments oﬃce handled it solo.
The appointments oﬃces under Governors Clements and Bush were not
led by lawyers. That changed during Governor Perry’s tenure, when
appointments were led by lawyer Ken Anderson (who had also served as
deputy appointments director for Governor Clements). And Anderson did
not consult with gubernatorial staﬀ outside the appointments oﬃce. “I
handled judicial appointments myself,” Anderson says.520 There was no real
interview process and no attempt to plumb a candidate’s thoughts on the case,
which Anderson says would be “highly improper.”521
Interviews with Governor Perry’s two appointments directors reveal a
process focused on administrative nuts and bolts, such as avoiding recusal
issues, not on trying to steer the result a certain way. “We tried to figure out
where the case was from so we wouldn’t appoint judges with a conflict,” said
Anderson.522 “We tried to move them around geographically, tending to prefer
urban areas, where you’d have judges who’ve heard more sophisticated cases.”523
When the ﬁrst request arrived from the court for a substitute justice,
Anderson had to ﬁrst go back and refresh his recollection on the statute.
Governor Clements’s sole substitute appointee, in 1988, had been a lawyer,
but the statute was amended in 1995. “I discovered it had been changed to
require a sitting judge,” Anderson says.524
What criteria did Governor Perry’s oﬃce use?

Chief Justice Phillips certiﬁed that fact to the Governor, who thereupon commissioned
to the Court the Honorable James A. “Jim” Moseley, Justice of the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth District of Texas at Dallas, to participate in deciding the case.
Id. at 519 n.10.
519 See supra note 358.
520 Telephone Interview with Ken Anderson (Aug. 20, 2015) (on ﬁle with author).
521 Id.
522 Id.
523 Id.
524 Id.
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We looked for folks who actually would’ve been good Supreme Court justices—
the best and the brightest. We didn’t read briefs, but we explored what the case
involved big picture. In a utility case, for example, we would look for someone
who likes to dig into the weeds because it’ll require a lot of homework.525

Anderson says they did not try to inﬂuence the case outcome, an
“improper” impulse in his view:
We didn’t try to tip the scales in a big way. That could come back to bite the
Governor in the behind and put potential appointees in a pickle.
Philosophical distinctions are not all that huge. It was more what were their
backgrounds. I tried to diversify the Court in terms of background
experience. They were all conservatives in a legal sense. We just tried to get
someone smart and conservative.526

Anderson says he has “no real misgivings” about the Texas procedure,
though he concedes there’s “no perfect mechanism.”527 In that sense, he says,
it’s akin to judicial selection, where every system has pros and cons. “Clements
and Perry viewed judicial appointments seriously,” says Anderson, adding,
“Their only priority was to appoint a smart, conservative judge.”528 Anderson
has no recollection of anyone reaching out or suggesting names or lobbying
for someone, though he says after Governor Perry began appointing substitute
justices, “judges would approach me and volunteer to be appointed.”529
How do Governor Perry’s substitute appointees recount the experience?
Former Justice Jim Moseley of the Dallas-based court of appeals described
his selection for the Wolﬀ case this way:
I was talking to Ken [the appointments director] about other issues, and near
the end he said, “Occasionally, we have to appoint a temporary justice. Would
that be something you’d be interested in?” It was just a question in the
abstract. But Ken called months later and asked if I’d be interested in sitting
in this case or had any conﬂicts. They wanted someone not from Austin or
Houston, which as I recall is where the parties were from. The Court had
already had argument. We met in the conference room, discussed the case,
and reached a tentative vote. I got the strong impression the case had been
around the horn once or twice.530

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Telephone Interview with Jim Moseley, former Just., Sup. Ct. Tex. (Sept. 10, 2015) (on ﬁle
with author).
525
526
527
528
529
530
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Justice Moseley isn’t a fan of disclosing the case to the Governor. “A better
option,” he says, “is to just inform the Governor there’s a need for an
appointment, and then run the choice by the chief justice for conﬂicts. That
way you preserve anonymity and protect separation of powers.”531
2. Strategic Selection—A Targeted Focus on the Issues Raised and Who
Might Lean a Preferred Direction; “The Judicial Version of a Fantasy
Football Draft”: Governor Greg Abbott (2015–present)
Texas’s newest Governor has yet to appoint a substitute justice. But
interviews with his key executive personnel make clear that Governor
Abbott—a former Texas Supreme Court justice and attorney general—would
approach the responsibility much diﬀerently, and more strategically, than his
non-lawyer predecessors.
Governors Clements, Bush, and Perry relied exclusively on their
appointments directors when naming substitute justices. Governor Abbott,
by contrast, would be far more engaged personally and would consult a wider
circle of executive-team advisers (chief of staﬀ, deputy chief of staﬀ, general
counsel), all top-tier lawyers who served in senior staﬀ roles alongside him at
the attorney general’s oﬃce. These savvy and versatile lawyers, including
federal appellate and SCOTUS clerks, boast a sophisticated understanding
of the judicial branch generally and the court’s docket speciﬁcally.
When asked how Governor Abbott’s team might handle a request for a
tiebreaking justice, his appointments director, Luis Saenz, laughed, “It would
be the biggest pow-wow,” he said, joking, “We’re talking fantasy football draft.
Eye black. Calisthenics. People banging their heads into lockers.”532 Saenz says
they would examine the case to assess whose background might “fit the case.”533
Governor Abbott’s former general counsel Jimmy Blacklock, who now
serves as a Texas Supreme Court justice, conﬁrms that Governor Abbott
“would take it really seriously.”534 In fact, a lawyer from the general counsel’s
oﬃce is assigned to every judicial vacancy and plays “a big role in the judicial
selection process.”535 Governor Abbott and his Chief of Staﬀ, a 15-year Abbott
veteran and former Number Two in the Attorney General’s Oﬃce, “would
take it as seriously as anybody could.”536
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Now Justice Blacklock explained that the Governor’s Oﬃce would “want
to know everything we possibly could about the case and the record,” which
would help them select the right jurist to assist the court in making an
expeditious, principled decision.537 Certainly “we’d ask what are the
Governor’s interests in the outcome and in the direction the case might take
the law. These cases have broad implications.”538 As with any gubernatorial
decision, including permanent vacancies to be ﬁlled, the Governor’s “view of
the case would matter.”539 Ultimately, this role was not one any Governor
demanded, but one given to all Governors by the People. “The Texas
Constitution is written to vest power in the governor to select a tiebreaker.
Our Framers were comfortable with him exercising this power.”540
Texans elect their judges, but vacancies are ﬁlled by the Governor. And
since taking oﬃce, Governor Abbott’s team has overhauled the judicial
nominee application in order to get a better read on applicants’ judicial
philosophies. The then general counsel (who later succeeded this author on
the Supreme Court of Texas) describes it as “60-70% the same as Perry, but
it now has seven to eight pointed questions about judicial philosophy.”541
Indeed, Governor Abbott’s hands-on approach to judicial nominations long
predates his election as Governor. While serving on the Texas Supreme
Court, then Justice Abbott volunteered to help vet lower-court judicial
nominees from the Houston area for Governor Perry.
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